Energy Policy

Lord Hunt of Chesterton: asked Her Majesty's Government:
	Whether, in the course of revising their energy policies, they will take into account the policies of the French Parliament (law 2005–781) which emphasise the need for both renewable and nuclear energy so as to safeguard self-sufficiency, the environment and competition.

Lord Sainsbury of Turville: My Lords, on 27 September, the Prime Minister announced that the Government would publish proposals on energy policy next year in the light of our continuing commitment to tackling climate change, preserving reliable supplies of energy and maintaining competitive markets. We remain committed to the energy White Paper goals, but in developing our proposals we will consider a wide range of options, including civil nuclear power.

Lord Hunt of Chesterton: My Lords, I thank the Minister for his helpful reply. But does he agree that in order to give a clear answer about nuclear energy in the UK uncertainty about dealing with long-term nuclear waste will need to be overcome? Why are Her Majesty's Government not supporting more strongly the programmes of the International Atomic Energy Agency that are seeking new techniques for this purpose?

Lord Sainsbury of Turville: My Lords, I totally agree that solving the issue of nuclear waste, as the Prime Minister made clear, is central to this matter. The work that the International Atomic Energy Agency is doing is quite distant in terms of its impact. We support work on issues such as partitioning and transmutation through EURATOM.

Lord Redesdale: My Lords, if one of the options that the Minister described in the new energy strategy is to be renewables, how much will the DTI be spending on wave power, because the money spent to date is a paltry sum and will not kick start that industry into a sustainable industry?

Lord Sainsbury of Turville: My Lords, this Question is clearly about whether we will be copying the French. I do not know what the French view on tidal energy is. However, as the noble Lord knows, we are supporting all the renewable forms of energy with considerable sums of money. In fact, through the renewables obligation, this will reach nearly £1 billion a year by 2010.

Lord Richard: My Lords, does my noble friend agree that we seem to have been waiting an awfully long time for this particular White Paper? Would he be kind enough to take back to his colleagues in the Government the feeling in all quarters of this House that it is time that it appeared?

Lord Sainsbury of Turville: My Lords, I remind noble Lords that there was a White Paper in 2003. In that we said that we would review the matter at regular intervals. It is but a couple of months since the Prime Minister said that we would have one of these reviews and it is not usual for a White Paper to come out within two months of the Prime Minister suggesting that there might be one. We will be announcing the terms of reference shortly.

Baroness Miller of Hendon: My Lords, in a reply to me on 15 March the Minister said that,
	"the initiative for bringing forward proposals to construct new plant lies with the market".—[Official Report, 15/3/05; col. WA128.]
	What is Her Majesty's Government's reaction to the interest recently expressed by EDF and others in building new nuclear power stations? Will the Government now, at last, actively support and encourage these initiatives? The Minister would please me if he answered "yes" or "no".

Lord Sainsbury of Turville: My Lords, I will not remotely fall into the trap of saying either "yes" or "no". That would be an appalling prospect for a budding politician. Some interest is now being shown. The point of the review is to establish what our policy response to that show of interest will be.

Lord Taylor of Blackburn: My Lords, how many Section 36 notices have been granted and how many of them are likely to be taken up?

Lord Sainsbury of Turville: My Lords, if I had the faintest clue what Section 36 was I would do my best to answer the question. However, I will find out and let the noble Lord know.
	(13)

Baroness O'Cathain: My Lords, following on from the question of the noble Lord, Lord Richard, about a White Paper, there was a White Paper in 2003, two years ago. However, at the end of the debate on energy in your Lordships' House on 27 October, I specifically asked the Minister to tell us when we were likely to get policies rather than proposals. We do not want proposals: we just want policies and it looks as though policies could be another three or four years off. He has still not written to me and I would like to know when I will get a reply.

Lord Sainsbury of Turville: My Lords, we will issue the terms of reference shortly. We have said that we will produce the White Paper during next year, and out of that will come clear policies for what we will do.

Lord Corbett of Castle Vale: My Lords, as to the renewables sector, has my noble friend seen reports in today's newspaper of a nationwide survey of wind, which confirms that Britain has the best wind output, as it were, anywhere in Europe?

Noble Lords: In this House?

Lord Corbett of Castle Vale: My Lords, not including this House. Even better news is that the peak winds arrive exactly to match peak electricity demands. Would it not make more sense to redouble the investment that we are putting into the development of offshore and onshore wind power and to steam ahead with tidal and wave power?

Lord Sainsbury of Turville: My Lords, it is true that we have the best wind in Europe. That is agreed by all experts. But, as I said before in this House, it is not a case of pursuing one technology alone. We are clearly agreed that to ensure that you have a diversity of energy resources is almost the most important requirement of an energy policy.

Lord Crickhowell: My Lords, is it not really rather important that we take account of the policies of the French Parliament, as we already use a great deal of electricity from France that is generated by nuclear power—and, if the policies of Her Majesty's Government fail, we shall probably have to use even more French nuclear power?

Lord Sainsbury of Turville: My Lords, in these circumstances it is always sensible to consider the policies of other countries to see whether one can learn anything from them. However, in this particular case, we shall leave it to the review group to decide whether there are lessons to be learnt from the French experience.

Baroness Carnegy of Lour: My Lords, have the Government studied why the people of France are perfectly happy to build an increasing number of nuclear power stations? They are still doing it, are very happy to do it and seem to have no problems with worrying about danger. Have the Government studied why that is, and are they going to learn the lessons from that?

Lord Sainsbury of Turville: My Lords, I do not believe that any study has been done on that, but it is an interesting fact that countries that do not have their own indigenous sources of energy tend to have a much greater enthusiasm for nuclear. The two obvious examples of that are France and Japan, and the reasons are obvious—that if you are reliant on sources from other countries, there is a real issue of energy security. Therefore, those countries are much keener to have nuclear, because they believe that it gives them energy security.

Prison Estate: Biometrics

The Earl of Northesk: asked Her Majesty's Government:
	Whether biometric-based security systems have been deployed anywhere within the United Kingdom prison estate; and, if so, with what results.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: My Lords, biometric systems are used in all Northern Ireland prisons and in 34 prisons in England and Wales. The prime objectives are to deter and detect prisoners swapping identities with visitors in order to escape and to identify banned visitors. Success has been reported in identifying banned visitors attempting to enter prisons. There have been no identity swap escapes in prison using those systems. Information relating to the Scottish prisons is a matter for the Scottish Executive.

The Earl of Northesk: My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for that reply. While I acknowledge that the prison estate in Scotland is the responsibility of the Scottish Executive, is it not the case that a fingerprint recognition system was installed at Glenochil high security prison? Is it not also the case that, within short order of it having been installed, inmates had spoofed and circumvented the system and gained access to all parts of the prison—even to the extent, as some prison staff have suggested, of settling old scores?

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: My Lords, I am afraid I can make no comment on that. In all the prisons in England, Wales and Northern Ireland where these systems have been put in, they have worked remarkably well and we have had no escapes at all.

Lord Strathclyde: My Lords, surely the Minister can confirm whether my noble friend's version of events north of the Border is true. She must know that it would be helpful to the House if she were able to confirm it or not.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: My Lords, I am sorry to say I do not have any details about that matter. I am more than happy to check and write to the noble Lord, but there is nothing in my briefing to indicate that biometrics of this sort has caused any difficulty, although most of that briefing is on Northern Ireland, England and Wales.

Lord Dholakia: My Lords, has the Minister given any thought to the cost of biometric ID cards, particularly as this affects prisoners and claimants, and who is likely to meet this cost?

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: My Lords, biometric ID cards will relate to any citizen who seeks to apply for them, so there will be no different provisions for those who are in prison. This Question deals with the extent to which we are using biometric data to monitor those who go into and out of prison and who are within prison. As I have said, we have recently been using biometric identifiers to very good effect.

The Countess of Mar: My Lords, if what the noble Earl has said is correct, is it not an indication that the Scots, as usual, are ahead of the English?

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: My Lords, it would be quite invidious for me to comment on whether prisoners and officers in England, Wales and Northern Ireland are intrinsically more honourable than elsewhere across the Border. I would be loath to say that.

Lord Elton: My Lords, which characteristics are the biometric measurements taken from? Are they just thumbprints or fingerprints? Is this the same range of characteristics as is intended to be employed for the future identity card scheme?

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: My Lords, various schemes are currently in place. Seven prisons use fingerprint biometrics, 15 prisons use fingerprint and photo biometrics, 10 prisons use single fingerprints alone and two prisons use hand geometry. A mixture of biometrics is used, depending on the level of security and the needs of the particular prison establishment.

Lord Skelmersdale: My Lords, while I accept that the Minister has nothing in her brief about the situation in Scotland, what my noble friend was asking about, as I understand it, was the biometric operation of door locks between various parts of an individual prison estate, which have been circumvented by prisoners. Do such door locks occur in England, Wales or Northern Ireland?

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: My Lords, from the information I have, there has been no difficulty; the difficulty experienced before the introduction of biometric identifiers has been resolved. For instance, in a number of prisons in Northern Ireland, staff use a palm identifier to get in and out of certain areas, which has greatly enhanced security. It has also reduced costs, because no more passes have had to be produced. People have found it extremely useful, which is one of the reasons we are looking at this more closely with regard to roll-out.

Court Fees

Lord Ackner: asked Her Majesty's Government:
	Whether, since 1992, they have sought the approval of Parliament for their decision to recover from litigants in civil cases the full costs of the proceedings, including, inter alia, the provision of judges' salaries and pensions and court buildings; and, if so, when and how.

Lord Falconer of Thoroton: My Lords, it has been the policy of successive governments, at least since the 1920s, that the costs of court administration in civil cases should be defrayed by litigants' fees. Over time, the range of costs taken into account when setting fees has varied. In 1992, the government of the day decided that, in line with general government fee-charging policy, court fees in civil cases should be set to reflect the full cost of providing the service, with the exception of those areas where there is some subsidy. That meant including, for the first time, the salaries of the full-time senior judiciary—circuit judges and above—paid direct from the Consolidated Fund. That decision was not subject to consultation.

Lord Ackner: My Lords, I have three questions for my noble and learned friend. They grow progressively shorter—the last one is very short indeed. First, does the noble and learned Lord the Lord Chancellor recall that the former Lord Chief Justice and the current Lord Chief Justice, both acting on behalf of the Civil Justice Council and the civil justice review, raised strong objections to the civil courts making that recovery on two grounds: first, there was a failure to recognise the collective benefit in the administration of civil justice and, secondly, it seriously weakened access to justice?
	Secondly, does the Minister recall the decision of the Divisional Court in 1998—Queen's Bench 575, Queen v. Lord Chancellor, Ex parte Witham—in which, in a very full reserved judgment, Mr Justice Laws said:
	"Access to the courts is a constitutional right; it can only be denied by the government if it persuades Parliament to pass legislation which specifically—in effect by express provision—permits the executive to turn people away from the court door"?
	My final question—

Lord Grocott: My Lords, with respect, the Companion says that noble Lords should ask two questions. We should now move on and hear the two answers.

Lord Falconer of Thoroton: My Lords, on the first question, whether I recall what the Lord Chief Justice and the former Lord Chief Justice said: yes, I do. The issue that has to be addressed is a balance between charging those who use the civil courts reasonable fees and ensuring that those who cannot afford them are not denied access to justice. We seek to do that by having reasonable levels of fees and, at the same time, providing subsidy for people who would otherwise not be able to come to court. We are consulting on increases in court fees and those very issues will be considered in the course of the consultation. Secondly, do I recall the case in 1998? Yes, I do.

Lord Goodhart: My Lords, the Question concerns parliamentary scrutiny. The principle that court fees should be subject to parliamentary scrutiny, at least in limited cases, was recognised by Section 92 of the Courts Act 2003. Is it not now time that that principle was made of general application, particularly in view of the fact that excessive court fees are a serious threat to access to justice?

Lord Falconer of Thoroton: My Lords, a balance has to be struck. There should be widespread consultation; there should be complete openness on proposals to increase fees. Ultimately, the principle has been established that where a party has used the civil courts—for example, a large commercial organisation—there is nothing wrong in principle in charging it for that.

Lord Ackner: My Lords, perhaps I may squeak in my third question. Why has Parliament been given no opportunity to debate this matter?

Lord Falconer of Thoroton: My Lords, there is currently consultation in relation to whether, and if so by how much, the fees should be raised. It is only after that consultation that the question of parliamentary scrutiny would arise.

Home Improvements

Lord Ezra: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question standing in my name on the Order Paper. In so doing I declare a long-standing interest in the National Home Improvement Council.
	The Question was as follows:
	To ask Her Majesty's Government what steps they are taking to encourage home improvements in the private housing sector.

Baroness Andrews: My Lords, the Government have a range of provisions to drive improvements in the private housing sector. These include resources for private sector renewal, housing market renewal pathfinders and Warm Front, which are aimed at renewal of housing stock and improving standards of decency in the private sector. The Housing Act 2004 also contains a large number of provisions which will help improve housing standards, particularly in the private rented sector.

Lord Ezra: My Lords, is the noble Baroness aware that there are more than 5 million homes, or 30 per cent of the total private housing stock, classified as non-decent under the Government's own classification, and that the bulk of these are deficient in adequate heating and insulation? Will the noble Baroness indicate how soon the Government intend to put right this glaring deficiency? Will she give an assurance that if householders decide to improve their homes, and particularly their heating arrangements, they will not be penalised when council tax is eventually revalued?

Baroness Andrews: My Lords, I recognise the noble Lord's expertise in this area. It is very important to recognise that the majority of fuel poor people are in the private sector. The noble Lord is right to say that it is a challenge to ensure that people have decent insulation and heating. We have made very good progress. We have set a target regarding non-decent homes in the private sector of up to 70 per cent by 2010. We have already exceeded targets—from 43 per cent up to 63 per cent between 1996 and 2003. The noble Lord asked me how hard we will work and how fast we can make better progress. He will perhaps know that the Warm Front programme, which is vital to private sector homes, has been expanded from June this year. We have put in another £140 million for the next three years. We are targeting it more effectively and we want to make sure that it reaches the most vulnerable. I assure the noble Lord that when we complete our revaluation of council tax noble Lords will be well pleased.

Lord Renton: My Lords, do the Government bear in mind that home improvements vary tremendously? Some are luxurious and unnecessary whereas others are perhaps considered necessary, but the owner cannot afford them. Will the Government therefore give an undertaking not to enforce home improvements on those landlords who cannot afford them?

Baroness Andrews: My Lords, there is a range of help available to people who want to improve their homes through local authorities—£230 million in grants and loans was made available this year—and through programmes such as Warm Front. Landlords can apply for help. We hope that good landlords will do so. Under the Housing Act 2004 we made provision to protect people in rented accommodation in multiple occupation where conditions are often very poor indeed. We have changed the system to require licensing for people at risk. I hope that the noble Lord approves of that.

Lord Clarke of Hampstead: My Lords—

Baroness Trumpington: My Lords—

Noble Lords: This side.

Baroness Trumpington: My Lords, I do not see anyone.

Lord Clarke of Hampstead: My Lords, is my noble friend aware of the report published this week by Elevate, the programme of housing improvements—among other things—in the north-west? Will she join me in saying how pleased she is that it has made such great progress in such a short time turning some people's very poor accommodation into decent living standards, and wish it well for the next part of its programme?

Baroness Andrews: My Lords, I am delighted to have the House's attention drawn to that report. I certainly do what the noble Lord suggests.

Baroness Trumpington: My Lords, from what the Minister said am I to assume that the Government are in favour of improving old terraced housing rather than pulling it down and putting up brand new housing in places where people have no wish to have extra housing?

Baroness Andrews: My Lords, the noble Baroness has interpreted me correctly. I think she is talking about the Housing Market Renewal Programme. By next March we are planning to deliver 21,000 refurbished homes and 3,000 new homes; 10,000 houses will be demolished as part of that programme. The emphasis is on refurbishment; demolition is never the first or only option. If it is an option we require that the people who are affected should be properly and fully consulted because it is a very serious decision for them.

Lord Haskel: My Lords—

Baroness Howe of Idlicote: My Lords—

Noble Lords: Cross Bench!

Baroness Howe of Idlicote: My Lords, given what I know is the Government's commitment to a sustainable approach to house-building and design, what percentage of UK homes have so far been fitted with water-saving, two-flush lavatory systems? Do the Government have plans to encourage all homes to adopt this kind of system?

Baroness Andrews: My Lords, I have an extensive brief, but strangely enough I do not have that figure. I could probably give the noble Baroness a number of equally interesting figures, but I shall have to write to her about that one.
	The point about sustainability is that we are bringing forward for consultation a code on sustainable buildings, which will be in place next year. It will look at improving elements of sustainability in houses, not just energy but certainly water and use of materials. We are seriously committed to sustainability and there is a great deal of work in hand.

Baroness Hanham: My Lords, in view of the fact that energy efficiency will be part of the declaration in the home information packs when people sell their private homes, what financial support is or will be available for people to improve energy efficiency before they are required to submit a report saying what it is?

Baroness Andrews: My Lords, the noble Baroness will know that the Warm Front programme, of which I have spoken, is not least a carbon saving programme. Essentially it directs vulnerable people towards all sorts of insulation. Under our Energy Efficiency Commitment we also have arrangements with suppliers to direct consumers towards products that reduce energy consumption. There is a great deal of work being done in this area, and I shall write to the noble Baroness listing the different initiatives that are in place.

Baroness Scott of Needham Market: My Lords, is the noble Baroness aware that in the north of England many properties remain empty because potential buyers on low incomes cannot get mortgages for the purpose of refurbishment? Will she undertake to talk to the mortgage lenders to see whether joint working between the Government and the industry could prevent demolition?

Baroness Andrews: My Lords, we certainly want to work across the HMRP areas with all forms of partnership. In terms of low-cost housing we are developing products to enable shared equity schemes. If the noble Baroness has identified a particular problem, I should be interested to know about it in more detail.

Lord Haskel: My Lords, my noble friend has told us what assistance is available to houses in the private sector. Is that same assistance available in the social housing sector? What assistance is available in that sector?

Baroness Andrews: My Lords, when we came into government we inherited a stock of millions of social homes, which needed about £19 billion worth of repairs and investment to bring them up to a decent standard. We have made a major commitment to decent housing in the social rented sector. Since then, local authorities have invested more than £16 billion, and a further £6.5 billion has been brought in from the private sector. We have reduced the number of non-decent homes by more than one million, and in June this year we announced a further 61 schemes, which involve a further 34 local authorities and a further £3 billion investment. We have made restoring all those homes, which were in shocking condition in 1997, a major priority. Many people in that sector are living more satisfactory lives as a result.

Lord Brooke of Sutton Mandeville: My Lords, I declare an interest as president of the National Home Improvement Council, in which I had the privilege of succeeding the noble Lord, Lord Ezra. Does the Minister contemplate revisiting the subject of climate change in the light of the widely admired debate initiated in your Lordships' House on Thursday by the noble Lord, Lord May of Oxford?

Baroness Andrews: My Lords, it was an excellent debate. I can confirm that we are seriously attending to the target that we have set ourselves of a 20 per cent reduction in energy consumption by households by 2010. The Building Regulations Part (l) amendments that will come into effect on 6 April 2006 will mean that householders in new dwellings will on average produce about 20 per cent less carbon dioxide as a result of reduced energy consumption on space heating, water and lighting. Indeed we have recently set up a review of our housing stock of 22 million dwellings to look at ways in which we can encourage and enable better forms of energy saving in those homes.

Lord Ezra: My Lords, have the Government given any further consideration to the reduction of VAT on home improvement, bearing in mind that eight other EU countries have successfully introduced such a measure? Nearer home, it has also been working successfully in the Isle of Man.

Baroness Andrews: My Lords, I know that this is of interest on the Liberal Benches, but such a broad-based reduced rate for all domestic repair work would not be efficient or well targeted. We have chosen to introduce more targeted reduced rates in support of regeneration and domestic energy efficiency objectives, such as residential conversions that create new homes through the better use of existing housing stock and the renovation of housing that has been empty. I am afraid that I will have to disappoint the noble Lord at the moment.

Children and Adoption Bill [HL]

Report received.

Baroness Morris of Bolton: moved Amendment No. 1:
	Before Clause 1, insert the following new clause—
	"PRESUMPTION IN FAVOUR OF CO-PARENTING
	"CO-PARENTING
	After section 1(1) of the Children Act 1989 (c. 41) (welfare of the child) insert—
	"(1A) In respect of subsection (1)(a) the court shall, unless a good reason to the contrary be shown, act on the presumption that a child's welfare is best served through residence with his parents and, if his parents are not living together, through sole residence with one parent or shared residence with both of them and through both of them being as fully and equally involved in his parenting as possible.""

Baroness Morris of Bolton: My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Ashton, for the full and frank meeting that we had last week; I am especially grateful to her for the mountain of extra reading that she provided. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, for his detailed letters following Committee stage. With Amendments Nos. 1 and 8, we return to the lively and important debate that we had in Committee. Our Amendment No. 18 addresses the crucial importance to children of their extended family.
	"Both parents are equal and both should continue to have a meaningful relationship with their children following separation, so long as it is safe and in the child's best interests".
	Those are not my words but the view expressed by the Government in their Green Paper on parental separation. Yet the reality for too many parents is that they face too many battles within our family law system to achieve the positive outcomes that they so desperately want for their children. That was never the intention of the Children Act 1989. In his opening speech on that Bill in your Lordships' House in December 1988, my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern, in his valued role of Lord Chancellor, said:
	"The Bill will, in particular, establish a framework of rights and responsibilities with which to see that children in need receive the care, upbringing and protection they require, and that parents and others with an interest in the child can play a full part in those crucially important decisions".—[Official Report, 6/12/88; col. 496.]
	The intention of the Bill was to take the rancour out of proceedings and to encourage both parents to share in their children's upbringing even after separation or divorce. But as I said in Committee, over the weeks and months since Second Reading we have built up a picture of an outdated family law system that leaves the impression that if you get the best lawyer you can have the house, keep the kids and airbrush the non-resident parent out of your life. Many professionals in the family law world now think that the pendulum has swung too far. So we have retabled our amendment on the legal presumption of co-parenting. I can fully understand why there is anxiety at that. There is a concern to prevent any weakening of the fundamental principle that a child's welfare will be the paramount consideration. Not only do we understand, but we share that anxiety and it is not our intention to weaken that fundamental principle in what we propose.
	What we propose is entirely consistent with that paramount consideration. Our amendment springs from our belief that where safety is not an issue, a child has a right to a full and meaningful relationship with both his or her parents. My noble friend Lord Howe and I would not stand here and move our amendments on co-parenting and reasonable contact if we thought for one moment that we were putting one child in danger. It is for that reason that the safety side of this debate is so crucial and why we have tabled a robust amendment on this issue.
	Amendment No. 1 is also about the responsibilities of a non-resident parent. A good and loving parent is no less that after the breakdown of a relationship and separation. A good and loving parent is therefore entitled to the fullest possible part in the upbringing of his or her child. Such a parent is entitled to the knowledge, the hope and the security that this amendment would bring—that there is a presumption that he or she will be able to discharge their parental responsibilities toward their children, a presumption enshrined in statute, and in a way which would require a court in each case to give clear reasons why a parent is to be restricted or denied the exercise of parental responsibility. We cannot see how this is, or should be, controversial.
	Clearly the presumption which we propose would be displaced if a contrary reason was shown. I shall take an extreme example. No one would suggest that a persistent and physically or mentally abusive parent would enjoy substantial, or indeed any, contact. In such a case, the safety of the child is a real issue. The very behaviour of such an inadequate parent could of course amount to a contrary reason. The behaviour of such a parent would demonstrate an inability to exercise parental responsibility, which would either restrict or deny that parent any involvement in parenting.
	While we say that our amendment should not be controversial it clearly is. There are those who think that we want to tear children down the middle. As the Minister stated in Grand Committee,
	"calling for a presumption of full and equal involvement by both parents in the upbringing of their children after separation undermined the paramountcy principle".—[Official Report, 11/10/05; col. GC 7.]
	I will repeat what I said at Second Reading and in Grand Committee. Co-parenting is not equal parenting in the way the Minister continually seeks to describe it. We do not see children as a possession to be shared out like a record collection. This amendment simply recognises the benefit to a child of a meaningful relationship with both his parents. This is a fundamental right of the child.
	There are other benefits too. As I was driving to the House last Monday, throughout the morning Radio Five Live was broadcasting a piece about the failure of the Child Support Agency. As I heard the piece for about the fourth time, I could not help thinking that if parents were obliged to maintain some link for the sake of their children then financial problems might not be quite so bad. Later that day, while researching something for this Bill, I came across an article from 27 January 2004 on the Times online. It was an interview with David Levy, president of the United States Children's Rights Council who was over here to discuss shared parenting. He said that the benefits of shared parenting were not just in fewer costly disputes going to court, but in increased child support payments and the Consensus Bureau statistics showed that fathers with shared parenting rights paid twice the amount that fathers with no contact do.
	There are also controversies about the amendment. Others ask why we press on with it when, within the present statutory framework, a court is able to—and courts do—take account of all parties including the non-resident parent. Why muddy the waters with the amendment? We all know that, when relationships break down, there is often bitterness—even hatred—between fundamentally decent people who carry the scars of emotional battles, will not forget, and all too often cannot bring themselves to acknowledge that their former husband, wife or partner should have any contact with their children. Any child is not only entitled to the fullest possible access to each parent, whatever the residual bitterness between them, but to each child's family—to feel a full part of that family. That is a privilege that should not be lightly denied.
	A separated parent should not have to prove a right to contact, nor have to prove to a court's satisfaction the extent of that contact. Parents accepted as fit—as good and loving parents—during their relationship do not, whatever the issues between them, become unfit on separation. The amendment recognises that and requires as full and equal an involvement in parenting as possible. It is only if that presumption is displaced on the balance of probabilities that, in the interests of the child, a parent will be denied responsibility for the upbringing of the child. That is right and fair. The principle demands statutory force, to the mutual benefit of children and their separating parents. The signal will be clear. The best parent for a child is both parents.
	We have tabled Amendment No. 8 because it is important that the contact that a child has with both his parents is not only reasonable—my noble friend Lord Howe will talk about that shortly—but frequent and continuous. I cited the case in Committee of a mother who, despite being in receipt of two contact orders, had been to court 35 times and spent £70,000, but still did not see her sons. After such a gap, she fully realises that the judge will have to possess the wisdom of Solomon. A recent IPPR pamphlet, Daddy Dearest?, cites research that shows that contact needs to be designed in such a way that father and child regularly experience a range of activities together—bedtimes, mealtimes, watching TV, doing homework, trips out, "hanging" in, and visiting friends and family. All that is important because, once a parent is disempowered, the links begin to unravel.
	That leads me to Amendment No. 18 on the desirability of contact between the child and his extended family in the absence of good reason to the contrary. The group that we really have in mind is grandparents. At Second Reading, I described them as,
	"unpaid childminder, cook, taxi driver, nurse, marriage guidance counsellor and overdraft facility. And yet, overnight, their relationship with a much cherished grandchild can be ended".—[Official Report, 29/6/05; col. 255.]
	They are the innocent party in the whole proceedings. A project funded by the Department of Health between 1996 and 1999 called Care and Family Life in Later Childhood found that grandparents emerged as important figures. They were considered by children to be important in symbolic, practical and expressive ways. Children also held their aunts and uncles in high regard, especially their blood-related ones. The family is the most immediate and important group within which people share responsibility for one another's well-being. It is the very foundation for the good and just society that we all desire.
	It is time for the rhetoric to stop. We need radically to reshape our family law system. We need to effect a culture change in attitudes to parenting, and to use legislation to send an important signal that extended families matter, and that the best parent for a child is both parents. I beg to move.

Baroness Walmsley: My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment Nos. 11 and 12 in my name in this group. First, I will not be in a position to support the amendments of the official Opposition in this group today. That is not because I do not think it is highly desirable to have a sensible and clear definition in statute of the fact that children should have reasonable contact with both their parents. It is a good idea to have something very clear. If a couple go into their solicitor's office and say, "What does the law say about this?", the solicitor will not be able to easily demonstrate what the law says about it if he has to refer to half a dozen law books and pull down several cases, which is what the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, appeared to be suggesting in Committee. It is much better if we have a clear statute so that people can understand what the law says. The very fact that you have case law does not preclude putting something clear in statute. After all, there was an offence of theft long before theft was clearly defined in statute. Unfortunately, we do not live in an ideal world. In an ideal world I would be able to support amendments like my own and vote on them, and like some of those of the official Opposition today. But we do not live in an ideal world and in real politics one sometimes has to prioritise.
	Unfortunately, the issues about child safety will be debated later today. My priority is the welfare of the child—to protect and make sure children are safe. My second priority is to get dissenting couples out of the courts and agreeing with each other; to fulfil their responsibility as parents together by agreement; and to remember that they may not be married any longer but that they are still parents and the child's interests must come first. That is my second priority and that is why I shall be promoting our amendments on mediation very strongly.
	My third priority is to get something into statute, which does not have the danger of overcoming the presumption that the child's welfare has to have absolute primacy. So, I will not support Amendment No. 1, even though about a year ago in the House of Commons, my honourable friends in another place were able to support an amendment to the Children Bill. Unfortunately, a very paltry amount of time was given to that amendment, as so often happens in another place. My honourable friend, the Member for Somerton and Frome, said:
	"It is a great shame that we do not have sufficient time to explore the issue properly but in stating clearly that the child's welfare is paramount—the honourable Gentleman [Mr Dominic Grieve] has done so without equivocation, for which I am grateful—and in putting forward a proposal that one doubts will take us further than case law in terms of its effect.—[Official Report, Commons, 2/11/04; col. 233.]
	On 13 December 2004, Members of the House of Commons were able to debate at greater length another amendment put forward by the official Opposition. Again, my honourable friend, the Member for Somerton and Frome said:
	"The timing of this debate is unfortunate, as we have not yet had responses to the Green Paper, which is a serious piece of work and deserves our proper attention, and because the Select Committee on Constitutional Affairs, so ably chaired by my right hon. Friend the Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Mr. Beith), is even now taking an abundance of evidence and is yet to reach conclusions. His plea to both sides of the Chamber not to close down options until that process was complete was entirely appropriate. Sadly, it went unheard by those on both Front Benches.—[Official Report, Commons, 13/12/04; col. 1471.]
	My honourable friend went on to say that he agreed with many things in the Official Opposition's Motion. He also criticised a great many things. Ultimately, he advised his honourable friends to support it. He said:
	"I will advise my right hon. and hon. Friends to support the Conservative motion today because there is more in it that we support than we reject, notwithstanding my trenchant criticisms of some aspects of it. I will reject the Government motion because it smacks of self-congratulation and I do not believe that they have got it right".—[Official Report, Commons, 13/12/04; col. 1476.]
	My honourable friend was so hesitant because the Constitutional Affairs Select Committee was taking evidence at that time. One rather significant thing happened: the Solicitors' Family Law Association changed its position between its written evidence and its subsequent oral evidence. That was reflected in the Select Committee report published on 2 March. It stated:
	"We also received evidence from witnesses who pointed out the risks inherent in forcing separating couples to share contact in all cases, because of the prevalence of domestic violence and the risks to children".
	Initially, a statutory presumption appeared to have the backing of the Solicitors' Family Law Association, which had commented in its written evidence that it believed that there should be a statutory presumption that children should have contact with both parents post-separation unless there are reasons that militate against that, such as safety concerns. During our oral evidence session with the judiciary, difficulties were identified with that proposal. A potential compromise was identified. Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss commented:
	"we can only have one presumption that the welfare of the child is paramount. If you have two presumptions, which one takes precedence?".
	I have very much taken to heart the words of Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss. The amendments to which I shall speak in a moment are, I hope, worded in such a way that they do not take precedence over the primacy of the welfare of the child.
	The Select Committee's report continues:
	"In oral evidence from the legal profession it emerged that this compromise had support. Mr Christopher Goulden who appeared on behalf of the SFLA stated that:
	'I have to deviate slightly from the SFLA line on [the proposal for a statutory presumption]. We have had subsequent discussions about that. I do not think that that is as well put as it might have been, with all due respect to my organisation. I think a better way would be perhaps to follow what the President said which is to have it as part of the welfare check-list and then it would get over that problem of there being, as it were, two conflicting presumptions. There is nothing wrong with having a presumption which is rebuttable, as was the recommendation in our written evidence, but as long as it came in perhaps by means of being part of the welfare check-list' ".
	We will come to the welfare check-list later.
	I cannot support the amendment proposed by the Official Opposition because I believe that it is too prescriptive. My honourable friends in another place agree that our position has moved on, given the evidence and the report of the Select Committee and given what I have heard during our debates on the Bill from many concerned organisations. In an ideal world, court systems would be robust enough to protect every child. It would then be safe to put a rebuttable presumption of reasonable contact into statute.
	It is an absolute disgrace that we are not able to do the right thing today because the Government have not given proper resources to CAFCASS and have not ensured that statute on the protection of the child is as robust as it should be. I hope that noble Lords will listen carefully to the suggestions on that front to be made by the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton.
	The second reason why we cannot support Amendment No. 1 and would prefer our amendments is that we think that they are better. For example, a statutory presumption regarding the exercise of parental rights, as set out in Amendment No. 11, raises a presumption for all separating parents that they should make arrangements that enable the child to spend time and have a continuing relationship with both parents unless there is evidence that that would be contrary to the child's best interest. I ask noble Lords to notice that our amendment is rebuttable if there is evidence to the contrary. That would apply whether they agree arrangements privately, invoke mediation or go to court, but there will always be cases where the parties do not agree and end up in court. In those circumstances, it is important that the strong message from research that the welfare of children is best served by continuing to have a relationship with both parents is well understood. It has been well established in case law. The amendment strives to send that clear message in primary legislation so that it is not just embedded in case law and, as I said, inaccessible to the majority of litigants. The law would reinforce the message that parents should find a way to enable each other to remain involved with the child. Members in all parts of the House want to ensure that that happens. On that, I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Morris of Bolton. Of course, it has to be subject to any safety considerations.
	The effect of my amendment would be that those who are negotiating in the shadow of the law, whether on their own, in mediation or through negotiations with solicitors, will be clearly aware of the principle that the court will apply if they cannot reach agreement and have to invoke the jurisdiction of the court. That principle in primary legislation will also underpin the suggestions made in the guide, What to do if you can't agree, which accompanies the parenting plan and gives examples of how other parents have resolved differences in typical scenarios that arise on separation. However, the amendment does not attempt the impossible task of being prescriptive about what arrangements the court will order if it has to become involved because they necessarily vary according to the circumstances of each case, as the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, pointed out to us several times in Committee.
	I am aware that it is heresy to talk about amending Section 1 of the Children Act. However, it is not a question of amending the substance of the paramountcy principle. I would not have tabled an amendment to do that. Rather, it is a question of amplifying how the Government and the courts view child welfare when parents separate. The Act has been amended before in respect of issues that needed to be considered in relation to a child being placed for adoption, for example, by Section 1(4)(f) of the Adoption and Children Act 1989. That is why I had the temerity to suggest it today.
	Amendment No. 12 is somewhat different. It is about parental responsibility. The current publicity from fathers' groups about 50:50 parenting raises important issues. As we try to do the right thing—all noble Lords in the House are trying to do that today—those issues need to be addressed. However, in our view, the solutions are not what fathers' groups would want. It is clear that the power dynamic between the parties is frequently defined by which parent has "got" the children. It is often, but not always, the mother. If the parties have been separated for some time, the status quo of the arrangements made immediately after separation has become entrenched, which makes it difficult for parties to change the arrangements without causing further disruption to the children. None of us wants to do that. In some, but not all, cases, that can create a power imbalance between the parties when it comes to renegotiating the arrangements.
	Following the recent amendment of the Children Act 1989 by Section 111 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002, most parents will have parental responsibility for their children, but the law needs to define in statute how that parental responsibility should be exercised post-separation, so that the law encourages co-operative parenting—hence Amendment No. 12. It is inadequate to leave it to case law to define parental responsibility and how it should be exercised post-separation. The law should be clear and unambiguous to separating parents so that one cannot act unilaterally on big questions concerning the raising of the child, unless he or she is authorised to do so by the court.
	Those are the reasons why we think our approach is better. It is less prescriptive, and it allows the courts to have their prerogative of looking at the circumstances of a case. I do not intend to vote on the amendments today, because my priority is to look at what we can do to strengthen the Bill. I hope that the Government are listening carefully to the concerns that have come from all sides. The safety of the child must come first, but we must strengthen the arrangements for couples to mediate, to do it effectively and to do it before they go anywhere near the doors of the court.

Lord Northbourne: My Lords, I support the noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley: the message that we send to parents is of huge importance, and that message will not get through if it is buried in case law.
	I added my name to Amendment No. 1 because I believe in the principle that, wherever possible and safe, both parents should continue to be as fully and equally involved as possible in the parenting of their child. The object that we all want to achieve—in Grand Committee there was huge agreement about the outcomes that we wanted, although there was significant disagreement on the means whereby those outcomes were to be achieved—is that a child's family life and his trusting and loving relationship with his parents should be as little disrupted as possible. As we all know, that is most likely to happen if future parenting arrangements are worked out, where possible, amicably between the parents. In order to achieve that, not only do the courts need to be clear on what they think and what they mean, but separating parents also need to be clear about what the courts mean and what they are likely to do.
	I have one reservation on Amendment No. 1—the words "the presumption". I should like to be assured that that presumption does not in any way intrude upon the paramountcy of the welfare of the child as set out in Section 1 of the Children Act 1989. In that context, I should like to quote from the Solicitors' Family Law Association, to which the noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley, referred, because I think that it is extremely relevant. In a report dated June 2004 entitled Practical Steps to Co-Parenting, it states:
	"The Association was in favour of a legal presumption of contact for both parents, but with the proviso that the child's best interests should remain the paramount consideration in any dispute:
	'A presumption, enshrined in law, that children should have an on-going relationship with both parents unless this would not be in their best interests. This should make it crystal clear that a child's relationship with a parent is not dependent on the wishes of the other parent. The child's best interests should remain the paramount consideration in any dispute. This principle is fundamental and should not be diluted by pressures to deliver rights for either parent' ".
	That is all that I need to say on Amendment No. 1.

Baroness Howarth of Breckland: My Lords, I understand absolutely the sentiments behind the amendment. I believe that all sides of the House have the interests of children securely at heart, I simply think that we come at the issue from different positions. I shall outline why I cannot support the amendment.
	First, let us remember that we want all children to live in stable, loving families with both parents. We all want that to happen. When problems arise, we want them to have access to help that brings them back to that stability and contact when that breaks down. We want to think about the difference between safety and safeguarding. I know that we shall be talking about safety later on, but I want to talk a little about safeguarding.
	Safeguarding is to do with the whole development of the child. A presumption that a child's welfare is best served through residence with his or her parents and the concept of equal involvement in the difficult situations we are dealing with is unrealistic, unhelpful and in my view potentially dangerous. That, if you like, is at the other end of the spectrum when we are talking about safety.
	Many of the problems that I see regularly in the court do not necessarily involve reasonable adults talking about safety, but unreasonable adults. All of us can be unreasonable, so there is nothing strange about people who find themselves in such situations, when powerful emotions are evoked. The most powerful emotions can be felt when people who said that they loved each other and have had children split up and face all the difficulties involved in breaking up. Noble Lords who have had that experience will know the power of those emotions, and those who have not will know what it is like to have normal household rows and what sorts of emotions are involved.
	In such situations, we are often dealing with families who also have other difficulties. Research has shown that they are families at the end of the spectrum—not all of them, but many of them—where there are other difficulties. Let us remind ourselves that most families find a solution to contact themselves. Most families are able to find help if they actually need it. Of the ones who come to court, CAFCASS can often find ways to solve the problem before the case goes before a magistrate or judge. A number of our projects are proving extremely successful throughout the country in doing that. However, 1 per cent of cases end up with no contact, and I see many of those cases.
	The child's needs must remain paramount, and our courts and staff should put them first. The noble Baroness, Lady Morris, talked a lot about the rights of parents. Yes, I believe that parents have rights, but the matter goes above and beyond the rights of parents who have decided to separate and have got themselves into such difficulties and have not decided that sticking together for life for the sake of their children is what they intend to do—there are many families who decide to do that, and I admire them. Those rights are not the ones that we should consider. The paramount responsibility and right at that moment is the need of the child who comes before the court. As I said, I believe that the child's needs are met by contact with both parents when possible. In terms of their development, even when children are not at risk in a technical sense, there will be times when contact will be very difficult to decide on. I have had CAFCASS officers and judges distraught because they can see the need but find some cases difficult to take through.
	I should point out again that we are not talking about situations in which a contact order has been made and then broken or that we believe that the resident parent is being unreasonable. In those situations, we are dealing with the provisions about enforcement. Again, I know personally and professionally situations in which there are unreasonable parents—very often mothers but sometimes fathers—who, for their own reasons, not for the value or needs of the child, do not wish the child to see the other parent. That is when we need enforcement; that is when judges are asking us to take further action. But that relates to another part of the Bill; it does not relate to the part that we are discussing.
	A massive amount of scarce professional time, including court time, is used when judges and CAFCASS practitioners try to reason with parents who are hostile to each other. They must at the end of the day be able to focus on the one thing that matters and not be distracted by other issues such as terms like, "reasonable contact" or "the presumption of contact". We have seen in the report from Her Majesty's Inspectors that that can affect the judgment of staff—and I believe that that happens. I welcomed enormously the speech made by the noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley, whom I have always seen as a champion for children. It was heartening to hear her talking about the paramountcy of children's welfare. I hope that she does not believe that it is because of staff attitudes that there are difficulties. The staff are seriously influenced by the culture that we create legislatively, in our newspapers and for certain groups who have made their life misery. That has been the difficulty.

Baroness Walmsley: My Lords, does the noble Baroness accept that I do not so believe?

Baroness Howarth of Breckland: My Lords, I do indeed, as I know the noble Baroness too well to think otherwise. I was simply commenting on her being a children's champion.
	Over the past few weeks, I have spoken to judges, magistrates and our own staff, who all consider that such an amendment would simply lengthen the court process when we are working hard to shorten it. People would then begin to debate what was reasonable or a presumption, and we do not want that to happen; we want the court process to be shortened. I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Morris of Bolton, that if she looks more closely at the research she will see that when fathers contribute to their children, they are usually fathers who are having more contact. Contact and pay for support go together, but often the fathers who do not want to continue to pay their support are the ones that walk away. In fact, we have indications that fathers walk away because of some of the pressures of building a new family and the finances involved in all that.
	In conclusion—I recognise that it is not a Second Reading debate—I encourage us continually to keep it in mind that, unless we have the paramountcy of the child at heart, not only will that be unfortunate for children but it will affect how people in the courts and the other professionals view how they go about their job. We see ourselves as influencing people; that is why we have legislation and why we have such debates. Let us influence for good and ensure that everyone has clearly in their sights the interests and paramountcy of the child. Therefore, I would be unable to support the amendment.

Baroness Pitkeathley: My Lords, I declare an interest as the chair of CAFCASS. I have only a little to add to the magnificent input from my deputy chair, the noble Baroness, Lady Howarth of Breckland, but some things bear repeating. We must remember that 90 per cent of all parents who separate make their own post-separation arrangements. Of those, research shows that 82 per cent of resident parents are satisfied or very satisfied with the arrangements that they make and 88 per cent of non-resident parents are satisfied or very satisfied. So when cases can be easily resolved in the ways perhaps implied by the amendment, they have already been resolved—by lawyers, mediators, friends or the people involved themselves. If we could guarantee that all separating parents, however much bitterness there had been between them, would act in a safe, sensitive and intelligent way, I would not have any problems with the amendment—but we cannot guarantee that.
	An increasing number of private law cases such as the ones that CAFCASS deals with have the characteristics of public law cases, in that there are alcohol and drug abuse, anger management problems, domestic violence and personality disorders. All those are common in the cases that our officers in CAFCASS have to deal with; they are difficult enough and we have to approach them in a very open way, for the sake of the children—as the noble Baroness said. We do not have to be constrained by a set of legal presumptions, which would make it harder to get parents on the specific actual situation, faced by individual children, which needs a much more tailored and personalised approach. After all, in a great deal of public policy we are moving away from the idea that one size fits all towards a more individualised approach, which is very welcome. The children that CAFCASS deals with deserve nothing less.
	In summary, the reason I oppose these amendments is that only 10 per cent of separated families approach the court with contact disputes, but those families have the highest level of conflict between the parents and the highest level of other problems. As your Lordships will know, there are relatively high levels of allegations of domestic violence among the parents approaching the courts, which means that concerns over the safety of the children and/or the other parent may mean that direct contact cannot take place, particularly given the lack of supervised contact centres.
	Contact is refused in only a small number of cases where there are grave and justified concerns about the well-being of the children. I would be concerned that adding a presumption of the right to contact would lead to an increase in litigation, because we have to move away from parents thinking that litigation can solve these problems.
	On a practical level, as other people have said, introducing a presumption of contact would mean changing the Children Act 1989, and therefore would have far-reaching results. It is, therefore, to be avoided.

The Earl of Listowel: My Lords, most of the important arguments have already been very well put. I salute the intention of the movers of this amendment. I join with the noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley, in saying that the current situation is far from ideal. That is one of the reasons I find this amendment difficult to accept. I welcome what my noble friend Lady Howarth of Breckland said about the wider question of addressing not just the safety of children, but also their welfare, and the danger of their being drawn into the conflict between their two warring parents. That can happen if the balance is not struck exactly right between promoting contact, which is normally in the best interests of children, and preventing children getting caught up in continuing long-term conflict.

Lord Northbourne: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Earl for giving way. Does he accept that great emotional damage can also be done to a child if he believes that his father who used to love him has walked away and deserted him?

The Earl of Listowel: My Lords, I agree. My own father was quite advanced in age when I was born, and when I was 13 I was sent to a boarding school. One of the reasons for that was that my parents believed I needed contact with an older man to be a sort of surrogate father figure. Indeed, my housemaster was kind to me, and I became attached to him. Sadly, he had to move on when I was 15, and that was a very sad experience for me. I was sad about that for several months afterwards, and this Bill has brought it back to the front of my mind.
	So, in a way, I have a little experience of what the noble Lord has described: this loss of a father figure. I do not demur from what he has said, but I emphasise that there is a balance to be struck—a difficult balance—between the hell of a child losing contact with a parent, and the hell of a child being caught up in a long-term conflict between parents. I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Pitkeathley, that we need to approach this on a case-by-case basis and consider the complexities behind each case.

Baroness Ashton of Upholland: My Lords, I was very sorry not to be able to participate in our discussions in Committee, and I apologise to the noble Baroness for giving her so much reading. Of course the upside for her is that, having given it to her, I had to read it all as well. I am sure she will agree that it was well worth the effort to ensure that we understood all of the background.
	I am also grateful to all noble Lords who have discussed the issued raised here with me and my noble friend Lord Adonis outside your Lordships' House. I join all those who have spoken in saying I completely understand the motivation behind the amendments, and salute everyone who has spoken for the passion with which they have declared the desire to see our court system work to the best effect for children and their families.
	I remind your Lordships where we started from with the Bill. In this part of the Bill we were seeking to deal with an injustice to children, who, despite the courts saying that it was in their best interests to have the attention of both parents, found that for whatever reason they were denied access. All the anecdotal evidence, and evidence of which noble Lords are aware, suggest that fathers, in particular, are affected. We know that the judiciary was frustrated that it could not deal with this matter as effectively as it might.
	We have sought to achieve two things: first, to increase the speed with which cases can return to court and, secondly, to create sanctions that would work. Fathers' groups in particular pointed out that when things went wrong it took so long to return to court that, effectively, a new status quo was in place, which could not be overturned easily and they found that they could not have what they had been told was in the best interests of their child, with which they had concurred. As noble Lords will appreciate, it is difficult to find a sanction that does not, in effect, create even more tension in the relationship between the child, the resident parent and the non-resident parent. That is what we have sought to do. The Bill should be seen in the context of a whole raft of work that is taking place to try to ensure that the system works more effectively, more efficiently and quicker for parents and children.
	We have recognised a fundamental point about the way in which our courts work. I do not presume that anyone is trying to undermine that, but it is at the heart of why I cannot accept the amendments. The more I look back at what happened in 1989, the more remarkable it appears. We did something that is now being copied in over 12 jurisdictions across the world and for which the noble Lord, Lord Laming, among others—he could not be with us today—spent 20 years of his life campaigning. At the heart of our court system is the fact that a child's interests come first; in other words, a child has rights—the paramountcy principle, much debated in your Lordships' House. It is important to reflect on how critical a development that was. It has been heralded across the world. We do not want people to end up in court and we are delighted that 90 per cent do not.
	We shall do more and more. Perhaps as the afternoon develops I shall talk about the work we are undertaking on mediation, for which I, as a Minister, am responsible. However, we do not want people to go to court, but sometimes matters become so difficult, so intractable that people end up in court, and sometimes, as the evidence suggests, couples come to court because they want the reassurance of a court order.
	Above all else, what is best for children? The courts act on behalf of our society asking what we should do when things are difficult, times are tough and the parents cannot agree. We look at the innocent, at the person who does not have a voice. We ask what is in the child's best interests. Almost invariably it is contact with both parents, but that contact will vary. Sometimes, unfortunately, there will not be contact in the short term—perhaps not in the long term—but that is a fact.
	The evidence that we have gained, particularly from the University of Leeds, from the work of Carol Smart, Vanessa May and others, is that when parents go to court, their concerns for their children are not fabricated, but they are not necessarily the driving force behind the conflict. Everything else that has gone wrong drives the parents' anger with each other. As the courts do not deal with such matters, parents channel their hostility into issues that they can take to a judge—issues of residency and contact. Researchers call it the parenting contest. There are very high stakes. Is she a decent mother? Is he a good father? In the context of trying to channel all that anger and hostility, many of the disputes take place. It is very important to remember that when the courts are confronted with that, they begin from a very different starting point. They have before them—not necessarily physically, but in their minds—children who need the best possible outcome which will make their lives as good as possible.
	As research indicates, we find parents who are at odds with each other but at the same time we see a competing set of values and ideas about child rearing. The noble Baronesses, Lady Howarth and Lady Pitkeathley, referred to their experience with CAFCASS and families with multiple problems. We also see children who have clear feelings about their parents, extended families who have very strong views and, above everything else, we see huge amounts of distress. I believe that we all agree in your Lordships' House that in that context it is very important to be clear that the interests of these children come first.
	I believe that we have developed the right approach in what are always difficult circumstances. I understand that it is not the desire of noble Lords to overturn that paramountcy principle by their amendments. However, we have a problem in that that is precisely what would happen. One amendment that I rather hoped would be tabled in your Lordships' House—perhaps this is an invitation to the noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley, more than anyone, and she will know instantly why that is so—concerns a matter that we have not dealt with very well and need to deal with better, and that is listening to the voice of the child. We need to ensure that what children feel and think is taken more seriously. We know that when confronted with a certain degree of parental conflict and distress, children say that they would rather not see the parent at all than put up with that. That tells us an awful lot about what more we have to do to stop people reaching that point of great conflict. We need to recognise that these children are caught in impossible situations. We must look after them above and beyond anything else.
	That does not mean that I do not respect and admire what noble Lords have sought to do with their amendments and their translation of the strength of feeling of different organisations which have met the noble Baroness, Lady Morris, the noble Earl, Lord Howe, the noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley, and ourselves. I recognise that not everything is perfect and that we have more to do. However, I want to be clear that I cannot go down the route proposed in these amendments as they would rub against the paramountcy principle, and I cannot afford to do that.
	The amendment on co-parenting, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Morris, has a laudable aim. The trouble is that in the end it would invite more litigation because we would have to sort out what takes precedence in a world where we have the paramountcy principle and the idea that co-parenting somehow runs alongside that. There are many good reasons why children's lives do not allow for parenting to be equal or for it to be the way one would like it if the parents were together. It may be a matter of geographical distance apart from anything else. It may be the nature of the child's life. It is very important that we ensure that we do not go back to having things done to the child rather than the child being involved. It is very important that we do not pass amendments that would permit more litigation in that a case would have to go to the Court of Appeal and ultimately to the House of Lords to determine what takes precedence and what is meant by the Bill's intentions.
	I accept that there are safety issues on the frequent and continuing contact amendment. I completely accept that no noble Lord is suggesting for one minute that where safety issues are involved, we should do other than put those top of the queue. However, the courts take other matters into account. They take into account the wishes and feelings of the child. They also take into account social welfare issues. One needs to define what is meant by "continuing and frequent" as one person's frequency is someone else's infrequency. It is difficult to define. We know that the courts are already required to deal with appropriate arrangements. Therefore, I am not sure what we would add by the measure except the potential to create confusion and, of course, more litigation—which we all wish to avoid.
	As children grow older their needs and desires for contact with their parents change. I call it turning into a taxi service, from my experience. We need to ensure that we do not accidentally create a measure which says, "It always has to be like this". It might be great when children are five but it would be hopeless when they are 15 and their lives have moved on. Spending time with parents at that age is not as cool as it used to be, when they could spend it with their friends.
	The real problem is that we define quantity and regularity from the perspective of the parent, not the child. A whole body of research was looked at by the University of Oxford, and we know that it is the nature and the quality of parenting that is critical, not necessarily the quantity. Parents know that, too. It is not how much time you spend with your children, but what happens when you do. We need to hang on to that as well. I have a problem with frequency as it implies quantity, not quality of parental perspective, and it does not give the flexibility that we need. Children are trapped in these situations, which is the difficult part of it.
	The noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley, has done a lot of work on her amendment, but my problem is that it still leads us into some kind of presumption. I have looked carefully to see whether there is a way of putting some provision into statute without detracting from the welfare provision, but I cannot find it. The noble Baroness will know that I try hard to achieve that when I see the point of something. The difficulty is including in the Bill a provision that needs to be interpreted. The judiciary will rightly ask why we have added something new when Parliament is asking for something different. That is the difficulty, but we shall continue to talk about it.
	I see the aim of Amendment No. 12—consulting each other about decisions on bringing up children. The problem with the amendment, which I am not sure the noble Baroness realises, is that it covers all parents, including those who have never come near the court at all. I am not keen. The "nanny state" Daily Mail headline would run riot on that point. I am not keen to get into the business of instructing parents in that way.
	It is also difficult to define an important decision, especially at times of parental conflict. Parents will claim that a particular decision is important, such as, for example, whether the child goes on a school trip; goes for tea at somebody's house, and so on. They will claim that such decisions are important because it suits them to do so at a time of enormous conflict. I am sure that the noble Baroness and I would agree on what we thought was important, but it is difficult without a list being defined.
	Sadly, as the noble Baroness, Lady Pitkeathley, said, there will be cases when co-operative decisions cannot be reached. There may be fear of violence, intimidation or bullying, which tragically happens in some relationships, or sometimes parents just cannot stand each other. Decisions cannot be made co-operatively in those circumstances. We cannot generalise about that.
	There are also difficulties with phrases, such as "brought up by". It will be a happy time for lawyers trying to define such phrases, but I am fearful of ending up with more litigation, however much I understand and share the objectives. The objective of extending the family welfare checklist is fine, but there is a problem with putting it here in this way. The checklist is factual—trying to establish facts about what is happening, which is important.
	In winding up on this group of amendments, my theme on this part of the Bill is that I completely accept the ambition to do two things. The first is to be clear about parental responsibility. The noble Lord, Lord Northbourne, reminds us of this in every Bill with which I have ever been involved around this subject. You cannot walk away from your children, and you should take responsibility for them seriously. That includes financial and emotional support, as well as good quality time. Children should not be ignored and abandoned. We need to consider what we should do about those issues.
	Secondly, we need to consider parental rights. They want to be involved with their children; they love them and want to prevent them being harmed. They do not want to be cast out of their lives. Those issues are important, but they are not for this part of the Bill, which is about trying to do something different. But they are relevant to the programme of work that we should be considering.
	I have tried to set out a series of measures to ensure that we develop a better system. I talked about mediation, for which I have grand plans, but we shall discuss it in later amendments. I have much time for the work that needs to be done on getting information out to parents much earlier—even before they think of separating, but certainly at the point they do—through all the organisations, websites, and so on, that they can consult about what to expect. We need to look carefully to ensure that we understand what happens in our court system, and I shall be happy to discuss that further.
	I have two final points. A number of things have been said about other jurisdictions that are based on presumptions. Noble Lords know that legal systems are different and the profile of the populations using the courts is different. We have found little evidence from across the world to explain what happens. Making changes here on the basis of no evidence from other jurisdictions is making bad law. We need to be clear about our evidence base. I know that the noble Baroness, Lady Morris, is particularly interested in Australia, which is not adopting any presumption about contact. Rather it is saying that the court will regard the best interests of the child as a paramount consideration. I promised to check that for the noble Baroness, and I have done so.
	To move away from the principle that the child needs to be the basis on which the court makes its decision would be a travesty of justice for some of the most vulnerable people in our society. In 1989, in a sense we led the world in making it absolutely clear that when it came to those moments of real dispute our interests would lie with the child. People fought very hard to put children at the centre; we must not change that. It would be wrong to do so.
	I hope that noble Lords will not push the amendments but rather that they will work with us to ensure that everything that I volunteered to do will make sure that children get the best that they possibly can from the justice system. We want parents to understand their roles and responsibilities, and we want to right the wrongs where parents have not been able to see their children, not because the courts have not ordered it but because it has not worked out that way because of the other parent. All that we are trying to do in the Bill is ensure that children get the best possible deal, and within that to make sure that those family members who want to be with their children get to do so. I hope on that basis that noble Lords will not press their amendments.

Baroness Morris of Bolton: My Lords, I thank the Minister for that full and, as always, gracious reply. However, I am disappointed that she cannot accept our amendments, because I genuinely believe that she wants to see better outcomes. I stress that we are not talking about equal parenting. We recognise that as children grow their needs will change, but a parent who feels secure in their relationship with their child will not be as rigid as they are if they are fearful that they will lose contact with their child.
	I thank all noble Lords for such a thoughtful debate. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Northbourne, for his support for our amendments. He was absolutely right that it is important that the message sent out to parents is not buried in case law. We discussed with the Minister last week how to get information to parents. Yes, you can open telephone helplines and print leaflets, or get a storyline going in a soap, but to change the law would be like nailing the information to every lamp post in the country. The noble Baroness, Lady Howarth, talked about unreasonable people, but the system makes people unreasonable. She talked about the few, as did the noble Baroness, Lady Pitkeathley, at the hard end of the process. They will always be there; but there are many who do not even seek recourse in the courts because they fear the system. There are no certainties; they are unsure of the outcomes, and it is expensive, so they settle for second best, fearful that what little contact they have could be lost. That is the silent majority that we are also seeking to help. We must be careful not to penalise the majority because of the few. We need robust safety measures set against the amendment. The noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley, said that she could not support us because other things needed to happen first, but all other measures without a change in the law are like running a bath without putting the plug in.
	On Second Reading, my noble friend Lord Howe said:
	"Legislation that is presented to Parliament, no matter what its content, should aim to do one thing—to make the world a better place, to put it in the broadest of terms. If we were trying to sum up what we wanted to do to make the world better for those parents whose marriages were breaking up, we would say this. We want to help children continue to see and spend time with both their parents, wherever violence is not an issue".—[Official Report, 29/6/05; col. 282.]
	I simply cannot begin to think what life would be like if I could not see my children or I was told I could only see them every now and then. Over the course of this Bill my noble friend Lord Howe and I have been privileged to meet some truly wonderful people. They are good decent people. They come from different backgrounds, different parts of the country and different age groups. They are united by their grief because they cannot see their children. In their name I would like to test the opinion of the House.

On Question, Whether the said amendment (No. 1) shall be agreed to?
	Their Lordships divided: Contents, 94; Not-Contents, 190

Resolved in the negative, and amendment disagreed to accordingly.

Earl Howe: moved Amendment No. 2:
	Before Clause 1, insert the following new clause—
	"REASONABLE CONTACT
	In section 8(1) of the Children Act 1989 (c. 41) (residence, contact and other orders with respect to children), for the definition of "a contact order" there is substituted—
	a contact order" means an order requiring the person with whom a child lives, or is to live, to allow the child to have reasonable contact with the person named in the order in the absence of good reason to the contrary"."

Earl Howe: My Lords, nearly a generation ago this House met to debate and to pass the Children Act. It was a measure which, as the noble Baroness said, was by any standards groundbreaking in defining the way that our society and our legal system should treat children. The Children Act 1989 has rightly been held up as a model of excellence in legislation, which other countries have sought to copy. It established for the first time in statute the paramountcy principle, to which we have already referred; that is, the test that says that in all decisions taken by the courts and by public authorities involving a child's welfare, it is the child's best interests which must be considered paramount. No one argues with that principle, least of all me.
	It is generally agreed that the Children Act has worked well, even though, over the years, it has been amended in various ways for very good reasons by successive governments. There is, however, one aspect which has not delivered all that we hoped that it would; namely, the provisions which relate to the way in which contact between a child and his parents is maintained following separation or divorce.
	The whole purpose and rationale of the Children Act was to ensure that the law recognised and promoted the best interests of children. Throughout recorded history, civilised societies have taken it as axiomatic that it was in a child's best interests to experience the love and influence of both parents; that that love and influence was every person's birthright; and that, therefore, unless there is good reason to the contrary, the state has no business to sever the parent/child bond. That is most decidedly my belief. I like to think, having read the Government's Green Paper, that it is the belief of Ministers as well.
	The opening paragraphs of the Green Paper state:
	"We believe that in most cases it is very much in the interests of the child to have an on-going relationship with both parents and so we hope that through improving the system, more non-resident parents will enjoy meaningful on-going relationships with their children. After separation, both parents should have responsibility for, and a meaningful relationship with, their children, so long as it is safe . . . It is in the interests of the child to have a meaningful ongoing relationship with both parents".
	Amen to all of that. In effect, the Green Paper is saying that a child's best interests are served by a presumptive right of meaningful contact with both his parents, with that right being denied to him only if it is unsafe to exercise it.
	The whole of the Green Paper is suffused and shot through with that idea. You cannot read it and emerge at the end believing anything other than that, in the view of the Government, children and parents have a natural right of reasonable contact; that all too often the legal system as it currently stands fails to deliver reasonable contact; and that, therefore, the way in which the courts intervene in disputed contact cases requires radical amendment.
	In Grand Committee, we debated the significance of case law in that area. Case law has established the principle that, in the absence of good reason to the contrary, both parents, upon separation or divorce, have a right of contact with their child and vice-versa. It is important to understand what that means. The right of contact is not the same as the right of reasonable contact or meaningful contact.
	What do we mean by a meaningful relationship or meaningful contact? If you ask most non-resident parents what they mean by it, they would say that they mean doing those ordinary little things which parents and children in undivided households take for granted—tucking a child up in bed, reading the child a bedtime story, cooking a child's supper, eating a meal at home together or taking a child to the supermarket. It is through those ordinary, but deeply important, acts that a child has a life in his parents and the parents have a life in the child. That simple truth was reflected in the words of the Green Paper. On page 22, it speaks of the need for arrangements which,
	"result in children feeling comfortable in both parents' homes. A typical arrangement might be for a child to live at one parent's home and to spend alternate weekends, a mid-week visit, alternate special or festive occasions and extended time during the school holidays with the other parent".
	Many of us took tremendous heart from that, because it demonstrates the Government's recognition that a meaningful relationship between a child and a non-resident parent cannot be achieved without them being allowed to enjoy each other's company in unforced surroundings for a goodly period of time. It is stated in terms in the Green Paper that an approach that incorporates shared parenting arrangements in this broad sense promotes the interests of the child.
	In Committee, the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, told us that cases in which the courts denied a request for contact from a non-resident parent were extremely rare. He said:
	"we note that all but 1 per cent of requests for contact lead to the making of contact orders".—[Official Report, 17/10/05; col. GC 157.]
	The noble Baroness, Lady Howarth, said something similar: in fact, on 11 October, she said less than 1 per cent.
	The accuracy of both those assertions has been completely and utterly demolished by the publication last month of a survey by Napo, the trade union representing family court and probation staff. The Napo survey provides us with the first ever ray of light to fall on the decisions that are being taken day in, day out in our family courts. Of 864 cases sampled, no fewer than 5.2 per cent resulted in a no contact order. A further 8.2 per cent resulted in an order for indirect contact only. For those of your Lordships who are unfamiliar with the term, indirect contact means that you are allowed to communicate with your child in some pre-agreed way, but you may not actually see or be with him. A further 5.7 per cent of cases resulted in an order for contact on condition that any meeting between parent and child is supervised by someone else, typically in institutional surroundings, such as a contact centre.
	If we put those figures together and ask ourselves what they mean, the answer is this: of the 864 cases in this sample, a not insignificant number, just short of 20 per cent, resulted in an order of the court that prevents the non-resident parent from being alone in the same room as his child. In other words, the key figure is not less than 1 per cent; virtually a fifth of contact decisions make it impossible for the parent/child bond to be meaningfully nurtured. They allow no bedtime stories, no tucking into bed, no sharing a meal around the kitchen table, no pushing a trolley around the supermarket. I do not for a moment seek to play down or belittle the significance of domestic violence as a factor in some of these cases, but 20 per cent is a very substantial figure. It is a figure that excludes all those court decisions where direct contact is granted to the non-resident parent, but only at minimal levels: one afternoon a month for two hours and that sort of thing.
	We do not know what the percentage of such court orders is, so we cannot say much about them, beyond the fact that, anecdotally at least, they occur very regularly. In Grand Committee on 17 October the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, said that there was no evidence that the courts are not making reasonable contact arrangements. I say to him that in the Napo figures we have the first glimpse of such evidence and, indeed, the first real glimpse of what CAFCASS is doing. I cannot say that I like what I see. It may well be, as the noble Baroness, Lady Howarth, said in Committee, that CAFCASS is successful in promoting contact where no contact existed before, but, judged on this evidence, we cannot deliver a verdict on the ability of CAFCASS to promote reasonable, meaningful contact.
	The difference between a presumption of contact and a presumption of reasonable contact is this: if as a non-resident parent you enter the family court with a presumption of contact, and no more than that, you can expect the courts to award you at least minimal contact with your child in the absence of good reason to the contrary. At the same time the onus is on you to argue to the court why it would be in the child's interests to have a more substantial quantum of contact.
	By contrast, if you were to enter the court with a presumption of reasonable contact, the onus would be on others to show why contact arrangements which afforded the prospect of a meaningful relationship between you and your child were unreasonable. That is the difference. They would need to produce a good reason, such as domestic violence, to deny the parent and child a reasonable or meaningful degree of contact.
	At present, the absence of a presumption of reasonable contact means that material contact between a parent and child can be brought to an end for no good reason; in other words, for trivial or immaterial reasons. That means that the slightest blemish on the track record of the non-resident parent can be enough for him or her to be damned in the eyes of CAFCASS and the court as a "bad parent" and therefore unfit to look after the child. "He lost a sock". "He fed the child inappropriate food". "He fell asleep while reading a bedtime story". Those are the sorts of trivial immaterial reasons that are produced to demonstrate somebody's unfitness to look after a child.
	By the same token, the slightest plea from the resident parent that a proposed contact arrangement is inconvenient for one reason or another can carry weight far beyond what most would regard as reasonable. To the casual observer it may appear that two parents in a contact dispute have equal rights before the courts, but in practice, because the law is as it is, the scales in contact cases are weighted heavily in favour of the resident parent. In that respect the Children Act has failed children and parents. That is the reason I propose these amendments. They would ensure that, provided there was no good reason to the contrary, the court would have a duty to make contact arrangements that were reasonable.
	The definition of what is "reasonable" or "meaningful" would be arrived at in two ways—through guidelines issued by the courts and, in time, by case law. The guidelines would take the form of approximate allocations of time which, in the court's judgment, were applicable to different circumstances—all other things being equal. We see a model for this in other jurisdictions such as Florida, a number of other US states, Scandinavia and New Zealand.
	There are those who maintain that a presumption of reasonable contact and the existence of guidelines would serve to place children at greater risk of harm. I respectfully disagree. A presumption of reasonable contact will not of itself increase the risk of harm to a child because, as now, any suggestion of genuine risk to the child's well-being would count as a good reason not to grant meaningful contact or, indeed, any contact at all. If the worry is that genuine risks to the child's well-being are not being picked up, the answer is not to perpetuate a system that denies meaningful contact, even when there is no hint of a good reason to do so, but to improve the protocols for establishing whether an allegation of violence or child abuse has real substance and then proceed from there. We shall be debating later some separate amendments designed to work towards that end. In those jurisdictions where there is a legal presumption of reasonable contact, backed by court guidelines, contact disputes have fallen to extremely low levels with, if anything, less risk to children than before, because the system provides for very swift intervention by the courts when violence or abuse is an issue.
	I believe that my proposals are wholly at one with both the substance and the spirit of the Government's Green Paper and with numerous public utterances by a number of Ministers over many months about the benefits of dual parenting. It is a mystery to me why the Government should now oppose them. The noble Lord, Lord Adonis, said in Committee that the amendments would amount to a qualification of the paramountcy principle. That would certainly be true if I were proposing that the paramountcy principle and the presumption of reasonable contact should carry equal weight in the eyes of the court. I am not proposing that. I am saying that the courts are perfectly capable of operating on the basis of an overarching principle that the child's best interests should be paramount; and, beneath that, the subsidiary principle that, in the absence of good reason to the contrary, both parents should have reasonable, meaningful contact with their own child.
	I come back to the point with which I began. No one in 1989 can have intended to pass a law, and surely no one can now support a law, which provides that all material contact—the very measure that we agree is in the best interests of children—can be stopped even if there is no good reason to stop it. Surely no one can have intended the law to allow that the parent/child bond can be set aside lightly. Yet this is what the law allows and what happens every day in our courts. I am afraid that the Government are trying to tinker at the edges of a system that, in their own words, does not work well. I do not believe that we will succeed in doing justice to children and non-resident parents without a complete change of approach. I beg to move.

Lord Northbourne: moved, as an amendment to Amendment No. 2, Amendment No. 3:
	Line 8, leave out "reasonable" and insert "child-centred"

Lord Northbourne: My Lords, we are making a mistake in trying to define contact in terms of the benefit that it brings to the parents. If we really mean that the welfare of the child is paramount, any attempt to give guidance to the courts and CAFCASS about how much or what kind of contact they should encourage should be worded in such a way as to make it clear that it is child-centred. The Government will say, "Why give guidance at all? Why not just leave the presumption of Clause 1 in the Children Act and let the courts make all the decisions through case law?" I understand that that is the Government's position. I believe that they are wrong. The courts have now been in the driving seat for six to eight years and the outcomes for children are not yet satisfactory. Parliament is responsible for this legislation and for what is going on. Therefore, Parliament should make clear what it wants. The noble Earl, Lord Howe, quoted someone saying that the system requires "radical revision". Perhaps that is what we should be trying to do.
	The noble Earl's amendment about reasonable contact introduced this difficult word "reasonable". Neither he nor anyone else has been able to tell me what reasonable means. It seems that reasonable is what a person thinks is reasonable. What I think is reasonable may be different from what you think is reasonable. We could turn this round by including some words that made it clear that what matters is that the policy is child-centred, so I propose adding "child-centred". I do not know whether that works well, but my Amendment No. 17 would insert "child-centred" before "contact". On reflection, I hate the word "contact" because it implies the sort of uncomfortable sessions to which the noble Earl referred. The phrase "child-centred parenting" should be included. That is what I would like to see.
	Moving on boldly, I thought that I had better try to define "child-centred contact" or "reasonable contact", but then I thought that my amendment would not be accepted so I had better define "reasonable contact" as well. I have done that in Amendment No. 16, where I have drawn attention to two or three things. They may not end up in the Bill, but it is tremendously important to make the point that one of the essential features of the relationship between a child and its parent is attachment, as we all know. Attachment means love and trust. One of the things that very often breaks down when a parental partnership breaks up is that one parent—usually the father—goes away. That is perceived by the child as abandonment and desertion, and sometimes it is, although sometimes he is driven away. The word "trust" should be included as well as "love". Also included are the obvious things such as the "care, support and education" that the child needs. I leave those amendments on the table for discussion.
	The noble Earl made an extraordinarily good and rather frightening case. Is it really true that the onus in court is on the non-residential parent to show that they should have more time for contact with the child? Can it really be the case that contact can be ended for no good reason? If so, the noble Earl is surely right in saying that the scales are too heavily weighted against the non-resident parent. I beg to move Amendment No. 3.

Baroness Pitkeathley: My Lords, the noble Earl quoted research which showed that, as the noble Lord, Lord Northbourne, picked up, the courts were inclined to take the word of the resident parent against the non-resident parent, but many of us would say that that research was selective. We might also quote the recent HMICA report on domestic violence, which showed that, on the contrary, the presumption was rather too much towards assumption of contact. My real difficulty with the noble Earl's amendment is that it is a mistake to assume that you can have a once-and-for-all decision about what is reasonable contact.
	I must speak up for CAFCASS workers who work with very difficult parents, not for weeks or months but sometimes for years to establish reasonable contact. I have sheaves of letters that I could quote to your Lordships; I will spare noble Lords that, but I shall quote one, from a parent who says:
	"I know now",
	at long last,
	"that this case is not about what either parent wants, and is all to do with the needs of the children, but it has been my deepest wish that my children would one day see my home and be a part of my life, and it has taken me years to achieve this.
	To me the weekend was a huge success and I must give credit to the children's mother for her complete compliance with the court order and giving every chance for the weekend to work".
	Those are parents who until now could not even be in the same room with each other. That kind of work goes on all the time. It seems to me, however, that the amendment tabled by the noble Earl starts and stops with parents, whereas the work done by CAFCASS with resident and non-resident parents starts and stays with the individual children. Of course there is a get-out clause in the amendment, unless a good reason to the contrary is shown; but there are often good reasons, and the problem is that in my view the amendment would weight the legislation and legal advocacy too far towards the parents' rights and not enough towards the children's rights.

Baroness Walmsley: My Lords, I find myself agreeing with a great deal of what the noble Earl, Lord Howe, said. However, for the reasons I explained when speaking to the first group of amendments, I could not support him in the Lobby if he chose to seek the opinion of the House today, because of the hierarchy of priorities that I hold. In an ideal world, I would very much like to see us put something into statute about reasonable contact or even child-centred contact, because it would be very much clearer for everybody. But until we have sorted out the safety issues, which we shall do later today, I would not feel in a position to do that.
	Noble Lords will notice that my name and that of my noble friend Lady Barker are attached to Amendment No. 6; that is because it was part of a package of amendments that we tabled in Committee. On the other amendments we have changed our approach. In an ideal world, I should like to amend the Bill in that way, but I do not feel that we can do that until we have sorted out the safety issues.
	As for the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Northbourne, I very much understand the spirit of what he is trying to do, but I question whether any piece of legislation could enable a child to love and trust each of his parents. That is a very noble aspiration, but it is beyond the means of any legislation to be able to ensure such a thing.
	As for Amendment No. 4—to return to my comments on the first group of amendments—I noted that the Select Committee on Constitutional Affairs suggested that it might be a good way forward to put something about reasonable contact in the welfare checklist. I look forward to hearing the Minister's remarks in that regard, because I would very much welcome a conversation with the noble Earl, Lord Howe, and the noble Baroness, Lady Morris, on the subject.

Lord Northbourne: My Lords, to clarify the position, my Amendment No. 16 says that,
	"such arrangements for parenting and contact as, in the opinion of the court, will be most likely to lead to the child continuing to love and trust each of his parents",
	and so on.

Baroness Walmsley: My Lords, I understand that point, but I still think that it is beyond any legislation to devise anything that is likely or unlikely to lead to such a thing.
	As I said, I would very much welcome a conversation with the noble Earl, Lord Howe, and the noble Baroness, Lady Morris of Bolton, particularly about Amendment No. 4, after today's debate. It could be that if we are satisfied on the issues of safety later in today's debates, we might find ourselves being able to work together on something like that for the next stage of the Bill.

Baroness Howarth of Breckland: My Lords, I was not going to speak to these amendments but, having been goaded by the noble Earl, Lord Howe, I need to say a couple of words. First, I admired, as I always admire, his carefully reasoned arguments. They are always carefully thought through and, I believe, very much in the interests of the child and the family. Disagreeing with him does not mean I do not sympathise with the objective he is trying to reach.
	I start with the "lies, damn lies and statistics" issue. The figure of 1 per cent comes from the judicial statistics. The Napo research, which is a useful piece of work that I find extremely valuable, has a quite different objective, and shows that CAFCASS was indeed doing its job. We should not be producing a whole load of reports, but intervening on behalf of children and working with the families to improve contact. The research is very selective. It is not modelled; it is an experiential piece of work that looks at cases, so it is not balanced against the whole numbers issue. It is valuable, however, in that it shows that if we work carefully with families we can increase contact. This is what we should be looking for.
	The noble Earl is right in saying that the sooner these issues are dealt with, the more likely it is that contact will be maintained, which is what we all want to happen. However, he is not right in suggesting that one parent has to argue for or against contact. It is the responsibility of those looking at the situation, and of the judge assessing the situation, to ensure that the child's interests are put first in whatever is decided. When you are in court, you feel you are arguing for your case, and I usually hear that both parents feel that.
	Much as I admire the argument, eloquent as it is, I still do not feel that I could vote for anything that interferes with the central presumption of the child's welfare and interests being paramount.

The Earl of Listowel: My Lords, I thank the noble Earl, Lord Howe, for putting the case so eloquently for his amendment. As Anthony Douglas, the chief executive of the Child and Family Court Advisory Support Service, has said to me, 30 to 50 per cent of these cases are fairly straightforward, and the rest are complex cases verging on public law. As I said before, there is a balance to be struck between the hell of a child not having reasonable contact, so he cannot be read a bedtime story by his father, and the other hell of him or her being caught in a continual conflict between warring parents. It is a difficult balance to get right.
	Several of your Lordships have referred to the HMICA report. In chapter 3, regarding domestic violence, it says:
	"Practitioners and managers told Inspectors that, whilst they may not always agree with it, private law practice is driven by what is known as 'the presumption of contact' . . . Inspectors were told by practitioners that 'the presumption of contact is so strong. It makes it difficult to challenge and we don't give adequate attention to the continuing impact of the abuse on the child'".
	This is a report on domestic violence, but its findings are relevant to a wider group of families in these proceedings. My assessment of the report is that it underlines that CAFCASS, as the noble Earl has said, is faulty and struggling in several ways. I was glad that the chief executive, Anthony Douglas, acknowledged the strength of the report in this chapter, and that there is a lot of work to be done at CAFCASS.
	There is such a strong presumption of contact that not only the safety of children but also their welfare is being put to one side, in a drive to get contact between parents as far as possible. There is a balance to be struck but the report suggests that the balance is not being struck and that it is going too much in one direction. I am concerned that the amendment, with its laudable aims, would push the balance too far in the wrong direction at the current time and in the current context. I look forward to the Minister's response to the amendment.

Baroness Ashton of Upholland: My Lords, I shall not repeat what I said in our previous discussions on presumption. I firmly believe that the paramountcy principle must be crystal clear within the Children Act. In moving their amendments I know that noble Lords do not seek to dilute that, but it is quite clear that that would happen. So it is very difficult for the Government to say anything other than that they cannot accept the move in that direction. It is absolutely clear to us that a child's interests must come first.
	Noble Lords have focused heavily, for very good reasons, on issues of violence, and will probably know that the NSPCC has indicated its strong opposition to the presumption of reasonable contact. The noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley, is an ambassador for the NSPCC. It believes that the problems identified in the report, to which the noble Earl referred, would deepen if shared contact were observed to be prioritised over the risk of domestic violence. The NSPCC has made a statement, of which I shall ensure noble Lords have sight, to explain its reasons for doing that.
	We shall consider the important issue of domestic violence and the role of CAFCASS and we welcome the amendments that will be tabled—I do not want to say too much. We start from the principle that the child's interests must come first. I would be as appalled as the noble Earl if, because a dad lost a sock or fed the children a Chinese takeaway or whatever, the courts did anything other than dismiss any claim.

Earl Howe: My Lords, those are real examples.

Baroness Ashton of Upholland: My Lords, I thought the noble Earl would say that, but we do not know what else was going on at the same time. It is absolutely right and proper that we ensure that the courts act in the best interests of the child. The noble Earl says that those are real examples, but we do not know what else was happening. I have indicated all along that we need evidence to ensure that we are correct. I believe that the time has come for us to look very carefully at repudiating some of the anecdotal evidence or to consider carefully what has happened in the courts. To understand more about the process we shall research what happens when the courts start with a desire for contact and see what the final orders are. Noble Lords will know that we are also considering transparency in the family courts, a matter for which I am responsible.

Baroness Walmsley: My Lords, can the Minister give the House a timescale for that research?

Baroness Ashton of Upholland: My Lords, the noble Baroness will not be surprised that I cannot do that. I have only just decided to do that in the past two or three days. It resulted from the conversations I have had with noble Lords through the passage of this Bill. To a degree, we are faced with an anecdotal base for some of this work. I recognise that the courts do a fantastic job—I believe that noble Lords would agree with that. None the less, we need to understand anecdotal stories that abound about what happens. I put it no higher than that. I shall write to the noble Baroness and to the noble Earl to explain what we may be able to do and I shall invite their comments. I stand by what I said, that I do not believe that it is right and proper for a child to be denied access because a dad lost a sock. If I worked on that basis my children would never see me at all.
	Turning to the "reasonable" amendment, I hope the noble Earl will not mind me saying that it is slightly paradoxical. In making decisions, the courts consider that what they have done is reasonable. So if we say to the courts that what they currently do is not reasonable and, therefore, we want them to do something that is reasonable—but they believe they are being reasonable, as they are trying to make reasonable decisions—I am not sure where that would get us.
	More importantly, I think what the noble Earl's amendment says is that it is for the resident parent to allow reasonable contact. Therefore, the courts would order the resident parent to give reasonable contact. The effect of the amendment is that the resident parent would determine what is reasonable. I do not think that is at all what the noble Earl intended. However, I believe that would be the effect of his amendment. I hope, therefore, that the noble Earl will think very carefully about it. Indeed, it would not achieve at all what the noble Earl seeks, rather it would do something entirely different. That is certainly my interpretation of the amendment.
	The survey to which the noble Baroness, Lady Howarth, referred looked specifically at cases at the hardest end. It is important to understand that. I pay tribute to CAFCASS which discovered that before court proceedings 36 per cent of fathers in the sample had no contact, but that by the end of the court process, thanks to the work of CAFCASS officers, that figure dropped to 8 per cent. That survey indicates strongly the tremendous work that CAFCASS staff do all the time. As we have already indicated, of all the contact applications in 2004, less than 1 per cent resulted in a court order for no contact.
	I turn to the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Northbourne. I sympathise entirely with what the noble Lord seeks to do. I had the benefit of having a previous conversation on the matter with the noble Lord. I cannot accept the amendments because I cannot accept the amendments that they seek to amend due to the difficulties which we have with the presumption. However, I understand entirely what the noble Lord seeks to do, which is to state that the purpose of contact is ultimately to benefit the child. Ultimately, that is what it is for. Good contact with both parents, where that works well and there are no safety issues, is critically important.
	The noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley, was keen to have further discussion with the noble Earl on Amendment No. 6. The difficulty is that the "no order" principle is designed in part to deal with the situation where parents agree. Where parents are clearly about to agree, or an agreement has been reached, the court will not make an order, partly because orders can in some ways drive up a conflict rather than resolve it. It would be a pity to move away from that. It is not a "no order" principle in the sense of not making a decision; it is designed specifically for the situation where parents reach an agreement. The court then has the ability to say, "In that case we shall not make an order". I do not think that the purpose of the amendment is to upset that opportunity. If an agreement had been reached, it would be very odd to try to impose a condition on it, but that, sadly, would be the effect of the amendment. The amendment has a further problem in that it contains no reference to a parent, so it would enable anyone to apply for contact. I do not think that is what is intended. I hope that noble Lords will understand that we consider that the amendment would increase rather than reduce conflict. I do not think that is what the noble Earl or the noble Baroness sought to do.
	This is an important group of amendments. As with the earlier group of amendments, we believe that it is critically important that the paramountcy principle is crystal clear to the courts. We believe—and we consider that this belief is shared—that for the vast majority of children it is obviously in their best interests to see both parents and to have a loving strong relationship with them. Therefore, there should be no conflict in the courts between the desire of parents and the desire to see the children get the best possible deal except where safety issues arise. Of course it needs to be recognised that children have their needs as well. We have talked about the different needs of children at different ages. This matter is trapped in a big conflict between two adults who have ended up in court and who will be seeking different outcomes, and who frankly may not get everything that they want in terms of contact. It is also true that the resident parent may not get everything that he or she wants either, which may lead to anger. Taking the child's interests into account is precisely what we should be doing.
	I have said that I am keen to look carefully at what is happening around the court system in order to deal in a proper way with some of the anecdotal issues that come to light. I shall write and set out how I propose to do that. On the basis of the unintended consequences of how the amendments are framed, I hope that the noble Earl will feel that he does not want to achieve what the amendments would achieve, if I may put it that way, and accept that the noble Lord, Lord Northbourne, is seeking to do something that would be more acceptable to me. But, even by amending them, we would still run into the problem that the question of presumption runs against the paramountcy principle in a way that would not work. On that basis, I hope that the noble Earl will withdraw his amendment.

Lord Northbourne: My Lords, it defeats me to understand how I can press an amendment to an amendment that does not exist.
	I welcome the support of the noble Baroness, Lady Pitkeathley, on the importance of child-centredness, and that of the noble Baroness. I shall not press the amendment this afternoon, but if the noble Earl succeeds in his amendment, or perhaps redrafts it, I may come at it again to attempt to amend whatever he may have done at that time. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment No. 3, as an amendment to Amendment No. 2, by leave, withdrawn.

Earl Howe: My Lords, this has been an interesting debate and I am grateful to all who have spoken. The noble Lord, Lord Northbourne, asked me what adding the word "reasonable" would achieve. It would act as a signpost to anyone wishing to dispute a contact arrangement. The signpost would say that to challenge a contact arrangement, one would need to do so on the ground of reasonableness. The court, and in certain instances the Court of Appeal, would rule on what constituted a good reason and the circumstances in which the guidelines would apply.
	The Government appear to believe that they can arrive at the same end point without that change. But they have omitted to see that unless we change the law in the kind of way that I propose, and have court-backed guidelines with a presumption of reasonable contact, there will be no incentive for a resident parent to reach an agreement out of court. Why? Because the resident parent knows, or will soon realise, that in the eyes of the court every case is different, and that all material contact can be brought to an end for no material reason. We have to move away from that.
	The noble Baroness, Lady Howarth, challenged that interpretation. She said that in her experience non-resident parents do not have to argue for contact, but they feel as if they do. They feel it because they know that case law gives them a presumption of contact, and that is all. Many non-resident parents go back to court time after time to argue for the tiniest quantum of extra contact.

Baroness Howarth of Breckland: My Lords, I agree that many people find contact issue difficult. I believe that that is because we do not have the right kind of remedies to ensure that contact can be enforced. That is not the same as the initial contact orders being made with the paramountcy of the child in view. That is the difference.

Earl Howe: My Lords, as I made clear, I am not arguing against the paramountcy principle. In many cases there is no question of violence or risk to the child. but the non-resident parent cannot get the court to agree to extra contact. The reasons adduced are not what most people would regard as substantive.
	The noble Baroness, Lady Ashton, resisted the idea that we could have a countervailing presumption to the paramountcy principle. If Ministers are really saying that, why on earth has the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, devoted considerable effort to setting out, in Grand Committee and in correspondence, the case law that clearly shows that there is already a presumption countervailing the paramountcy principle? It is a presumption of contact—not "reasonable contact", however. That presumption appears to exist perfectly happily side by side with the paramountcy principle. The courts have no difficulty operating on that basis, and the legal advice that I have received is that they should have no difficulty operating with a presumption of reasonable contact provided, as I propose, that that presumption is treated as subordinate to the paramountcy principle. Apparently, according to the Government, we can have a presumption in case law, but not in statute. I frankly find that incomprehensible.
	It was said by a number of noble Lords, including the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, that they were worried that a presumption of the kind that I am proposing would increase the risk of harm to a child. That is not the experience in Florida, and nor would it have been with the original early interventions project, which would nip in the bud any genuine risk of violence by having an early hearing on that issue. I was pleased that the noble Baroness, Lady Howarth, agreed with me on that point. The Government really cannot dismiss out of hand the success secured by other countries that have adopted early intervention principles; the track record over more than 10 years is proven. I have read the critical passage of the HMICA report, and I have read a great deal of the rest of the report.
	One reaches the conclusion that it is not the presumption of contact that is wrong but the lack—if I may say this without sounding too critical—of proper procedures to evaluate allegations of violence. I am afraid that reading that report did not put me off my stride. The Minister does not accept that the courts act unreasonably; indeed, what she said carried the implication that everything that the courts did was inherently reasonable because they had to act in the child's best interest, and that every order is in the child's best interests irrespective of what it is. That is an extraordinarily Panglossian view of the world, which really does not bear close scrutiny. The Minister admits that we lack detailed statistics of what the courts actually do in contact cases, but those statistics that we do have are apparently dismissed as of no account. I emphatically cannot go along with that.

Baroness Ashton of Upholland: My Lords, I was talking not so much about statistics as about looking at what happens in the process. The noble Earl would accept that neither of us should change the law on the basis of anecdotal evidence.

Earl Howe: My Lords, we should not change the law on the basis of anecdotal evidence, strong as that is, but the point is that the Napo survey provides us with our first, revealing glimpse of the decisions being taken by courts. If the statistic that I quoted were substantially less than the figure that I gave I might not be so worried, but I was very shocked.
	We need to draw this to a conclusion. The Government say that they believe in the value of a meaningful relationship between the child and both his parents, and they say that the way that the courts intervene currently does not work well, but they do not take the obvious next step, which is to change the way that the court system works. They said in the Green Paper that they would do so but instead they are tinkering at the edges of the existing system, they resist any notion of court-backed guidelines and they repeat the argument that every case is different. It is completely baffling to me why they should be arguing against themselves. There is no doubt in my mind that technical defects or not—and those can be put right—this is an issue on which it is appropriate for me to seek the opinion of the House.

On Question, Whether the said amendment (No. 2) shall be agreed to?
	Their Lordships divided: Contents, 93; Not-Contents, 151.

Resolved in the negative, and amendment disagreed to accordingly.
	[Amendments Nos. 4 to 8 not moved.]

Baroness Morris of Bolton: moved Amendment No. 9:
	Before Clause 1, insert the following new clause—
	"PARENTING TIME PLANS
	(1) The Secretary of State must issue guidance for the courts and for separating parents called parenting time plans ("the guidance").
	(2) The plans must outline the kind of contact orders the court is likely to impose in a range of circumstances should parents be unable to reach agreement regarding contact with their child.
	(3) Before publishing guidance under subsection (1), the Secretary of State shall consult and seek approval from the following—
	(a) child development experts,
	(b) the family courts of England and Wales,
	(c) any other person who appears to him to have an interest in the issue.
	(4) The Secretary of State may not issue the guidance unless a draft of it has been laid before, and approved by resolution of, each House of Parliament.
	(5) The Secretary of State may, from time to time, revise the guidance.
	(6) A revised version of the plans does not come into force until the Secretary of State lays it before Parliament.
	(7) Where either House, before the end of the period of 40 days beginning with the day on which a revised version of the guidance is laid before it, by resolution annuls that version—
	(a) the Secretary of State must, under subsection (5), make such further revisions to the guidance as appear to him to be required in the circumstances, and
	(b) before the end of the period of 40 days beginning with the date on which the resolution is made, lay a further revised version of the guidance before Parliament.
	(8) In reckoning any period of 40 days for the purposes of subsection (7) no account is to be taken of any time during which—
	(a) Parliament is dissolved or prorogued, or
	(b) both Houses are adjourned for more than four days.
	(9) The Secretary of State must arrange for any revised guidance under this section to be published in such a manner he considers appropriate."

Baroness Morris of Bolton: My Lords, in moving Amendment No. 9, I shall also speak to Amendments Nos. 10 and 29. In Grand Committee, we moved the amendments separately as we felt that full and thorough debates on the issues were needed. We were not disappointed. However, in practice, the amendments are intertwined. Amendment No. 9 allows the Secretary of State to issue guidance for separating parents called parenting time plans. They are not the same as those currently proposed by the Government. The House will not be surprised to hear that they will be based on reasonable contact between both parents and the child. The plans would form the basis of negotiations. Given the countless cases that have passed through the family courts, it is possible to set out a range of circumstances that the courts would impose if parents were unable to reach an agreement.
	Around 10,000 judgments are made a year on overnight contact. Based on that, it should be possible to come up with a formula that says, "Overnight contact should be allowed to take place by X in determination of Y". Courts would take into account such things as religious holidays. I had a number of meetings with religious groups, and one recently with Rabbi Livingstone. A number of faiths, particularly the Jewish faith, are concerned that, where there is a right of passage for a young man, it is important that he has his father to support him through that wherever possible. The parenting time plans could take that into account.
	Such plans work well in a number of other countries. I stress that they would be court-backed and prepared by child development experts in conjunction with the judiciary. Our plans differ from those proposed by the Government in that the government plans require the warring couples to sit down and write a series of mini-essays together on everything from GCSE choices to Saturday jobs. Although those are important issues, the way in which they are introduced at such a sensitive time can only fuel resentment. Even the most happily married couple might struggle to come through the marathon of the Government's proposed plan intact. Parents in a fragile state want some certainty and guidelines, and our plans would help.
	In Amendment No. 10, we propose that couples seek dispute resolution and, if needed, mediation before they go to court. Professionals trained in mediation would make parents aware of the emotional and financial costs of resorting to court. Court-approved mediators and facilitators would provide a stark explanation of the effects on the well-being of children, the length of time that litigation can take, and the financial implication to parents. They would set out the parenting time plans.
	We are clear that some parents may be able to sort out their differences through dispute resolution, but some scars may be so deep and some enmities so entrenched that mediation is the answer. Whatever is decided at that first meeting, it must be mandatory, otherwise the very people whom we need to help will not go. Resolution—previously the Solicitors' Family Law Association—believes that, for couples who cannot reach agreement on their own, there should be a swift and effective dispute resolution process, and that an application to court should trigger a compulsory intervention appointment.
	A solicitor who specialises in family law said to me, "I can understand the argument about why clients' attendance at mediation should be voluntary, and when it works it works well, but the empirical evidence suggests that these cases are few and far between". He went on to say that, "making mediation compulsory would be one way, arguably the only way, of addressing the issue". Relate says it has no concerns about these meetings being compulsory. Its experience shows that people sent to Relate, at first probably reluctantly, quickly settle into a good relationship and usually feel very pleased they were sent.
	As I said in Grand Committee, this amendment sends a clear message that when your relationship has broken down and children are involved, before you go your separate ways, you have an obligation and a duty to face the facts as they are and not as you would have them, and for the sake of your children, to sort it out.
	Both the amendments I have spoken to would come together in our early intervention pilot. At first we did not think you could put a pilot into primary legislation and then realised there were pilots in the Housing Bill and one in a current electoral bill. I went into the history of the aborted early intervention project at length in Grand Committee. I do not propose to rehearse the details again today, except to say that the Government had handed to them a scheme designed by lawyers and members of the British judiciary which would work in the English legal system.
	I do not pretend to be a parliamentary draftsman and I am sure this amendment is deficient in many ways. I suggest to Ministers that they have a thorough search of their respective departments. Somewhere, probably gathering dust on a shelf, is a properly thought-out pilot scheme. When they find it, please could they dust it down and take a good long look at it, as they might realise they have the answer to many of their problems?
	In Grand Committee, I gave the last word of the amendment to Dame Margaret Booth, a retired High Court judge, who, speaking at a reception in Lincoln's Inn in May 2002, to mark the publication of the early interventions report said:
	"Looking back at the Conference, perhaps the most striking point is how much we have to learn from other countries and their pre-hearing Information and Mediation approach, and from their consensus—sometimes their statutory definition—of the quantum of contact.
	"It is a shame that our country does not easily learn from what other jurisdictions have done successfully for so long. In this matter, we are years behind. I believe profoundly that the time has come to remove our blinkers".
	I beg to move.

Lord Northbourne: My Lords, I support these three amendments in principle, because I have been much influenced by what I have read about the system in Florida. The information has been introduced to me by Dr Hamish Cameron, with whom I have worked as a trustee of the Caldecott Community and I believe to be an honest, good and wise man. In Florida, the early intervention principle has been firmly established for 10 years. It is proving successful although there has been no systematic, longitudinal evaluation. The principle is this, as Judge Lenderman said in his presentation at a seminar held in London in 2003:
	"Our studies in the United States show, that the earlier child support is established, the earlier access is established, the better the family unit will work as we in the courts restructure their family life.
	"The later child support is ordered or established, the less chance that child support will be paid, the more enforcement proceedings are going to take place, the more we are going to be jailing 'Gaddy Daddies' who do not pay their child support. Those fathers do not have access to their children as a result of their own actions".
	Florida made four key changes. First, the early hearing date, which can be as little as five days after the court receives notice of parents divorcing or separating; secondly, a standing temporary order served on both parents at the start; thirdly, a mandatory parent education session; and fourthly, a mandatory ADR mediation session, which is a preparatory session to explain to parents the facilities for mediation and the opportunities they have to settle before going to court.
	All separating parents are obliged to undergo this sequence. They have no choice but to sign in and learn—if you do not sign in, you cannot see the judge. An obligation is imposed on the parents, but parents who have taken part are pleased they have done so. They learn. The mandatory expectation respects them as parents but obliges them to make a parenting plan which is right for their child.
	The noble Baroness has described to the House an equivalent scheme which has been prepared, and which would work in accordance with the jurisdiction of this country. We should not be too proud to consider it.

Baroness Howarth of Breckland: My Lords, I will not speak about parenting plans, but I want to say a quick word about mediation, because it is a word that is bandied about and has many meanings depending where you stand on the professional spectrum. There is a real misunderstanding about the role of mediation as a cure-all, and this persists and is apparent in many of the amendments. It might well be mediation-plus, and I am joined with this by many people in CAFCASS. I apologise to the House for failing to declare my interest in CAFCASS.
	Traditional mediation—which I understand as a professional involved in a range of these issues—would make little dent on the families we work with. That is the view of the CAFCASS chief executive. Our models of dispute resolution increasingly involve the children, facilitated discussions and the use of therapeutic mediation models, such as the Relate model, but these are active and assertive rather than the traditional passive model. I have a real concern that we get into the right kind of pilot models and not into models that will not work. I am sure early intervention is the right process. There are a number of models on the shelf—one of which I am very familiar with—which might well be looked at again. But these are about practice rather than legislation. Your Lordships have great faith in legislation—we have a lot of it. I hope that we can also measure implementation because that is what matters.

Lord Northbourne: My Lords, would the noble Baroness accept that, alas, we have no power except legislation? That is why we put so much emphasis on it.

Baroness Howarth of Breckland: My Lords, it is no excuse for having that much.

Baroness Ashton of Upholland: My Lords, I seem to spend a lot of my life on legislation. I cannot but echo some of the sentiment behind it. So, of course, we only put forward legislation that is vital, as noble Lords will appreciate.
	I want to deal with these amendments in order. I completely understand the aim behind Amendment No. 9 but, for a number of reasons, I am nervous about it. The first reason is that I am never entirely sure that the best way forward is to have the Secretary of State give out guidance in this area—not because we do not have magnificent Secretaries of State but because there is an issue about how much guidance a Secretary of State should be giving to the courts. I am also nervous about prescription. While I take the point that has been made to me both inside your Lordships' Chamber and outside that although we go on about how every case is different, noble Lords then point to the similarities between cases.
	I asked the judiciary how they approach the issue. They say, "Of course the outcomes in many cases may look very similar because much of how we organise the lives of families with children who have broken up ends up looking pretty much the same". But you have to start from the court's perspective by saying, "This case is unique". In that way you can address the needs of the child and then look at the needs of the family from that unique perspective. So they are not actually contradictory. I believe that we should be nervous about prescription.
	I am also a bit nervous on the issue of who one consults in arriving at this set of guidelines. You only have to look at our debate today and the expertise in your Lordships' House, never mind outside, to see that there are very differing views. I am not sure how we would reach the type of consensus that we would need to have. We have looked at setting up the parenting plans and consulted on a new set of parenting plans. I would be very keen to discuss with noble Lords opposite on both Benches what we have come up with to see whether there are any changes that we might make to the parenting plans. I accept that the issue that noble Lords are concerned with is partly addressed by the quantity of information and the quality of advice and the quality of the work that we do beforehand. So I make the absolute commitment that we will come to noble Lords with what we are drafting.
	I take the point about filling in lots of things. But the purpose of the proposal is to get parents to think about different issues—such as whether your child should have a mobile phone, who is going to attend parents' evenings, and so on—and not just to get them to try to fill in all the information. However I take the point. I hope that we can have a really good discussion to see whether we can properly address those points. If noble Lords are willing to do that—as I hope they are—we will do that.
	We talk about jurisdictions. One of the difficulties which I think I have already indicated is that it is very difficult to get empirical research about what happens in different countries. We cannot find any research from other countries that shows the beneficial impact of parenting plans on the child's welfare; if anyone has any, we would be very grateful to receive it. We have sought such information from other jurisdictions and looked at many research bodies but we simply cannot find any. If there is any we would be very happy to examine it between now and the next stage. But we do not think that such research exists.
	A lot has been said about the Florida model, which I am not going to dispute works in Florida. Again, however, we do not have specific advice. As the Committee will know, the Florida situation is based on parents' rights and on children's welfare. That is the approach that they have taken and it is for them to decide what they want to do. Florida does not publish guidelines on contact.
	In her Private Law Programme in July 2004, the then president of the Family Division focused on early judicial interventions and the extension of alternative dispute resolution supported by Her Majesty's Courts Service and by CAFCASS. The consultation seeks to underpin that approach by looking at CAFCASS to frontload earlier interventions. So there is no dispute between us about the need to look at early intervention as the way forward. I agree with that. It is very important that people do not end up in court; hence the mediation issues. I also take what the noble Baroness said about the particular issue of, I assume, parental involvement in Bar Mitzvahs and Bat Mitzvahs. Perhaps we can think about that. I am sure that that would be taken into account, but I also take the point of religious groups in saying that there is an issue that we should think about.
	For those reasons, and with the commitment that we will bring forward the parenting plans to discuss with noble Lords in order to see whether we can improve them to achieve the objective at least in part, I hope that Amendment No. 9 will not be pressed.
	Amendment No. 10 requires the president of the Family Division to compile a list of mediators. Noble Lords will probably know of the UK College of Family Mediators. I am keen to involve it in what we do, rather than moving to create a different list held by the president of the Family Division—who I am sure would be absolutely thrilled to hear that we want him to add this to the list of things that he does. However, I am happy to talk to the UK college and to other mediator bodies about how we do this. I am not sure whether that would move into a regulation but I think that we could talk to them about issues of concern, if noble Lords would like to talk to me about that outside.
	The amendment includes a form of compulsory mediation. Noble Lords will know that there is a real issue in relation to Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. In last year's judgment, Lord Justice Dyson said:
	"It is one thing to encourage the parties to agree to mediation, even to encourage them in the strongest terms. It is another to order them to do so. It seems to us that to oblige truly unwilling parties to refer their disputes to mediation would be to impose an unacceptable obstruction on their rights of access to the courts"
	That would be contrary to Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
	There is also an issue about whether forcing people into mediation could add to the delay in getting them into court when that might be the best solution. The amendment does not allow for the fact that they might have been through mediation already which proved unsuccessful. I am always nervous about compulsory mediation, for two other reasons. First, in many cases which have become intractable there is a difficult relationship between the parties which may include either domestic violence or certainly intimidation and bullying. To suggest that they are able to mediate as equal partners is not necessarily appropriate. So I am not keen to look at that as an absolute. The Bill already allows the courts to order people to participate in the information sessions. The Bill also enables us to order them to undergo counselling. My experience of talking to mediation organisations is that they are nervous about compulsory mediation for the reasons that I have given. Moreover, the families often need much more than mediation; they need counselling. There is a longer-term issue that can be addressed in the Bill.
	I too am not going to go over the early intervention pilot. We will wait for the evaluation. I hope that my noble friend—it will not be me—will make that evaluation available. I think that it was a good pilot that achieved a great deal, although I know that noble Lords will take a different view. We have committed about £7.5 million over the next two years to support and develop child contact services. Without wanting to go down the route that is proposed by the noble Baroness, I should be keen to have discussions with noble Lords on how we might use some of that funding to develop services for the purposes that noble Lords are seeking to achieve in the amendment.

The Earl of Listowel: My Lords, can the Minister confirm that the group which was called together by the Department for Constitutional Affairs to examine the funding of contact recommended that £8 million a year be provided for the development of contact? The additional investment of which she speaks is very welcome, but can she say whether that is the correct figure and whether the Government are moving towards it?

Baroness Ashton of Upholland: My Lords, I do not know whether that figure is correct because the group was before my time. In the year and a bit that I have been at the Department for Constitutional Affairs, no group has been convened or has reported to me on any figures. I will write to the noble Earl and ensure that a copy is placed in the Library of the House. I would not be surprised if there has been a request for more funding than we have made available—that is always the job of government. However, we have made £7.5 million available and I am keen to ensure that we develop the services effectively. I hope that we can do that in dialogue with noble Lords opposite, because there is much in what is sought in the amendment.

Baroness Morris of Bolton: My Lords, I thank the Minister for her detailed reply and once again express my thanks to the noble Lord, Lord Northbourne, for his support and for sharing with us his wealth of knowledge on Florida. As I think I said in Grand Committee, whenever we discuss mediation, we get to that moment of saying, "Oh yes, but what do you mean by that?" The word means so many different things to so many different people. That is one of the reasons why we talked about dispute resolution. I think that it is in fact dispute resolution or mediation with some form of therapy attached to it, which is perhaps needed for some people with very deep wounds and scars.
	The Minister said that she was nervous about the parenting plans and about being prescriptive. As Conservatives, we also do not like to be prescriptive. I go back to what we are trying to achieve, which is clarity and confidence. In these parenting plans we are looking to have some anchor points so that people know a little more about what might happen.
	The noble Baroness, Lady Ashton, also talked about the empirical research of the early interventions project, which reminded me of the Civil Service mantra—it seems to be working very well in practice, now let us see if it stands up to intellectual rigour. The fact is that it is working. It is keeping lots of families out of the courts and resolving their disputes at an early stage before bitterness and rancour set in. That is surely what we are looking for.
	On early interventions, the difference between us and the Minister is that we were talking about the original early interventions project, which was designed by judges and those who practise in the family law world. It was adapted from America and put together in order that it would work here. It is somewhere in one of the Government's departments. That is the pilot we would like the Government to look at to see whether it might work. With that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
	[Amendments Nos. 10 to 12 not moved.]

Baroness Walmsley: moved Amendment No. 13:
	Before Clause 1, insert the following new clause—
	"PRE-COURT DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND MEDIATION
	Before section 8 of the Children Act 1989 (c. 41) (residence, contact and other orders with respect to children), insert—
	"7A DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND MEDIATION BEFORE MAKING A CHILD CONTACT ORDER
	(1) The President of the Family Division must keep a register of mediators.
	(2) The President may make regulations about the qualifications and conduct required for registration as a mediator under subsection (1).
	(3) A person may not act as a mediator for the purposes of this section unless he is on the register.
	(4) Before the court hears an application under section 8 about contact, unless the court is satisfied that considerations concerning the safety of the child make it inappropriate to make such a direction, the court shall give a direction requiring each party to attend a meeting with a mediator arranged in accordance with the direction for the purpose—
	(a) of enabling the mediator to explain the facilities and options open to the parties regarding parent education, parenting plans, dispute resolution and mediation in relation to disputes over child contact, and
	(b) of enabling a timetable for dispute resolution and mediation discussions with a mediator regarding reasonable child contact for both parents.
	(5) The parties may attend separate meetings if either of them wishes.
	(6) The meeting with the mediator as described in subsection (4) shall be provided at no cost to either party.""

Baroness Walmsley: My Lords, in moving Amendment No. 13, I shall speak also to Amendment No. 15 in the group. We now come to the version of mediation amendments proposed by these Benches. CAFCASS published a report entitled Every Day Matters: New Directions for CAFCASS, which is a consultation paper on a new professional and organisational strategy. Section 36—Relationship Breakdown Cases Without Significant Harm—states a number of things, which I would pray in aid in support of these amendments and Amendment No. 14.
	Section 36.1 states:
	"CAFCASS (and other agencies) frequently intervene too late, long after parents' attitudes have hardened against one another, or long after one parent has created a new household, excluding their former partner. Indeed, many attitudes have hardened long before the first court application, hence the need for even earlier intervention where possible. Arguments about the fine detail of contact arrangements occupy huge amounts of scarce professional time, often unproductively. Once a court application is made, there is a clear risk of an adversarial model of law being started up before all attempts to resolve disputes on a basis of shared, co-operative parenting have been attempted".
	Our amendments in this group attempt to make that even earlier intervention and to provide services which will assist parents to come to an agreement without the need for a court order at an even earlier stage.
	Amendment No. 15 states:
	"No application may be made for a contact order under section 8 unless the applicant has attended a meeting with a mediator and the mediator has certified that mediation is not suitable to resolve the issue which is the subject of the application".
	By "not suitable", we would anticipate that a professional mediator would say that in cases where he or she has determined during the meeting that there is no agreement to be found between the couple through mediation and that the court will have to intervene. At those meetings, a professional mediator will probably be able to prevent quite a lot of parents having to ask the state to make decisions about the contact arrangements for their children. Through that early mediation, one would hope that some cases would be prevented from darkening the doors of the court.
	I am sure noble Lords will agree that an agreement people have made themselves has a much greater chance of sticking and being complied with by both parties than even the most reasonable order made or imposed on them by a court. Very early mediation would be a service of enormous advantage to the children, who have our top priority; to the parents; and, of course, to the state. Every court case costs a great deal of money, particularly if it is publicly supported, and takes a lot of the professional time of court officers. It would be much better if that time could be devoted more to the cases where there has been an allegation of domestic violence in order to sort out the situation.
	Noble Lords will notice that Amendment No. 13 is similar in some respects to Amendment No. 10 brought forward by the noble Baroness, Lady Morris of Bolton. It is important to have high quality mediation. That is why both Benches believe that there must be a register of mediators and that there must be regulations about the qualifications and conduct required for registration as a mediator. This should not just be done by a list that is held by any body—or even a professional organisation. It should be monitored externally and someone separately should reach a conclusion about the level of quality of such people.
	But there are some differences between our Amendment No. 13 and Amendment No. 10, which we on these Benches believe are significant. First, subsection (4) of Amendment No. 13 refers to the court being,
	"satisfied that considerations concerning the safety of the child make it inappropriate to make such a direction".
	We believe that our wording is better than the comparable wording in Amendment No. 10, which says,
	"where the safety of the child is not an issue".
	That represents an opportunity for much clearer analysis by legal people.
	Additionally, there is no compulsion in our amendment. We agree with the Minister that you can take a horse to water but you cannot make it drink. There are cases in which mediation will not work because the parties have set their faces against it. In that case, you have done your best and will hope to have helped some couples, but every couple cannot be helped by that means. We also believe that if the couple want—or if either of the couple wants—the mediation meeting to be separate, they should be able to make that decision. It should not be left to the court to decide whether it is appropriate for the mediation meeting to be conducted separately.
	Finally, we believe that the meeting should be at no cost to either party. Noble Lords will notice that subsection (6) of our Amendment No. 13 provides for that. If the Government are so convinced of the benefits of mediation—I believe that the Minister is—why put any barrier whatever in the way of a couple who are willing to attend a meeting at least to find out the benefits of mediation? I would ask noble Lords to bear in mind that during that meeting the couple can be directed to advice about things other than child contact that might be concerning them, which might be getting in the way of decisions about child contact, issues about financial advice and housing, and so forth. Of course, the couple can also be presented with materials and information on how other parents have solved that same problem. Although every case is different, there are many similarities between groups of cases. It could be enormously helpful for parents to be shown case studies of how parents like them have addressed the matter in the interests of their children and how successful it has been in the past.
	Such a meeting should not have any barrier of cost. What would the Government do if there was a charge and one of the parents simply refused to pay? If a person was not entitled to legal aid, the couple would not be able to have that valuable meeting if someone refused to pay. The small amount of money that it would cost to have such meetings would be a very good investment, giving opportunities to present parents with helpful and valuable materials which I believe are in preparation. Therefore, it seems perverse to suggest that a barrier of cost should be put in the way of anyone, however wealthy. It is a very small amount of money. I beg to move.

Baroness Howarth of Breckland: My Lords, I should probably have said all that I am going to say when I spoke about mediation. I have a great deal of sympathy with the noble Baroness's amendment, but I have concerns that I need to express. I am speaking as a practitioner, rather than as the deputy chair of CAFCASS, so this is a personal view. I am deeply concerned that when we are having discussions about mediation, we do not become locked in a series of activities that will be of no help to many families. The phrase "dispute resolution" is much better, and many of the families that we deal with understand the kind of intervention where someone is trying to talk with them round a table in a different way. I sat on the Select Committee and listened to associations dealing with mediation and the problem is that they are talking about a passive, non-interventionist type of mediation that will be very unhelpful to many of the families that cross the thresholds of the court and CAFCASS.
	I also want to express some anxiety about the way we move forward. It might be appropriate for me to do so here and on the record. At the moment, CAFCASS is engaged in a number of new programmes. We have cases being dealt with by dispute resolution and the number needs to be increased nationally because we are having enormous success. That is what is reflected in the Napo document. When we intervene, we are successful. We know that casework works. Mediation may not, but casework works in Staffordshire, Colchester, Leeds, Norfolk and many other places.
	I am anxious that the work is split between two major departments: DfES and DCA. With £7 million on the table and CAFCASS resources as they are, I make the point to the Minister that we are doing a great deal of work on a very under-resourced budget. I had to make that point at this moment.

Baroness Walmsley: My Lords, before the noble Baroness sits down, can she explain to the House what she means by the statement that casework by CAFCASS works and mediation by other organisations does not? It is not clear to me.

Baroness Howarth of Breckland: My Lords, I am sorry if I gave that impression. There are many good mediators who work with that form of mediation and for some people it works. With families where there is drug or alcohol abuse or issues of aggression, that type of passive mediation is not always the best type of intervention. I am worried about having a register that has one sort of people. I am not saying that mediation does not work and I apologise if I gave that impression. It works for some people. What we want is a wide enough register that is not so restrictive that we lose out on a range of new initiatives that will make a difference.

Baroness Pitkeathley: My Lords, I support what the noble Baroness, Lady Howarth, said. My slight worry is that these amendments are channelling us too far down a mediation route and do not look sufficiently flexibly and widely at alternative forms of dispute resolution. In some of the very successful dispute resolution schemes that CAFCASS is running—I am sorry that I cannot resist saying that we would run a great deal more if we had more money—the new way of working allows the parties to focus on specific issues and allows children to be much more involved so that we can hear the voice of child in some of these ways of resolving disputes.

Baroness Ashton of Upholland: My Lords, I do not think that any noble Lord who has spoken is terribly far away from any other noble Lord who has spoken on this amendment. I accept that mediation is very important and can prevent people ending up in court, but I also accept that there are other methods and other players who need to be involved and who can also do a fantastic job in preventing that. I take the point about the voice of the child perhaps being more easily involved through CAFCASS than it would be through traditional mediation methods. I have already indicated that we will think more carefully about the question of a register of mediators.
	As a Minister, I work in Europe on European civil justice and I know that within the European Union we are looking at the question of mediators and mediation. I need to think again about how we reconcile the different issues while not putting an onus on the president of the Family Division that I do not think would work.
	I have a slight difficulty because the amendment requires compulsory information sessions in every case. The noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley, says that the Bill already allows for these information sessions to be made compulsory in that the contact activities may include,
	"sessions in which information or advice is given as regards making or operating arrangements for contact with the child, including making arrangements by means of mediation".
	I do not want to put on the face of the Bill that this should be done in every case because it will catch cases where parents were able to reach agreement without needing mediation. Furthermore, it would not give the courts flexibility to decide that an information session was not appropriate in particular circumstances. I do not think that we are very far apart, but I do not want to go the extra mile and say that we should do this in all circumstances at all times.
	(6)The difficulty with Amendment No. 15 is the European Convention on Human Rights. While I can see the logic of saying that no application can go forward unless a mediator has pronounced it mediation-unsuitable, it would be successfully argued that that would prevent access to the courts if a person were to refuse to undergo mediation. I do not think we could do that. If somebody did refuse to participate, it is, in theory, contempt of court. The reality is that if the court believed that an information session and mediation was important and that the parents had come because they wanted to sort out contact disputes, it would take very seriously the issue of whether somebody did not participate.
	Although on an individual basis I can see that this would not cost very much, in 2004–05 the cost of 14,355 publicly funded family mediation was £14.2 million. Each individual case is not very much money, but I do not have a back pocket with extra money that I could put into this for parents who might be profiled like me or other noble Lords, who could afford to pay and who should do so as part of the process of trying to sort out their contact arrangements. Although I take the sentiment very well, the reality would be different. While I have enormous sympathy with the amendments, I do not want to go as far as saying that we would do this in every case.
	New Section 8A provides that cases can only go forward after mediation, but we run straight into the difficulty that that would, in theory, deny people access to the courts, and cause me difficulties in the European Court. On that basis, I hope that the noble Baroness will feel able to withdraw the amendment.

Baroness Walmsley: My Lords, I thank the Minister for her reply. I shall take back the point about the European Court, and I would not wish to press an amendment that would run into that difficulty. I will take advice on that before the next stage of the Bill.
	I am sorry that the Minister will not go as far as we would like to go. The amount of money she has mentioned is substantial, but it is for all mediation, not just for the meeting about mediation, which would cost considerably less than the figure that she quoted. We are talking about a much smaller amount of money than that. I maintain my opinion that it would be money well spent. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Baroness Barker: moved Amendment No. 14:
	Before Clause 1, insert the following new clause—
	"DEFAULT CONTACT ARRANGEMENTS
	(1) The Secretary of State shall by regulations establish a range of contact arrangements, to be known as "the default contact arrangements", appropriate for children of different age groups.
	(2) In the case of any child, following the separation of those having parental responsibility for that child, the default contact arrangements appropriate for the age group of that child shall be deemed to have been agreed between those having parental responsibility for the child unless and until either—
	(a) those with parental responsibility for the child agree any other contact arrangements for the child (with or without the assistance of a mediator or other outside agency); or
	(b) the court otherwise determines.
	(3) If a person having parental responsibility for a child applies for an order which would have the effect of excluding contact between the child and any other such person, the court shall deal with any such application as quickly as reasonably practicable, (having regard to the requirements of section 7A of the Children Act 1989 (c. 41))."

Baroness Barker: My Lords, I apologise for my late appearance today. I had to be elsewhere earlier this afternoon. Amendment No. 14 concerns a matter we have not hitherto discussed. Its origins lie in our discussions in Grand Committee and those that we on these Benches have had with a wide range of practitioners. We did not consult CAFCASS but could have done so. In its report Every Day Matters it stated:
	"CAFCASS favours a strong expectation that parents, with support, will reach agreements about future arrangements for their children and it supports a shared parenting framework in cases where there is no indication of risk to the child. Contact levels should normally be substantial, including overnight and weekend stays, if a relationship between a child and his/her non-resident parent is to be maintained and properly developed. Having said this, continuity of care is important, especially for babies and very young children, and the needs of each child have to be considered irrespective of general policy positions".
	That report talks repeatedly and at length about the need to act quickly when people separate in order to establish patterns of contact and behaviour which are in the best interests of the child.
	The amendment seeks to do a number of things. First, it recognises that there cannot be a universally suitable set of contact arrangements. Every case and the circumstances of every family will differ to some extent and there is a wide range of contact arrangements, varying from very limited contact in some unusual cases to fully shared parenting in other unusual cases. Nevertheless, there is a reasonable contact arrangement pattern which suits the circumstances of many families where parents live separately, particularly where the non-resident parent is in full-time work. In answer to a previous set of amendments the noble Baroness said something similar. Typically the pattern involves staying access every other weekend, for up to half the school holidays and every other Christmas and Easter. In addition, weekday access one day a week is quite common. Different arrangements often apply when children are very young, particularly for babies or where one parent lacks the necessary skills to care for a baby.
	Some of the problems with the current law have been alluded to in other amendments. There is no statutory model to which parents can look for guidance on the structure they might choose to agree between themselves or what arrangements might be regarded as being fairly typical. Some resident parents discourage or oppose contact on the misguided basis that a child would be better off without it.
	Practitioners have told us that, when people separate, the issue of property and which parent has the house are frequently bound up with the question of who will have contact with the child. The lack of any default contact arrangements makes resident parents who are opposed to contact less amenable to advice about the likely outcome of a court application for contact. Some non-resident parents are discouraged from applying for contact in the face of opposition by a lack of confidence about the outcome of such an application.
	In the absence of a set of default contact arrangements, unless there is an agreement to vary them or an order of the court, a resident parent can impose his or her will on the non-resident parent, unless the resident parent makes an application to the court. While such an application is pending, there is a tendency for the status quo to become established in a way that not only may not be in the best interests of the child concerned, but which also may be difficult to change once the matter comes to court.
	Therefore, we seek a set of default arrangements which parents, when they split up, can access easily. The provision would be in the Bill rather than being buried in case law. It would urge them to reach a framework for contact which suits them. They can vary it. And it would be in the best interests of their child. Parents are free, if they wish, to agree any other arrangements they choose at any stage. The court will approach every application for contact on its facts, without any statutory presumption. So the paramount interests of the child in the particular circumstances of each case will continue to govern the court's decision making.
	So, in summary, the amendment seeks to put in place an anticipated arrangement which separating parents will know about and which they can use to come to an arrangement which is in the best interests of the child. I beg to move.

Baroness Morris of Bolton: My Lords, I support the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, regarding default contact arrangements, although we would prefer the amendment to provide for the court to define the arrangements rather than the Secretary of State.
	The amendment provides a practical solution to the principles of co-parenting, reasonable contact and parental responsibility that we on these Benches have been calling for since well before the election in May.
	As all sides of this House have recognised, it is vital that a child's well-being is maintained by maximum contact with both parents during and after a separation where the safety of the child is not an issue. Keeping that contact link is vital. We feel the amendment will go a significant way to addressing our concerns and maintaining the flexibility that Her Majesty's Government insist our amendments to date would preclude.
	As the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, explained, the amendment will allow the Secretary of State by regulations to establish a range of contact arrangements, to be known as the "default contact arrangements", appropriate for children of different age groups. We have continually pointed out that there is enough case law and experience within the family law system to draw up guidelines, or, in this case, arrangements regarding contact for different age groups.
	Am I doing something wrong? I would not be surprised if I was.
	These arrangements will provide a basis which parents themselves can alter, depending on the individual situation.
	Subsection (3) states that if a parent decides to apply for an order limiting or excluding contact of the child with the other parent,
	"the court shall deal with any such application as quickly as reasonably practicable".
	I take the opportunity once again to raise the issue of resources. Good resources, available contact centres and quickly implemented contact activities will aid the courts in processing each case as efficiently and effectively as possible.

Lord Northbourne: My Lords, I should like briefly to support the amendment. If we are to persuade parents to settle early between themselves the future arrangements for parenting their children, they need to have some idea what will happen if they do not. There is a need for parents to know what they can expect if they do not settle these arrangements themselves. The amendment seems to me to fulfil that objective without having any other great objections to it.

Baroness Howarth of Breckland: My Lords, I admit to now being totally confused. I should be grateful for some clarification from the Minister about what the amendment intends. Clearly, parents should be given as much information about what happens in court and the possible outcomes. Indeed, there are real efforts to ensure that that happens at court, both face to face as well as with information sheets. If we are talking about having a set of criteria whereby we decide what is the best outcome for a child—and that is what is difficult to understand from the debate, and what I thought the noble Baroness, Lady Morris, implied might be the outcome—we debated that in Committee. I thought we had debated it here and suggested that that might affect the paramountcy in looking at each case. So, I would be grateful for clarification. I was not going to speak on the amendment because I did not understand it, but I felt I needed to seek clarification.

Baroness Ashton of Upholland: My Lords, I think I have lost the plot as well. I am with the noble Baroness, Lady Howarth. I apologise if that is the case. Let me explain what I am having trouble with. I apologise that I was grimacing at the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, and therefore put off the noble Baroness, Lady Morris. I do not like to grimace at the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, because I usually agree with her, but not always.
	The difficulty that I have with this amendment is that it is suggested that the Secretary of State should come up with a default contact arrangement, presumably in the form of some kind of list that says—I am guessing—"If a child is eight years old and has these parents who live 50 miles away, the arrangement may look like this, but if they live 120 miles away, it may look like that". I am not quite sure how many variables one would have to build in to that. I therefore have a problem with lists, and I cannot work out the variables; namely, that if the child is six months old, it is like this, and if it is two years old, it is like that. That is not because I am against giving parents advice and support. That is what the parenting plans are meant to do. However, I have difficulty with trying to establish it by reference to problems for children of different age groups. Age is only one factor in a myriad of different matters that need to be taken into account in regard to contact with children.
	We then go on to say, "That has been agreed unless you agree something else". Therefore, in the case of violent and abusive parents who disagree, it is suggested that unless they agree to something else or the court decides otherwise, it will be deemed to have been agreed. We therefore end up with the parties going to court and the court not having to take into account these default arrangements at all. It can simply override them. In the case of a bullying partner who says, "I want this, according to the law, I get this, I am not going to court and I am not going to let you go to court, so these are the arrangements that follow and I am going to intimidate you into agreeing them". I cannot quite work out how it will work.
	I am not against the idea of giving parents a good deal of information. Before the noble Baroness was in her place, we were talking about the need to do more before cases reach the courts. I agree wholeheartedly that parents should receive information that explains that the courts act in a child's best interests and that, in the absence of a valid reason to the contrary, both parents can expect to have good contact with their child. I do not disagree with the end; the Bill negotiates the means. However, I have a problem with trying to set this up in the particular way suggested, both because I think that the criteria will be complicated to work out and because we are saying, "That applies unless the court tells you otherwise". If the court was not involved, how would you know whether it applied? How would you know that that was what you should do? It moves us away from the guidance and support for families that states, "You may want to think about these different issues, you may want to think about how close you live to the child, whether the child plays football on Saturdays" and so on, which is a parenting plan idea. It takes us a little too dangerously close to a principle that I would not want to invoke. It does not allow for the fact that, because they will be in real dispute, families should have advice that states, "You can expect that if your child is four years old, the arrangement should look like this". We are not taking account of the danger in that for dysfunctional families that are out of control and are relying on the courts to put matters right.
	That is my problem with this amendment. Perhaps we have misunderstood it. I am certain that the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, is not trying to do what I have just suggested, but that is the effect of the amendment as I read it and according to the advice that I have received. I therefore hope that the noble Baroness will feel able to withdraw the amendment. Meanwhile, perhaps we can have a conversation about what lies behind it, which fits better with what the parenting plans attempt to achieve.

Baroness Barker: My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Morris, and the noble Lord, Lord Northbourne, for their support.
	The first point to make to the Minister is that paragraphs 2(b) and (3) of this amendment deal with precisely the kind of case that involves violent and abusive parents. This amendment seeks to ensure that parents who have split up are encouraged by seeing the law, without having to dig out parenting plans, good practice and case law, which says, "It is likely that in the case of your child the court may come to the following kinds of arrangement. You both have the power to vary that, in the best interests of the child as you see fit, but that is what is likely to happen". That gives a basis on which, where there is no issue about violence and where there is agreement, parents themselves can go ahead and make those arrangements at that very early point. That is crucial, in that it sets patterns of behaviour for later.
	The noble Baroness asked what kinds of variables there are. There are many: how old a child is; where the parents live; whether the child goes to school; whether the child has extra-mural activities on certain days or particular interests. We would know about all those issues because they are contained in the parenting plans. I therefore do not believe that there is a problem about that. The first part of the clause refers to establishing a range of contact arrangements. It tries to set a normative framework under which people who have to deal with such issues can begin to agree arrangements. I do not accept the noble Baroness's analysis that people in violent relationships will be forced into that situation. If she reads the amendment, she will see that, as with the rest of the Bill, there is within it provision for safety. We have not yet reached the amendment tabled in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Gould. When we do, it will have our utmost support.
	It is not about compromising safety in any way. It is about encouraging that group of parents we have already identified during our debate, who probably want to come to an arrangement and who, in all likelihood, once they have been through the court process, will wind up coming to an arrangement that perhaps could have been predicted from the start. It encourages them to do that from the outset, thereby avoiding much of the disruption to children's lives where one, usually the resident, parent holds out contact as a means of settling other issues involved in the process of splitting up. It also releases the time of the courts, and that of CAFCASS, to get on with the necessary work in other cases.
	That is what this amendment is about. I would like the noble Baroness to re-read it. I very much welcome the opportunity to discuss it with her, because I believe that this amendment will enable us to achieve what we are striving for; namely, to enable people to come to arrangements without in any way establishing principles and putting children's interests at a lower level. It does not do that.

Baroness Ashton of Upholland: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness for giving way and I thank her for that explanation. I now understand better what is behind the amendment. I shall be delighted to talk to the noble Baroness. I can see what she aims to achieve, and perhaps we can talk about it.

Baroness Barker: My Lords, I am encouraged by having met that first hurdle. I hope that by the next stage noble Lords will understand what we are trying to do. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
	[Amendments Nos. 15 to 18 not moved.]
	Clause 1 [Contact activity directions and conditions]:

Lord Adonis: moved Amendment No. 19:
	Page 2, line 5, after "that" insert "—
	(i) "

Lord Adonis: My Lords, in moving this amendment, I shall speak also to Amendment No. 20 standing in my name, before my noble friends Lady Gould and Lady Thornton move their amendments on the same issue. We now seem to have reached a point of peace and harmony in our debate. I therefore hope that it is appropriate for me to come on to the scene.
	We have reached the important subject of domestic violence, which occupied a good deal of our consideration in Grand Committee, when we agreed that, in seeking to make contact arrangements, no subject was more important than proper and effective arrangements for addressing allegations of violence and safeguarding children. One of the issues raised repeatedly was that of contact activities and the concern that contact activities should include domestic violence perpetrator programmes. I promised to look at that further. Amendments Nos. 19 and 20 make crystal clear the contact activities that the court may require people to undertake through directions or conditions under Clause 1, which may include domestic violence perpetrator programmes.
	It was always our intention that that would be the case—it was a recommendation of the Joint Committee that considered the Bill in draft. We are concerned that there should be no doubt whatever that this is indeed the case, least of all in the minds of the courts. These amendments put the policy on the face of the Bill explicitly. I beg to move.
	(6)

Baroness Gould of Potternewton: My Lords, I very much appreciate the comments made by my noble friend Lord Adonis. They run very nicely with my own amendment and that of the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton. We appreciate the noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley, adding her name to the amendment.
	Amendment No. 27 in this group relates to risk assessment. Amendment No. 34 is a consequential amendment, which I understand is necessary to ensure that Amendment No. 27 is within the scope of the Bill. In Committee, my noble friend Lord Adonis felt unable to accept the proposal for the risk assessment checklist as had my noble friend Lady Scotland previously. It is therefore necessary to find some other means to persuade my noble friends on the Front Bench that a risk assessment can and should be built into the legislation.
	Everyone agrees—and it has been repeated throughout today's debate—that it is desirable for children to maintain contact with both parents following a separation. That requires not only quantity but quality of contact. Of course, shared parenting is desirable if the circumstances for it are right—circumstances that guarantee the safety of the child or children involved. That means that the welfare of a child must be paramount in family proceedings.
	I do not want to reiterate all the points that were raised in Committee, but it is important to put on the record once again why this amendment is necessary. Some of the points have already been heard as the debate has progressed. The link between domestic violence and child abuse is also not questioned. The reality is, as cited in the Green Paper on parental separation, that there are concerns about the safety of the child in 35 per cent of cases. Again, using the Government's own evidence, nearly three-quarters of children on the at-risk register live in households where domestic violence occurs. The noble Baroness, Lady Howarth said on 11 October that,
	"Some 66 per cent of the caseload of a CAFCASS officer concerns domestic violence".—[Official Report, 11/10/05; col. GC12.]
	but the courts still fail to recognise that that is the reality.
	The guidance for the courts on how to deal with contact applications, The Private Law Programme, makes it clear that the judiciary regards cases involving safety concerns as "exceptional" and that is reflected in court practice. In 2003, 67,000 applications were made for contact under Section 8 of the Children Act 1989. Only 601 cases were refused—less than 1 per cent of all applications, which when taken alongside the figures of domestic violence and child abuse represents a significant institutional failure to protect. Nothing has changed, in spite of the introduction of gateway guidelines. In 2004, the courts granted 70,169 contact orders and refused contact in only 504 cases—again less than 1 per cent.
	Even when evidence is available, it is sometimes disregarded. Women's Aid reports that in 2003, a survey involving 178 refuge organisations found that 6 per cent knew of cases where contact orders had been granted to Schedule 1 offenders, and in some cases unsupervised contact was granted so there was no protection for the child at all. Dame Butler-Sloss said at the hearings of the Select Committee on Parental Contact:
	"We do not always know that they are Schedule 1 offenders at the time".
	This evidence shows that the family justice system does not have adequate proceedings for identifying high-risk cases and assessing and managing risk to ensure that contact is safe. That will not do. I was very interested to hear my noble friend earlier talk about looking at the system to see what is happening in the courts. That will be enlightening and interesting information.
	In Committee, I referred to the cases where some judges now insist CAFCASS should not do checks where the domestic violence box has been ticked, if it does not have prior consent of the parents—in other words, parental rights are taking precedence over children's rights and safety. I hope that this amendment will change the court system and help to eliminate these practices along with other examples of domestic violence being ignored by the courts.
	This is a very straightforward amendment, which will require CAFCASS officers or family proceedings officers in Wales to carry out a risk assessment whenever they are involved in private law proceedings where an issue of harm is raised. The first part of the amendment provides that the section is engaged whenever a CAFCASS officer is involved in any proceedings where the court can make an order under Part 2 of the 1989 Act, including, for instance, all contact and residence orders, or any function in connection with such an order or where a question with respect to such an order arises.
	The second part of the amendment provides that if, in the circumstances described above, the CAFCASS officer is given any cause to suspect that there is a risk of harm to the child concerned, the officer must carry out a risk assessment and inform the courts of the results. Taking these two clauses together, the amendment imposes a wide duty on CAFCASS officers to carry out risk assessments. Such assessments will have to be applied consistently whenever there is an issue of harm raised in private law proceedings in which CAFCASS is engaged. That is important because each case must be considered individually with the focus on the well-being of the child.
	I appreciate that the amendment places greater burdens on CAFCASS officers, but as my noble friend Lady Pitkeathley said in Committee, anything that enables those working with families to have more clarity about how they proceed is bound to be helpful. I hope that she, our Front Bench and the rest of the House find this amendment helpful, and I hope that it will be a part of their new CAFCASS domestic violence policy and toolkit. As others have said, the resources will have to accompany this extra duty.
	I also appreciate that this amendment is not the total answer, and I have no doubt that when the opportunity arises we will return to the issue, but I believe that it is a major step forward and I hope that the Government will feel able accept it. It is clear that the present position is not robust enough and that providing guidance is not enough. Risk assessment has to be built into legislation. It is crucial to ensure that contact is safe before it is imposed.

The Lord Bishop of Manchester: My Lords, the clergy in their pastoral ministry often come across cases of domestic violence and, sadly, child abuse. In that regard, all of us on these Benches welcome the amendments. However, in my experience as a bishop I have come across complications relating specifically to risk assessment, where the precise qualifications of the risk assessor concerned have subsequently been questioned by a solicitor. In responding on these amendments, will the Minister reiterate and give further assurances about the ways in which the people who are to undertake risk assessment can be properly trained and the information about them made available to those whose job it is to decide on risk assessment? Particularly in my profession, we sometimes have to find people to do these risk assessments before an issue has come before the courts. Therefore, in that preventive area, it is extremely important for us, and any guidance the Minister can give on making secure these risk assessments would be most welcome.

Baroness Walmsley: My Lords, I support this amendment, to which I have put my name, because it does what I had hoped we would be able to do during this Bill—strengthening and making more consistent the processes by which children's safety is looked after by the courts.
	I have been influenced considerably during our deliberations by the valuable report by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Court Administration. It contains some conceptual leaps, but it is a very useful document. It makes a number of recommendations that line up very well with the amendment. Recommendation 2 says that CAFCASS should,
	"ensure that all cases, including conciliation at court are subject to risk assessment and liaison with other agencies".
	Recommendation 3 says that it should,
	"implement a strategy to ensure improved practice in domestic abuse cases".
	These are all recommendations to CAFCASS.
	Recommendation 5 is that,
	"to improve services to children and families CAFCASS should provide training . . . in assessment and risk assessment skills",
	picking up the point just made by the right reverend Prelate. Recommendation 8 is to,
	"take steps to ensure an appropriate balance is maintained between safety and service delivery through the use of robust risk assessment procedures".
	Finally, Recommendation 11 suggests that HMCS should,
	"provide appropriate training to assist staff in gaining a greater understanding of domestic violence and its impact on survivors".
	All those recommendations lead us to one such as has just been described by the noble Baroness, Lady Gould of Potternewton. However, a poor risk assessment could be much worse than no risk assessment at all, so training is very important indeed. If the Government are minded to accept the amendment, they must put the resources where their intentions are and provide the resources for that training and for the manpower—and woman power—that is to brought to bear to carry out the assessments, so that we can be assured that they will be of high quality.
	I am aware that CAFCASS is not in a position to match the golden handshakes or enhanced salaries that many local authority social services are now offering to social workers to come and work for them because of the great crisis that we have had in recruitment and retention of social workers. CAFCASS has simply not been given the means to match those incentives and, unless it is, it will not get the best quality social workers coming to work there. That is what we need to support the amendment. However, I very strongly recommend it to the House and very much thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Gould of Potternewton and Lady Thornton, for their persistence in coming to something that I hope the Government will be able to accept.

Baroness Thornton: My Lords, I join the noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley, in urging the acceptance of the amendment, which is everything that we have been pushing for over many years. I put on record how thankful I am for the support that Members throughout the House have given on the issue through many Bills over the past few years. As my noble friend Lady Gould has said, we believe that it is a reasonable start that everybody should be able to support. The Minister has also taken an important step in his amendments in recognising the issue—and I welcome that also.

Baroness Pitkeathley: My Lords, I support the amendments, especially that of my noble friends and the noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley. The noble Baroness mentioned the HMICA report, which has been mentioned several times in our deliberations today. Noble Lords will know that CAFCASS takes very seriously the recommendations in that report and has already implemented many of them, including producing its excellent toolkit, which I hope has been seen by many noble Lords throughout the House. If not, I can certainly provide them with copies.
	CAFCASS is concerned about resources, but that does not in any way diminish our enthusiasm for taking on the role of risk assessment. We believe that it will help to focus our practice when under great pressure to broker agreements between warring parents. Sometimes the drive to reach an agreement about contact can mask underlying child protection concerns; at the moment, we have an inadequate statutory base for exploring those concerns. Making risk assessment mandatory will be an alert not just for CAFCASS practitioners but for those agencies from which we ask checks—courts and judges and all agencies in the family justice system. We should never forget that everybody has a responsibility for making sure that contact is safe. I am very glad to say that there is a clear consensus among all groups concerned for children to ensure that contact is safe, and that with all cases in which we are alerted to concerns, invariably in a court application by one party, we must carry out a formal risk assessment. We have clear procedures for that, and the amendment will lead directly to the protection of many children who are at the moment subject to an ambiguous legal framework.
	I share the concerns that have been raised about how necessary it is to have adequate training, with the right level of staff. No doubt we shall come to that when discussing another amendment later tonight.

The Earl of Listowel: My Lords, I, too, support the amendment. I greatly admire the single-minded attention to the matter that the noble Baronesses, Lady Gould and Lady Thornton, have given on this occasion and in the past. I also remember how passionately Earl Russell felt about this issue.
	I first wish to refer back to when, due to a failure on my part, I did not ask the noble Earl, Lord Howe, about his response to an earlier amendment. In referring to the report, he said that he believed that the failure was in assessment. Clearly, the amendment will work towards addressing the concern that he has, having read the report, that the assessment process was at fault. I wanted to ask him whether he recognised that that assessment failure will take a long time to remedy. It is not just about developing the new training programme; the courts need to be trained in it, as do the social workers. There is a culture in CAFCASS, which the report points to, of being hurried and not giving enough time to things, which is partly to do with resources, as noble Lords have said, and is partly to do with retraining. All those things take time to change.
	I would not wish your Lordships to believe that, simply because we now have a welcome start in ensuring the safety of children involved in these processes, we can therefore move forward with the other measures that we decided not to include earlier this afternoon. That is the main point that I wish to make.

Lord Adonis: My Lords, we seem to have almost a unanimity of opinion in the House this afternoon, which I hope that we can retain for the rest of our proceedings. Amendments Nos. 27 and 34 have been tabled by my noble friends Lady Gould and Lady Thornton, to whom I pay tribute for the huge time that they have spent pursuing these issues, long before my arrival in the House, in successive Bills. The Government are happy to accept those amendments, as we believe that they are a very constructive step forward in ensuring that issues of domestic violence and child abuse are properly addressed as soon as they are raised and before decisions about contact are made, or at any other point in private law Children Act proceedings when they would be relevant.
	(4)The right reverend Prelate raised the important issue of training officers who are to undertake risk assessments and how a risk assessment that is poorly undertaken can have calamitous consequences for those concerned. I entirely agree with him and know that the Children and Family Court Advisory and Support Service takes extremely seriously the training of those who undertake the assessments. He will have heard what my noble friend Lady Pitkeathley said on the subject. We believe that it is an important step forward. CAFCASS is already highly experienced in making these risk assessments and already undertakes them when it believes that they are appropriate, but putting it on a statutory basis will be a step forward and will address many of the concerns that have been raised in various stages of the debate on this Bill that the interests of the child should be paramount. That includes assessing as expeditiously as possible concerns about domestic violence and child abuse.
	I am glad that the amendments have had such a warm welcome from CAFCASS. We believe that they will need to be properly resourced, and we will provide the resources necessary. We see this as an important step forward and are happy to support the amendments.

Baroness Gould of Potternewton: My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley, is absolutely right: sometimes persistence does pay off. On this occasion, I can only say I am delighted that the Government have accepted this amendment, and that changes need to be made to court processes. I repeat, however, that this amendment is not the total answer, but it will make a difference, and will ultimately provide a safer environment for so many children. I take the caveats about resources and training, and look forward to hearing that those will be made available, but it gives me great pleasure to commend my amendment to the House.

On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord Adonis: moved Amendment No. 20:
	Page 2, line 6, at end insert—
	"(ii) may, by addressing a person's violent behaviour, enable or facilitate contact with a child;"
	On Question, amendment agreed to.

Lord Northbourne: moved Amendment No. 21:
	Page 2, line 21, at end insert—
	"( ) Subject to subsection (9), in considering whether to make a contact activity direction, the court shall have regard to the desirability of each birth parent assuming their obligations to provide (or procure) for the child the support, care and education which he needs."

Lord Northbourne: My Lords, I should say that I forgot to explain to the House that my noble friend Lady Finlay cannot be here because she has had to go to support her mother due to the death of a relative in France.
	(6)This is a probing amendment. In the past 20 years the proportion of children born to unmarried parents has increased dramatically. While many unmarried fathers share parental responsibility, as defined in the Children Act, with the mother, it is estimated that more than 1 million do not. These fathers are in a kind of legal limbo. Many accept the full obligation of being a good father, unconscious of the fact that they have no right in relation to their child or its welfare. On the other hand, an increasing number of others consider that to father a large number of children is a macho achievement, and persuade themselves that it is up to the mother and the state to concern themselves with bringing up the child.
	Setting aside entirely any moral considerations that may or may not be involved, I am concerned about the practical implications of this state of affairs for the welfare, well-being and future prospects of an increasingly substantial minority of the nation's children, and about the increasing cost to the state of assuming the responsibilities of more and more indigent fathers. This uncertainty in the law—and indeed in the shared values of our society—about the responsibilities of unmarried fathers means that children cannot be taught their responsibilities as citizens in this respect in school or elsewhere. Because we are a multicultural society, there are some ethnic groups whose cultures and values relating to parental responsibility are different from ours. How can they learn what it is to be a British citizen if we have no established norm?
	At the root of the problem that this Bill is designed to address is the increase in the number of children exposed to family breakdown. How can this be reversed if there is fundamental uncertainty in the law about the responsibility of those 1 million citizens who have children but no parental responsibility?
	So I ask the question: what are the obligations of a citizen who becomes a father, first towards his child, and secondly towards the state? This amendment, like its predecessor in Grand Committee, is a probing amendment to draw the attention of the House to the need to give some clear guidance on the obligations to his child of a father who does not have parental responsibility, and to ask the Government whether they are prepared to clarify the law on the obligations of unmarried fathers; and if not, why not? I beg to move.

Baroness Morris of Bolton: My Lords, I speak to Amendment No. 22. I thank the Minister for his reply in Committee. However, we believe that delay is the enemy of resolving many of these problems. This amendment would require the court to consider the time by which a contact activity can be provided, and is likely to be completed, before making a direction, in order to allow sufficient time to work with the parent or family concerned, but to avoid such directions in themselves causing delay if the facility is not available. The amendment also highlights the need for adequate resources for the provision of a framework or range of contact activity services across the country in order that children and their families may benefit from them.
	As I said in Committee, there is an acknowledged need for better facilitation of contact orders, and this amendment was suggested by the Law Society. However, we are concerned that there should be adequate resources for the provision of contact services across the country, in order that children and their families may benefit from them in a timely manner with less need for recourse to more lengthy or further court proceedings.
	The range of options to assist the implementation of an order needs to be sufficiently flexible to address the problem, and the options themselves need to be available. For example, there is no point directing a parent to undertake a parenting programme designed to address intractable contact disputes if the facility is not available locally and is not accessible. In order to avoid directions in themselves causing delay, we therefore suggest that the court should be required to consider the time by which this time can be provided, and whether it can be provided over the likely appropriate period of time in respect of the family concerned.
	There is already continuing concern among practitioners on the ground about the capacity of existing resources in some areas. For example, I believe that in some courts CAFCASS is not yet in a position to provide the additional facilitation and support services to fulfil its intended changing role in resolution, or supervised contact centre services may be unavailable. I believe that only one contact centre is available in Wales. In Committee, the Minister stated that he thought that the amendment,
	"would impose an unnecessary burden on the courts and the providers to specify a precise time period over which the contact activity is to be provided".
	He went on to say that this would run the risk of,
	"reducing the flexibility that the Bill provides".—[Official Report, 12/10/05; col. GC 95-6.]
	I argue the opposite. It will reduce flexibility and increase the burden only if the resources are not there. If they are not there in adequate measure, the principle of contact activities within this Bill will be empty, as they will not be able to be used in a timely and efficient manner.

The Earl of Listowel: My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Morris of Bolton, for tabling this amendment, because it gives us another opportunity to emphasise the concern about the resourcing of contact. It also permits me to tell the Minister that I now recall it was Beverley Brooks—until quite recently the chair of the National Association of Contact Centres—who was appointed chair of the committee to look at the funding of contact centres. The committee found that to resource contact centres adequately cost £8 million a year, but, in her evidence to a Select Committee on this new Bill in the other place, she said something to the effect of: "Now you are asking contact centres to provide a lot of new services". So she expressed even more concern that contact was not being given the resources it needed to do the job required.
	To the best of my recollection, the issue in Wales is that there is only one contact centre that provides supervised contact. That is important to our deliberations today.

Baroness Ashton of Upholland: My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Northbourne, for raising an important issue that he continually keeps us focused on: our responsibilities and obligations as parents, and particularly the rights of fathers, which is an issue of great concern to him.
	I will not rise to the challenge of saying what we are going to do about unmarried fathers, because that is to suggest that there is a problem that lies only with people who happen to be unmarried. There are many stable relationships where marriage is not part of the relationship.

Lord Northbourne: My Lords, I purposefully said fathers without parental responsibility. I am concerned about that group—the 1,000 fathers who do not have parental responsibility. Some unmarried fathers have parental responsibility.

Baroness Ashton of Upholland: My Lords, I understood what the noble Lord was saying. We must recognise the differences between different groups and that many take their responsibilities extremely seriously. Earlier the Child Support Agency was mentioned and my noble friend Lady Hollis, who is no longer in her place, pointed out that there are differences between those who contribute through the Child Support Agency and those who do not. It may be interesting to debate the various ways in which people approach the matter.
	The noble Lord's amendment is interesting. We can offer him reassurance on the point of principle that he raised. In the Children Act 1989, there is a welfare checklist in Section 1(3). The checklist directs the court with respect to the child concerned to have regard to,
	"how capable each of his parents, and any other person in relation to whom the court considers the question to be relevant, is of meeting his needs".
	That is in the spirit of what the noble Lord is searching for in the Bill. I also accept that the noble Lord raises a much broader debate, which I shall not enter into with great gusto at this point, about how we ensure that people understand the importance of being a good parent, including education in its broadest sense, not just within the school framework. That is important long before people have children and it is important when they have children and a relationship ends and the situation comes within those covered by the Bill. I accept the importance and value of that, but I believe that we have covered that point in the Bill.
	In Amendment No. 22, the noble Baroness, Lady Morris, considers the activity that will take place. There is a great deal in what she said. We have to be alive to the risk of delay for all the reasons mentioned by the noble Baroness. We shall ensure that the courts are guided by CAFCASS so that they can work out what is available locally and how quickly it can be made available. I believe that in the Bill we have covered the concerns of the noble Baroness and I hope that she will consider that. We have said that the courts must, before making a contact activity direction or condition, be satisfied that the suggested provider is suitable to provide the activity, that the activity is appropriate in the circumstances and that it is provided in a place to which the individual can reasonably be expected to travel.
	We have established that the provider who is suitable to provide the activity will, in light of the no-delay principle in a Children Act, include establishing that the activity can be provided within the timescale. The combination of the no-delay principle within the Act combined with that point does what the noble Baroness wants to do. I hope that that gives her the assurance she seeks within the legislation. We shall undertake a full mapping exercise to ensure that we understand exactly what provision is available. I have already said that we want to ensure that the £7.5 million is spent well on child contact centres, notwithstanding what the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, has said—I am grateful to him for explaining that in more detail. We know there are issues about contact centres, both in terms of geographical reach and in what they are able to offer. The matter does not rest with my department any more, but I know from contact with my noble friend at the Department for Education and Skills that his department is looking at that. I am sure that he will write to the noble Earl to tell him more about that. We shall deal with this issue. I believe the amendment is covered in the Bill already.

The Earl of Listowel: My Lords, does the Minister agree that if we are to achieve what so many of us wish—meaningful contact between non-resident parents and children—it is crucial, especially in marginal cases, that there is a high quality supervisor who does not just sit in the corner of the room taking notes, but facilitates contact between perhaps a father who probably has not had contact with his child for a long time? The father may have had issues with, for example, alcohol in the past—it could equally well be a mother—or there could be a history of abuse, but the parent may want the child to have contact with the non-resident parent in a situation where there is a highly skilled professional at hand who can supervise the contact. Does the Minister agree with that?

Baroness Ashton of Upholland: My Lords, that is not the only activity covered in this part of the Bill. In all the activities, we are looking for the highest possible professional expertise available. I have been fortunate enough to see the staff of contact centres at work and I recognise their professionalism and the difficulties under which they operate with families who have gone through great difficulties and who may still be experiencing them. I pay tribute to those staff. By no means is the situation completely right, but the Government want to work closely with those involved with contact centres and provide the support we can within the inevitable limits.

Baroness Morris of Bolton: My Lords, I thank the Minister for her reply. In light of her comments, I shall consider the Bill in more detail.

Lord Northbourne: My Lords, I was contemplating reading your Lordships a chunk of Chetneys Family Law on deserving and undeserving fathers but, at this late hour, I shall spare the House. It is all very well working on the superstructure of the arrangements for helping separating parents and children, but if the foundation is not right the whole building may collapse. Part of the foundation is knowing the obligations of all kinds of different fathers and mothers. With that thought, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
	[Amendments Nos. 22 and 23 not moved.]

Earl Howe: moved Amendment No. 24:
	After Clause 5, insert the following new clause—
	"SANCTIONS AGAINST FALSE ALLEGATIONS OF VIOLENCE OR SIGNIFICANT HARM
	After section 10 of the Children Act 1989 (c. 41) insert—
	"10A SANCTIONS AGAINST FALSE ALLEGATIONS OF VIOLENCE OR SIGNIFICANT HARM
	(1) The Secretary of State may make regulations to require the court to act in accordance with subsection (2).
	(2) Where during the course of contact proceedings—
	(a) a person makes an allegation of violence or significant harm against another person; and
	(b) the allegation is found by the court upon investigation to have been fabricated;
	the court must have regard to this finding when considering any representations by either person about contact arrangements with a child and may treat it as an aggravating factor when considering whether to make an order under sections 11J to 11N.""

Earl Howe: My Lords, in moving Amendment No. 24, I shall speak also to Amendment No. 25A. I hope Amendment No. 24 is self-explanatory. It is designed to highlight what I am afraid is a common occurrence in a separation or a divorce, and that is where one of the spouses manufactures an allegation of violence against the other spouse. Of course, that buys time, and often a great deal of time. No allegation of violence can ever be dismissed as being insignificant or of no account. If the allegation is of violence against a child, it carries even more serious implications: indeed it can be potentially fatal to any request for contact time by the accused parent.
	My noble friend Lady Morris and I have been approached by a number of groups who have raised this issue with us. We believe it is genuine. It is quite separate, of course, from the issue of enforcement. The Bill attempts to deal with the case of a resident parent who is obstructive or otherwise non-compliant in adhering to a contact order. But there is no provision for a parent who, for his or her own end, lies to CAFCASS about the actions of the other parent and makes out that abuse or domestic violence has taken place when, in fact, it has not.
	We believe it would be sensible to include in the Bill a clause along the lines of the amendment which says that where an allegation of domestic violence has been made, and that allegation turns out, on investigation, to have been made up, there should be consequences. The consequences would be up to the court, but I am suggesting that the court would have a duty to have regard to the fabricated allegation when making a contact order and should regard it as an aggravating factor in the context of any enforcement order being considered. The existence of a provision of that kind would, I think, act as a deterrent. I hope that the Minister will at least sympathise with the intent behind the amendment and give me some mild words of comfort.
	On Amendment No. 25A, in part, the intent behind this amendment has been superseded by that of the noble Baroness, Lady Gould, whom I congratulate, without hesitation, on her success in winning the approval of the Government for her amendment. It is certainly a step forward. If she reads our amendment, she will see that we are trying to do something even more powerful.
	I was very drawn to the amendment that she and her noble friend Lady Thornton tabled in Grand Committee, and I was rather sorry that that amendment did not return for further consideration on Report. However, our concern here is that in too many cases the concerns about the safety of the child are never resolved; they are allowed to drag on for a considerable period, often without a decision on whether the child is at risk. The only problem that I see with the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Gould, is that there is no sense in it of urgency or time horizons. In this amendment we have tried to introduce those time horizons because we think that it is important that the impetus in these matters is maintained by the court. It is very important for CAFCASS to do its work, but we do not want to see any slippage or lack of action.
	Child safety should clearly be tackled from the outset and expeditiously. We are concerned that in too many cases an allegation is made which raises concerns over child safety that is then subsequently not addressed sufficiently, with allegations lying on file. It is clearly in the child's interests, but also in everyone else's, for such allegations to be fully investigated as soon as possible. I hope that the sense of that amendment will commend itself to the Minister as well, although I have no expectation that he will wish to adopt the wording we have suggested. However, I place the thought with him for his consideration and guidance. I beg to move.

Lord Adonis: My Lords, the noble Earl asked whether I could express sympathy with his intentions and offer some mild words of comfort. That was not a very demanding threshold; I am used to more demanding thresholds. Certainly I am in a position to offer him sympathy and, I hope, rather more than mild comfort that we are able to achieve the objectives he has set out.
	The noble Earl's Amendment No 25A would ensure that comprehensive and timely investigations into allegations of domestic violence and abuse are made. The noble Earl's Amendment No. 24 would put sanctions in place on those who make false allegations. Amendment No. 25A makes the important point, with which we entirely sympathise, about the need to hold comprehensive and timely investigations. We believe that Amendment No. 27, tabled by my noble friends Lady Gould and Lady Thornton, and the noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley, will ensure that that takes place. It will ensure that there are risk assessments in all cases where domestic violence is alleged. We would expect those investigations to be timely because they will in most cases be precipitated by the new gateway form which is completed as soon as parents enter the system. In cases where allegations of domestic violence or abuse are made we would expect an investigation to take place pretty well immediately after that so we would expect the time lines the noble Earl has set out in his amendments to be adopted, but we do not think it is necessary to put them on the face of the legislation. We entirely share the objective that he seeks to achieve. We believe that the new and more robust statutory framework put in place by Amendment No. 27, with the requirement for risk assessments, will achieve what the noble Earl seeks to achieve.
	Amendment No. 24 seeks to put in place sanctions to discourage false allegations of domestic violence or harm. The amendment proposes that the court should take such allegations into account when making contact decisions. It may also treat them as an aggravating factor when considering an enforcement order or financial compensation order. We again entirely share the concerns underlying this amendment, but we hope that it will not be pressed for two reasons. First, allegations of domestic violence or harm will now be assessed at the outset of contact proceedings and in any event under Amendment No. 27, which has just been accepted by the House. We believe that the fact that there will be rapid and comprehensive assessment of any allegations will be a very significant deterrent to making false allegations. So we believe that that objective will be secured.
	(25)Secondly, there may be some cases where it is in the child's best interests to have a particular level of contact with an accusing parent despite the fact of the accusations. The courts will need to take account of that. But where the courts believe that a penalty would be appropriate and would be consistent with the best interests of the child, they already have the full powers at their disposal to make such a penalty, and indeed, they have been doing so. Only this year the Court of Appeal made a costs order against a parent who made such false allegations, and ensured that serious action was taken in that case. The case in question is Re T, which made the attitude of the courts very clear. In that case on the ending of a marriage various agreements and orders for contact had been made which had all faltered almost immediately. The resident parent then made allegations of sexual abuse. These were investigated and found to be false. The falsely accused parent had expended considerable sums in defending the actions. The Court of Appeal confirmed the decision that the resident parent pay costs to the non-resident parent. Cost orders are unusual in family proceedings since the courts are anxious to avoid seeming to punish one parent if that might lead to reduced co-operation between them. However, in this case Lord Justice Wall could not have been clearer in his judgment on upholding the application for costs. He said:
	"We do not think that the orders for costs which we have upheld in the instant case are either likely to or should deter a resident parent from advancing a reasonable opposition to contact which is genuinely based on a proper perception of the child's interests. But those who unreasonably frustrate contact need to be aware that the court has the power to make cost orders in appropriate cases and that the consequences of such unreasonable behaviour may well be an order for costs made against the resident parent who has behaved unreasonably".
	As I said, that is a Court of Appeal judgment made this year. The decision demonstrates that the courts can and do take appropriate action in cases of false allegations. They are very mindful of the concerns raised by the noble Earl. In the context of the more robust regime that we are putting in place for risk assessments, which we believe will also be a significant deterrent to false allegations, I hope that the noble Earl will feel able to withdraw his amendments.

Earl Howe: My Lords, I derive comfort from that very helpful reply from the Minister. I hope, too, that those individuals and groups who have spoken to me will do the same. I am grateful to the Minister for what he said on Amendment No. 25A and the intention that CAFCASS should act expeditiously under the amendment spoken to by the noble Baroness, Lady Gould. It does, of course, raise issues of resources, as the noble Baroness herself pointed out. We all hope that CAFCASS will be adequately resourced to do the work which it is charged to do. But I take pleasure from the fact that these issues have been recognised by the Government and addressed in the way that they have. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Baroness Crawley: My Lords, I beg to move that further consideration on Report be now adjourned. In moving this Motion, I suggest that the Report stage begins again not before 8.30 pm.

Moved accordingly, and, on Question, Motion agreed to.

Licensing Act 2003 (Second Appointed Day) Order 2005

Viscount Astor: rose to move, That this House calls upon Her Majesty's Government to withdraw the Licensing Act 2003 (Second Appointed Day) Order 2005 (S.I. 2005/2091) and to replace it with an order specifying the second appointed day as 30 June 2006 in order to allow more time to address public concerns about the effects of the proposed changes and for arrangements for any required changes to be completed in an orderly manner [8th Report from the Merits Committee]

Viscount Astor: My Lords, in the 2001 general election the Labour Party sent a text message to its voters, saying:
	"Vote Labour if you don't give an XXX for drinking up times".
	That message—a somewhat cheap electoral ploy—bounced the Government into introducing the Licensing Act, with the prospect of 24-hour drinking. It was an unwise promise—24-hour drinking is a concept that nobody asked for, nobody wants and has been condemned by all. The Government failed to listen to the serious concerns that were raised in this House during the passage of the Bill, and now an order is being made to bring in a licensing policy that is a total mess.
	Most people who go to bars, pubs and clubs behave well—the vast majority do so. Nobody wants 24-hour drinking, but many would like a reasonable extension to the hours that pubs, bars and restaurants can be open in their area. They should be allowed to open for longer if their customers want it, and if it does not create unacceptable consequences for local residents. Reasonable extensions, where appropriate, do not in themselves encourage bad behaviour. Indeed, there is evidence in Scotland that a more liberal policy has worked well.
	There are serious problems with binge drinking, mainly by those under 21. Binge drinking is a serious problem, as it leads to all kinds of other unacceptable behaviour, involving increased costs for the police and the health service. Sometimes it is not just drink that causes problems, but a mixture of drink and drugs.
	Alcohol sales in pubs have fallen in the past 15 years, and they have been declining by about 1 per cent a year, while alcohol sales in supermarkets have grown by about 5 per cent per annum over the same period. Supermarkets are cheaper. You can buy a tin of lager in a supermarket for 50p, which would cost £3 in a pub or bar. I am afraid that supermarket staff do not always check the age of their customers, and now that they are open 24 hours a day, they can apply for licences to sell alcohol for 24 hours a day, resulting in the problem becoming worse.
	I know something about the problems faced by the industry, local councils, residents and customers. In 1997 I founded a bars and restaurants business. We built the company up to 36 city bars, ranging from London to Aberdeen to Newcastle to Manchester, and even to Cardiff. On Saturday night we would have well over 30,000 customers eating and drinking in our restaurants and bars throughout the country. We were—I hope—responsible operators, partly because we did not let in those under 21, but mainly because we had a strict drinks and door policy. I do not have to declare an interest any more as we sold the business at the end of October.
	The result is that I have an insight into the industry of both good and bad operators. There are some bad operators who should not be allowed to trade. They could easily have been put out of business had the will and determination been there to do so. We did not apply for any new extensions to our licensing hours.
	The Government's policy is such a mess that it is difficult to know where to start. The DCMS has issued 180-page guidance to the Local Government Association, which is supposed to prevent the explosion of binge drinking, but it is skewed against those who want to object. For example, the guidance states that you have to live in the vicinity to object. We have seen that nobody understands what that means. Some councils believe it is 100 yards; some are Euro and believe it to be 100 metres. What does the Minister think the definition should be? What did the guidance intend?
	Some objectors have been threatened by some of the larger pub operators that should they lose their objection they might have to pay costs. Can that really be the case? I am afraid that it is. Two Labour councillors in Newcastle are facing costs because of their appeal to the magistrates' court. Will the Minister explain that? Logically, if that principle is extended to other areas of council policy, such as planning applications, all decisions by local councils might be subject to the same threat of costs. I cannot believe that that is what was intended.
	The guidance also prevents local councillors objecting to licences in their own wards. They are not even allowed to address their licensing sub-committee. We are told that local councils might be biased in favour of their local residents. But is that not why they are there? Have local residents not elected them to be precisely that—biased in favour of their local electors? What is the reason for that erosion of democracy? Will we now be told by the Government that MPs cannot represent their own constituents, or object to something in their own constituency? That is ridiculous.
	The problem with late-night drinking is not just what happens inside pubs, but the noise customers make when leaving. When people all leave pubs and clubs at the same time it can be noisy, but the guidance suggests that local authorities cannot stagger closing times. Indeed, it is clear the nuisance caused by noise outside the premises cannot be taken into account when local authorities apply for a closure order. It is very often the noise outside that local residents care about most.
	The Government should delay bringing the order. Their argument is that the Act gives the police new powers, but we all know that the police have plenty of powers to tackle existing problems. The problem is that they do not use them. Many, both inside and outside the industry, are constantly frustrated by the inability of the police to act, but it is difficult to understand why. I have often wondered whether the police allow a bad operator to keep trading so that they know where all the trouble-makers are in the evening in a particular area. In Birmingham responsible bar operators have had to close because of continued violence by the Yardie gangs. The police did little to help responsible operators, and now some months later, we have seen the results—an increase in crime and disorder in Birmingham.
	Environmental health officers already have the powers to close licensed premises that create a noise nuisance. The problem is that often many councils do not have arrangements for their officers to work at night. Some do. From experience, I know that Westminster council does, and its officers are extremely effective.
	The order to implement the Licensing Act was supposed to give local councils and their constituents more say. In fact it gives them less. It is a mess. What is more, it will cost local authorities more than they receive in licence fees to organise a new regime. The Government promised that it would be self-financing. Westminster council, for example, estimates that its net deficit on licensing will be £4.6 million in 2006–07. That represents a £38 council tax increase per Band D taxpayer. Surely that is not what was intended.
	I have to say as an aside that if the bizarre smoking laws, which have been trailed, are put into effect it will get worse. In many pubs about 10 per cent of their turnover is food. Now they will have to decide whether to continue providing food and allow no smoking, or allow smoking and provide no food. It is a mess; a farce. Let us have either no ban or a total ban. That is the only thing that makes sense both inside and outside the industry.
	The department has also promised a code of practice on irresponsible drinks promotions. When will we see a draft? Who has been consulted? The department is strangely silent on that matter.
	Licence applications are in disarray. We know that in Westminster alone 350 premises—about 10 per cent—have failed to apply for their new licences. That is replicated all over England. It is too late for them to apply to get a licence in time. As a result, come 24 November, those without a new licence will be trading illegally. What is the Government's response? It is extraordinary. We are now told that more than 20,000 bars, pubs and restaurants will be allowed to operate illegally. We are told that the police will take action only when there are specific concerns about crime or disorder. In effect, local authorities are now being encouraged to turn a blind eye. How can the Government pass an Act and expect us to allow this order to go through when they are so cavalier about the law? The message is, "We passed it but don't worry you don't have to obey it because we mucked up the introduction of this new policy". Is that a sensible policy? Is it sensible law-making?
	Who can and cannot break the law? Who will decide? Will it be the local authorities, the police or will the departmental Minister get a list on his desk every Monday morning? Will licence applications be accepted retrospectively? We await the Minister's answer. The policy is a farce; a total mess. The order should be postponed. The Government should accept my Motion, which would allow for all licences to be considered, so there would be no law-breaking. The police and local authorities have all the power they need, and the order does not change that.
	A survey published today by the Evening Standard found that more than 600 premises—160 pubs, 75 clubs, 110 hotels and 200 supermarkets—have now been given approval to serve alcohol 24 hours a day. That totally disproves and refutes the Government's earlier claim that there would be only a handful of licences. What is more, petrol stations have jumped on the bandwagon and are applying to sell alcohol 24 hours a day.
	The delay would allow the flawed guidance to be rewritten—guidance, that even the Minister responsible in another place, has already agreed to review. I commend my order and I beg to move.
	Moved, That this House calls upon Her Majesty's Government to withdraw the Licensing Act 2003 (Second Appointed Day) Order 2005 (S.I. 2005/2091) and to replace it with an order specifying the second appointed day as 30 June 2006 in order to allow more time to address public concerns about the effects of the proposed changes and for arrangements for any required changes to be completed in an orderly manner.—(Viscount Astor.)

Lord McNally: My Lords, I, too, look forward to the Minister's reply to what I thought was a forensic dismantling of the order by the noble Viscount, Lord Astor. It is a funny old world; it is about 100 years since that great Liberal, Sir Winston Churchill, accused the Conservative Party of drawing a brewer's dray across the road of progress. Of course at that time the Conservative Benches in this House were known collectively as the "Beerage". Today, it is the Labour Party that is the brewer's friend.
	I say at the outset that if the noble Viscount chooses to divide the House, we will certainly support him. Indeed, we regret that the Motion is not as robust at that put down in the Commons. We do so not in any way as killjoys; indeed like Falstaff and Justice Shallow I too have heard the chimes at midnight. We have been generally supportive since the mid-1980s of Parliament abandoning making moral judgments about how people spend their leisure time and their disposable income. But we also believe that there must be a limiting factor, because when one exercises one's leisure preference, it has to be not at another's leisure nuisance. The Licensing Act was sold to us on the rosy prospectus of bringing the continental café society to Britain—I remember the debates when the Minister talked about that.
	Just today I received the notice for the meeting on Wednesday of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Local Environmental Quality, which will be meeting to discuss the night-time economy. Here is the point for discussion:
	"The local environmental quality and anti-social behaviour issues arising from the night time economy include the following: litter; flyposting; vandalism; noise; urine; vomit; commercial waste and fear of crime and violence . . . The above issues can be said to be a result of a number of key underlying causes, including the following".
	The agenda goes on to list changes in the licensing law; the cultural change of binge drinking; the lack of transport late at night and the lack of toilet facilities. One local chief executive said to me that it is extremely strange that on the one hand we provide the facilities for people to fill themselves full of beer and then we close down the toilets where they could relieve themselves instead of in people's doorways. As the all-party group agenda points out, this clearly needs further thought and study. As the noble Viscount, Lord Astor, rightly said, right at the heart of the absurdity the promise about local power is being countermanded by the fact that objectors are being made subject to cost, threats are being made, and there is the absurd limitation on councillor power. I gave a stern warning about the dangers of this Bill on Second Reading. I said:
	"I am not sure that simply changing the hours will alter what is a peculiarly English attitude to alcohol consumption".—[Official Report, 26/11/02; col. 673.]
	I stand by that today. My noble friend Lord Avebury further warned that:
	"Large extra human and financial costs will be imposed on society and will make life intolerable for thousands of people".—[Official Report, 26/11/02; col. 683.]
	I am glad that he is here to say "I told you so". He could put a 10 or perhaps even a 100 in front of that "thousands" today. He stated that the assumption that allowing people to drink all night will reduce the level of alcohol abuse and of crime and disorder was "manifestly untenable". We warned before, and we are warning again. One of the biggest problems, as the noble Viscount pointed out, is that British teenagers are among the biggest drinkers in Europe. The latest government figures show that 44 per cent of 18 to 24 year-olds binge drink at least once a month.
	Even more alarming are the social and economic costs of that binge drinking. When the Lords considered the Licensing Act in 2003, many Peers gave graphic accounts of the escalating violence and social disorder on the streets of towns and cities across the UK due to binge drinking. Two years later, the situation has got even worse. In the last year, there has been a 15 per cent national rise in violent offences committed in connection with licensed premises. There are serious health consequences too. Around one in 13 of the UK adult population is dependent on alcohol, and in England and Wales there was an increase by 18.4 per cent in alcohol-related deaths in 2004.
	One need only look at the international situation to see that the Government are taking us in the wrong direction. Longer licensing hours in Western Australia, Iceland, Ireland and Canada have increased both consumption and the violence and drunkenness that it leads to. There is also good evidence to show that reducing availability and drinking hours can help to tackle binge drinking, which has happened in Norway, Finland and Sweden. Another of the Government's main justifications for the new licensing law was to vary closing hours and curb drunken violence on the streets at weekends. However, in a British Beer and Pub Association poll, 90 per cent of its 30,000 members had only applied for an extra one or two hours' opening time, with the majority applying to close at midnight. Figures like those suggest that midnight will become the new chucking-out time. Closing times will be deferred as opposed to staggered, and we will have a situation where, as Chris Allison, lead officer on licensing at the Association of Chief Police Officers has warned:
	"People will have drunk more and are more likely to get into fights".
	It is not just from these Benches and the Conservative Benches that doubts are now coming forth. Judges, health experts, the licensing industry and many local authorities are giving similar warnings. The Government's licensing reforms have been called "an absolute cock-up" and the major pub companies are accused of being concerned more with profits than with social responsibility. The Royal College of Physicians said that there was already an "epidemic" of binge drinking and that the Licensing Act,
	"flies in the face of common sense".
	What do the general public think? A BBC poll earlier this year said that 67 per cent of people thought that the Licensing Act would increase trouble, with 62 per cent saying it would make Britain a worse place to live. It is obvious that there is serious concern about these proposals.
	As the noble Viscount has pointed out, the police already have considerable powers, which they do not often use. The "new" police powers do little but replicate those existing and rarely-used powers. That is why on these Benches we join the noble Viscount, Lord Astor, in saying to the Government that there is a need for a pause before we take this step. Some flexibility needs to be brought in if we are not to reach the disaster that people are predicting. Indeed, one would say that almost before the Act is implemented there is a need for review and revision. It is not a crime for Government or Parliament to say, "We may have got this wrong—let's think again". Surely there is a case for that, and we urge the Government so to do.

Lord Avebury: My Lords, the noble Viscount, Lord Astor, referred to this Act as a farce and a mess. It is not only a farce and a mess, and a shambles, administratively, but a pernicious and imprudent measure that will result in greater crime and disorder, heavier burdens on the health service, and more young lives ruined by illness and disablement.
	It runs directly counter to the Government's professed objective of reducing crime and disorder. The Interim Analytical Report said that alcohol-related harm was then running—in 2001—at £20 billion a year, of which crime and public disorder accounted for £7.3 billion. My noble friend has given other examples of the enormous costs being incurred in connection with alcohol harm. That report also showed that as consumption of alcohol per head increased, so did the directly measured harm, such as accidental deaths, suicides, and alcohol-related diseases.
	As my noble friend observed, the same effects have been seen in Australia, Iceland, Ireland—and, I would say, Scotland as well. The Government have failed to produce any respectable academic evidence for the claim that the limited relaxation of drinking hours in Scotland in 1976 led to a reduction in crime and disorder there. As everybody knows, Scotland was at that time in the middle of a major recession and that was the reason for the unusual results that were obtained there momentarily. Scotland is now back on the same level of crime and disorder as we are in England and Wales. All long-term studies show that—other things being equal—the amount of harm caused by alcohol is directly related to overall consumption, and that increases in consumption will lead to more harm.
	Let me relate that to the small area of central London covered by the Soho Society, which tells me that in connection with the Act the licensing committee received 698 applications, 450 for renewals of the previous licence, and 248 for variations or extended capacity, which again reinforces the point made by my noble friend that we are not talking about a very small of increase in hours but a widespread variation being requested by the operators. There were 192 objections on the grounds of cumulative impact, of which 110 were not considered in time and therefore deemed to be refused. Of the 82 applications that were considered, 78 were refused, and 70 have appealed to the magistrates.
	Does the Minister agree that since all those applications come under paragraph 2 of Schedule 8 to the Act, the licensing authority ought only to consider the renewal of the existing licence and should look separately at the extension of hours which is being requested, once the bare renewal has come into effect? None of us appreciated that that was the effect of the schedule, but certainly this is the way that we read it now. But magistrates have begun to hear appeals already, where the authority has decided that both the renewal and the variation can be considered simultaneously.
	If I am wrong, and those appeals are successful, other licensees will ask for extensions and, in the worst case, throughout the area of Soho, there would be on average another three hours of drinking at all the 685 outlets. If, say, 300 people in each of these establishments drinks a couple of pints an hour, they will consume an additional 1.25 million pints during the extra time, causing a significant amount of extra harm. The same arithmetic could be done for every area in our towns and cities where the concentration of late-night drinking has already led to the kind of mayhem that we have seen on programmes such as the BBC's "Drunk and Dangerous".
	In one of the cases that was heard in Westminster—that of Candy Bar at 4 Carlisle Street W1—the district judge ruled that, although it appeared that the respondents in an appeal to the magistrates were exhaustively listed in paragraph 9 of Schedule 5, and did not include "interested parties" who had objected to the application, notwithstanding their right to lodge an appeal, they should have the option to be a respondent on equal terms with the local authority. Do the Government agree with that decision of the judge? The judge also directed that the application be considered de novo on appeal, undermining the principle that local authorities should be the primary determinants of licensing policy.
	The same judge in the appeal of Sophisticats, a strip club on Welbeck Street, who requested to be allowed to sell alcohol up to 5am instead of 3am, made no reference to the council's licensing policy. This is likely to be the case everywhere. The magistrates will hear all the evidence again, taking two days, with solicitors and barristers on either side, and obviously licensees would be stupid not to appeal when they are already getting clear signals that the magistrates are not there to reinforce the licensing policy of local authorities, but to develop their own independent policies. Could the Lord Chancellor not apply the Civil Procedure Rules to the magistrates' courts under Section 82 of the Courts Act 2003, to prevent a total log-jam in the magistrates' courts?
	The decision in the Candy Bar case may yet be appealed, and residents find themselves back in the situation of having no rights of appearance at appeals which they themselves have lodged. Is there anything the Minister can do to prevent that situation arising? Because if that situation is allowed to happen, then the magistrates hearing all these appeals will not have reference to anything that was said by the residents—they will not even listen to the residents—but will make up their minds, as the judge in this particular case said, de novo.
	There is a great deal to be said on the guidance, particularly in the way it appears to suggest that local authorities have no power to set terminal hours—as the noble Viscount, Lord Astor, pointed out. They can decide that the cumulative impact of licensed premises on a given area has an adverse impact on law and order and therefore that they will not grant any new licenses. Since an application for longer hours is now treated as a new application, that allows local authorities to refuse them after the existing licence has been renewed. It seems, however, that many local authorities have not fully understood the complex advice on cumulative impact and have failed to appreciate that it trumps the strong recommendation in paragraph 329 that longer hours are important to ensure that concentrations of people leaving the premises at the same time are avoided.
	Finally, I return to a subject which has been argued for two years without reaching a satisfactory outcome. I suggested that three indices be used to measure the incidence of crime and disorder before and after the second appointed day. Those were: crimes of violence against the person; ambulance call-outs on or in the vicinity of licensed premises; and A&E department statistics from hospitals to which the victims of drink-related attacks and accidents are likely to be taken. The Government have finally conceded that the first crime indices will be collected, but only in five named local authority areas, and in July they were still exploring how A&E data and ambulance statistics could be satisfactorily collected.
	The London Ambulance Service maintains detailed records of time and place of call-outs and I imagine that other local ambulance authorities do the same. I do not understand why the Government arbitrarily limited the assessment of the effects of the Act on crime and disorder to the particular areas chosen, leaving out the whole of the north-west, Wales, East Anglia and the south-west. If the authorities in those areas are already collecting information of the kind that is needed, surely it would help to give a more complete picture if they were incorporated in the assessment. As for A&E attendances, the bare statistics of the number of patients attending between 11 pm and 7 am would be better than nothing, on the basis that a high proportion of the casualties during those hours are very likely to be alcohol related.
	When this Act first saw the light of day, people did not realise how the country had already gone so far towards a licensing free-for-all and how extensive was the damage being caused to a whole generation. Now we are able to see the effects—which have already been described by the noble Viscount and my noble friend—in our prisons, hospitals, psychiatric institutions and morgues. There is no excuse for a Government who are deliberately turning on the taps.
	In her book The March of Folly, the American historian Barbara Tuchman examines leaders such as mediaeval popes, George III and President Johnson, who adopted policies that were plainly contrary to the interests of their people. When alcohol is demonstrably causing enormous harm to our society, a government who promote its use deserve to be included in that list. It is a pity that we cannot postpone the appointed day, not for six months, but for ever.

Lord Colwyn: My Lords, I hope that the House will allow me 60 seconds to say something on behalf of musicians in this country. Every time that I intervened during the passage of the then Bill, the noble Lord, Lord McIntosh, chastised me for my continual interventions, and assured me that there was no problem at all and that it was all in my imagination. However, although the Act includes the "playing of recorded music" in the description of regulated entertainment, that is disapplied in the transition to the new regime for existing bars, pubs, restaurants, hotels and any premises that are already licensed to sell alcohol for consumption on the premises. Those places will be allowed automatically to keep jukeboxes or other systems for the playing of recorded sound, no matter how powerful the amplification. However, the automatic permission to have one or two live musicians in such venues—amplified or not—will cease. That was the live performer element of the so-called "two in a bar" rule, which since 1961 has been available in those premises as an exception from the general requirement to hold a public entertainment licence for live music.
	The DCMS hoped that existing pubs, bars and restaurants would seek authorisation during the transitional period by varying their licence application to include live music, which could be done for one fee. However, that variation is not straightforward. It entails public advertisement at the applicant's expense, and a period for: public consultation; vetting by police, the fire authority, and on grounds of environmental health; planning; and ultimately the approval of the licensing committee of the local authority. If objections are received, whether from local residents or other agencies, a public hearing may be required with the potential for knock-on costs. The Government were warned that the then Bill would do nothing to promote live music. Musicians need venues to play and perform. The Act does nothing to help.

Lord Davies of Oldham: My Lords, it falls to me to clarify what the House should be concentrating on today. What we have had of course is a repetition of some Second Reading speeches, many of the points in which were not carried through to final decisions on the then Bill. The House should recognise that we are not debating the Act today, but a process of implementation of it that is already completed in accordance with the wishes of the House, other than this final step. I recognise that the final step gives the opportunity for some rehearsal of past arguments.
	The noble Lord, Lord McNally, was kind enough to suggest that the noble Viscount, Lord Astor, produced a forensic dismantling of the Government's position. That was scarcely in evidence during the passage of the then Bill. I heard the noble Viscount refer to the Labour Party's campaign with three Xs in it. That does not sound very forensic to me; it was a four X campaign, related to the advertisement for a famous lager firm. I did not think that we had a forensic dismantling of the Government's case. We had a plea for the final stage not to be implemented. However, the date is significant, because it is the date on which premises licences and club premises certificates are given effect and the old licences cease to have effect. If a vote took place and proved fatal to the measure, which it is not designed to do, vast numbers of our licensed premises would be outwith the law. Thousands of premises would have to apply simply to stay open over Christmas. Such are the reckless arguments presented on the other side of the House that I believe that noble Lords there are prepared to sustain their case on the basis of something that would produce chaos for the industry and the consuming public.
	Let us be frank. This debate is a fallout from a media campaign in the summer that began to identify what it regarded as weaknesses of the Act. The campaign revolved round the issue of binge drinking. Of course I recognise the strength of the anxieties of the noble Lord, Lord McNally, about binge drinking and the problems caused by the late-night economy. I do not for a moment do anything except understand his concern. But he must recognise that he is describing not the impact of the Licensing Act, but what is going on here and now under our present licensing regime. The whole point about the licensing regime that we introduced in the Act was to tighten up procedures so far as licensing was concerned. Noble Lords will recognise that we are involved in a major campaign to bring to the attention of the nation the problems of binge drinking. It is important in that framework that we recognise that the police welcome the additional powers that the Act gives them to tackle the issues.
	Of course excess consumption of alcohol in an irresponsible way is of concern to us all. The selling in an irresponsible way of alcohol in those terms has caused the problem to a large degree, and the Act increases the constraints on the selling of alcohol. Simply to take the argument of the noble Lord, Lord McNally—it was adverted to by the noble Viscount, Lord Astor—that is why it is important that we concern ourselves with binge drinking, and that the Act come into force. From the second appointed day, the Act will give the enforcement agencies an unprecedented range of new powers to address irresponsible retailing of alcohol. The vast majority of the expanded police powers on closure of premises and modernised offences are expressed in terms which describe events or offences taking place at premises carrying on licensable activities—such as selling alcohol—under the authority of premises licences, club premises certificates and temporary event notices. If the new licences or certificates are not brought into effect, the new powers and offences are without effect too. That is the importance of the order.
	I do not have time to expand on the long list of police closure powers, tougher penalties in respect of selling alcohol to children and more effective review procedures, but I assure the House that this was exactly the thrust behind the Bill and the basis of the Government's argument for why the Bill was needed. The House heard that repeatedly when we debated the Bill.
	It is not just the licensing powers that some noble Lords opposite would delay. The powers of environmental health officers to close licensed premises that are causing noise nuisance did not exist before the Act. We need to be able to enforce them. They are expressed in the new licences that the Act envisages.
	There is no demand for delay from those who will benefit from the powers or from those who are to be licensed under the new legislation. The Association of Chief Police Officers does not want delay on the Act—very much the opposite. It recently confirmed clearly that it did not want implementation to be delayed.
	Licensing authorities, which have put enormous effort and good work in to delivering the requirements in the transitional period of the Act, do not want it to be delayed—quite the opposite. The responsible parts of the alcohol industry, which have paid for their new licences and expect to have the benefits of them from 24 November, are certainly not arguing for delay.
	Village halls and sports clubs that have met the requirements of the new licences are also not in favour of delay. Local residents have engaged in licensing issues in greater numbers than we have seen before and have put in time and effort on objecting to variations. That would all be wasted if the Act was not implemented. They do not want delay.
	So who wants delay? Some sections of the media have contended that delay would be somehow in people's interests. We all recognised that binge drinking—to say nothing of the attendant crime and violence—need to be tackled, but the extent to which the Act is designed to get a grip on the issue has been misinterpreted.
	Noble Lords must recognise that one crucial issue that ran through the heart of the Bill was that a large number of people came on to the streets at the set throwing-out time for pubs and clubs, which meant that they were all milling around and competing for taxis and other forms of transport home, causing tension and confusion. The whole point of the flexible hours was to reduce that.

Lord Avebury: My Lords, the Minister's description of what happened at chucking-out time might have been true 10 years ago, but now in the West End, for example, closing times extend between 11 pm and 3 am. The crime figures hour by hour for that period are more or less evenly spread out, so the argument falls to the ground.

Lord Davies of Oldham: My Lords, the noble Lord is describing the current situation. He cannot be arguing that we ought to delay the Act and persist with the status quo, which he has eloquently criticised. The whole point about the present situation is that we need licences to be looked at more carefully and we need local representation. The noble Viscount, Lord Astor, with the support of the noble Lord, Lord McNally, introduced some issues about whether councillors could make representations. It is suggested that there is a restriction on councillors if they do not live in the area that they represent. That restriction obtains only if no local resident has raised an objection. Local councillors, local representatives and local people are expected to make representations on licences—and are in the process of engaging in that process, which we have never seen before. I cannot recall the noble Viscount or his predecessors on the Front Bench—he did not have the joy of appearing on the Front Bench throughout the passage of the Licensing Bill itself—emphasising at that stage that they wanted to preserve the status quo because local opinion was so frequently heard with regard to the issuing of licences; very far from it. The whole point is that this Act brings in a greater degree of local representation and involvement.
	I hear the point that the noble Lord, Lord McNally, makes about the restriction on local councillors and we will look at that. We may have defined matters too tightly in terms of the concept of "the vicinity". But I want him to recognise that we are bringing local councillors and representatives of local interests into the debate about licences and the role that they can play in licences which just did not obtain before this Act became part of the position.
	We are substantially towards the concluding stages of implementing the Act and we had all these actors play their part in the development of the licences. It is suggested that a very large percentage—in the media it has been suggested that as many as 10 per cent—of licensed premises will be trading illegally after 24 November because they will not have their licences. The figures do not amount to a fifth of that. We are talking about a very small number of premises indeed. However, because of the difficulties of meeting the fairly tough requirements in the procedure under the Act, if some premises have obtained a licence and it is known and on the record that they have obtained the licence but the certificate has not been sent to them for display in the bar—where they are obliged under the law so to display—we are expecting that there will be an element of tolerance with regard to the law in those terms. We do not expect the police to be certificate chasing when they are able to ascertain that a licence has been properly applied for and has been gained. That is not a matter of loose interpretation of the law; it is asking for common sense to be applied in what we all recognise is a major change to the arrangements for licensing premises in this country.
	The noble Lord, Lord Colwyn, raised the issue of live music—an issue on which he was most eloquent during the Bill's passage. Of course I respect his opinion on that. In the transitional period there has not been a decrease in the number of venues providing live music. We do not think that the Act is bad for live music. We think that abolishing the "two in a bar" rule increases opportunities. As far as we can see in licence applications, there will be increased opportunities for live music in licensed premises. However, as I move from the Scylla of the criticism of the noble Lord I land on the Charybdis of the criticism of the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, on the question of noise. But of course we are concerned that the local community will be in a position to make its contribution to the issuing of licences to guarantee that local opinion is taken into account.
	I recognise that what we have had this evening is a really rather jolly time in revisiting the Act. However, in the terms of the Motion, there is no intent to stop the second designated day of the Act, because to do so would throw the whole of our licensed premises and the selling of alcohol in this country and the control over selling of alcohol into complete chaos. On that basis, I hope that the House will reject the Motion.

Viscount Astor: My Lords, the Minister said that we are having a jolly debate on the Licensing Act. However, neither the noble Lord, Lord McNally, nor I discussed the Licensing Act. We were discussing the implications of the Licensing Act because of the guidance that had been published by the Government. That was our debate. I have to say that the Minister has totally failed to answer any of the major questions that we put to him. It was a most disappointing answer. I realise that he has the unfortunate task of being a spokesman for the department without having any responsibility for the policy, but I have to say that he has been let down by his colleagues in another place. He kindly said that he would look at the definition of "in the vicinity" as regards objections, and he also said that the Government would review the ability of councillors to address their licensing sub-committees and objections. However, he did not mention the fact that two Labour councillors in Newcastle have to pay the costs of an appeal on a licence. Is that something of which the Government approve? Is that going to be replicated whenever councillors appeal against a large pub or club operator gaining a licence? He did not address that point at all.
	There were a number of other points that the Minister did not address, such as staggered closing times and the problems that that brings. However, environmental health officers already have the power to close noisy premises and it is just not true to say they do not. They do, and I can give evidence in Westminster that shows that they do.
	The Minister did not address the point about licence fees being self-financing at all. I was absolutely clear and I gave the Minister statistics showing that they are not. The Government promised that it would be a self-financing regime. He did not address the point about the code of practice for irresponsible drinks promotions. We have not heard anything about that, except that we know it is coming. We do not know who has been consulted or when it will come in. The Minister went on to talk about licences and the police. He said that applications had not been passed or completed. It is not a question of that. In Westminster, 350 licensed premises have not even applied. It is not an issue of finishing those applications; applications have not been made at all. People will be trading illegally because of the Government's policy. It is clear that that is replicated throughout the country. Those are not my statistics: they are statistics from the industry. There might be up to 20,000 people trading illegally when that policy comes in because they have not even applied. Some have, but the majority of them have not.
	The Minister also failed to address 24-hour drinking. We already know that more than 600 premises have been granted licences, which was never intended by the Government's policy. We are not debating the Bill. We are debating the guidance and policy of the Government following the introduction of the Bill. That is what we want the Government to review. That is what is wrong. The Minister should have said that the guidance would be reviewed. If the order is delayed, it is not a question of chaos. The chaos will be when the order goes through. If the order is delayed, all those people with existing licences will operate under existing terms, which will give local authorities much more time to get it right.
	I am very disappointed with the Minister's answer, which leaves me no alternative but to ask the opinion of the House.

On Question, Whether the said Motion shall be agreed to?
	Their Lordships divided: Contents, 130; Not-Contents, 97.

Resolved in the affirmative, and Motion agreed to accordingly.

Children and Adoption Bill [HL]

Consideration of amendments on Report resumed.

Earl Howe: moved Amendment No. 25:
	After Clause 5, insert the following new clause—
	"COMPENSATORY CONTACT
	After section 11P of the Children Act 1989 (inserted by section 5 of this Act) insert—
	"11Q COMPENSATORY CONTACT
	(1) This section applies if a contact order with respect to a child has been made.
	(2) If the court is satisfied that—
	(a) an individual has failed to comply with the contact order; and
	(b) a person falling within subsection (6) has been deprived of contact time by reason of the breach,
	it may make an order granting additional contact time between the person and the child concerned with a view to mitigating the effect of the breach.
	(3) But the court may not make an order under subsection (2) if it is satisfied that the individual in breach had a reasonable excuse for failing to comply with the contact order.
	(4) The burden of proof as to the matter mentioned in subsection (3) lies on the individual claiming to have had a reasonable excuse.
	(5) An order under subsection (2) may be made only on an application by the person who claims to have been deprived of contact time.
	(6) A person falls within this subsection if he is—
	(a) the person who is, for the purposes of the contact order, the person with whom the child concerned lives or is to live;
	(b) the person whose contact with the child concerned is provided for in the contact order;
	(c) an individual subject to a condition under section 11(7)(b) or a contact activity condition imposed by the contact order; or
	(d) the child concerned.
	(7) Where the person proposing to apply for an order under subsection (2) is the child concerned, the child must obtain the leave of the court before making such an application.
	(8) The court may grant leave to the child concerned only if it is satisfied that he has sufficient understanding to make the proposed application.
	(9) Subsection (2) has effect subject to the restrictions in section 11S.
	(10) Proceedings in which any question of making an order under subsection (2) arises are to be regarded for the purposes of section 11(1) and (2) as proceedings in which a question arises with respect to a section 8 order.
	(11) In exercising its powers under this section, a court must treat as paramount the interests of the child concerned.
	11S ORDERS UNDER SECTION 11R(2): FURTHER PROVISION
	(1) A court may not make an order under section 11R(2) granting additional contact time between a person and the child concerned following the failure by an individual to comply with a contact order unless it is satisfied that before the failure occurred the individual had been given (in accordance with rules of court) a copy of, or otherwise informed of the terms of—
	(a) in the case of a failure to comply with a contact order that was varied before the failure occurred, a notice under section 11I relating to the order varying the contact order or, where more than one such order has been made, the last order preceding the failure in question; and
	(b) in any other case, a notice under section 11I relating to the contact order.
	(2) A court may not make an order under section 11R(2) in pursuance of a failure by an individual to comply with a contact order where the failure occurred before the individual attained the age of 18.
	(3) A court may not make an order under section 11R(2) in respect of a failure by an individual to comply with a contact order that is an excepted order (within the meaning given by section 11B(4)).""

Earl Howe: My Lords, perhaps I may begin with an apology. For some reason, of which I am not fully aware, the text of the amendment was printed with errors that make it incoherent. The second part of the amendment refers to Section 11R when it should refer to Section 11Q. Similarly references to Section 11S should properly read Section 11R. I am sorry about the confusion.
	The purpose of the amendment is, I hope, clear. It proposes that where a contact order has been breached and a non-resident parent has thereby been deprived of contact time, it should be open to the court to consider whether the non-resident parent should have that lost contact time made up to him. The Minister may say to me that the courts can do that anyway. The problem is that they do not. I believe that only a specific provision in the Bill will act as a signpost to the courts to put right a wrong that has been done. It is not only an issue of natural justice, it would also be a deterrent; and, above all, it is potentially in the interests of the child. Each case, however, would be judged on its own merits.
	I hope the Minister will take on board the thrust of the amendment at the very least and that she will have some words of encouragement for me. I beg to move.

Baroness Howarth of Breckland: My Lords, I think that it would be very difficult to put the provision into operation, except to say that the child's needs must be paramount again. It is the old argument. I do not see how you compensate in difficult situations between two adults without causing problems for the child.
	The other point that I should like to make—I had wanted to get it in for the whole of the Bill, and I only wish that I had tabled an amendment—is that if we are to have this kind of measure, we really should find a way of ensuring that men and women, but mainly fathers, I fear, who fail to keep their side of the contact bargain when they are the non-resident partner are encouraged to do so by similar amendments. I am sorry that I have not done that. However, I would like to place on record my view that, in considering these matters, we should ensure that non-resident parents who make and break promises are as much at fault as any resident parent trying to care for children who also breaches those promises.

Baroness Ashton of Upholland: My Lords, I think that we would all agree with the sentiments expressed by the noble Earl, Lord Howe, and the noble Baroness, Lady Howarth. It is important that promises made to children are kept. Distress can be caused by a parent not showing up for a contact arrangement, to which a child may have looked forward, and, equally, by one parent refusing to allow a child to see the other parent. I accept the sentiment behind these amendments.
	As the noble Earl quite rightly predicted, I do say that the courts are able to do this already. They can use their discretion; they can decide what form a new order should take; and, if it is thought that it should embody some form of compensatory contact for the child's sake, that indeed is what they will order. We know that in his evidence to the Constitutional Affairs Select Committee, in answer to a question from Dr Whitehead regarding whether consideration had been given to the idea of financial compensatory contact, Lord Justice Wall said:
	"As a matter of practice, it happens. That is a regular order that would be made. If a contract is frustrated on a particular occasion, the court will almost invariably seek to make it up in some way or another".
	Therefore, although I understand the noble Earl's sentiment, the evidence from Lord Justice Wall is that that would be the case.
	Underlying that, what really matters is the speed with which it is done. One of the issues raised by fathers' groups is that they are denied contact because Mum is not at home with the child when they visit or because something else has happened, and it takes quite a long time for them to return to court to deal with the issue. That is why we are extending the monitoring role of CAFCASS. Under Clause 2 of the Bill, the court can ask the CAFCASS officer to arrange for the monitoring of contact in any case. The purpose of that is to be able to say, "Did contact happen?" and, if it did not, to enable the CAFCASS officer to apply to the court to have the parent brought back before it very quickly. In that event, one would not end up with the situation, about which some fathers have spoken to me, that a new status quo evolves in which the parent does not see the child very much and feels that the courts are reluctant to undermine that when that is what the child has been used to. The court has the power to bring back before it quickly any offending parent. There is some evidence from the judges that that happens, and they certainly feel very strongly about it. I therefore hope that we can resolve this important issue and that parents will be able to feel that if they do not get contact they will be given compensatory time and that it will be dealt with swiftly. On that basis, I hope that the noble Earl will feel able to withdraw his amendment.

Earl Howe: My Lords, I am grateful to both noble Baronesses. I suspected that the noble Baroness, Lady Howarth, might criticise the amendment for being too parent-centred, which is why I included in it a specific reference to the paramountcy principle. However, I do not see what is wrong with saying that the court has this option at its disposal while all the time being required to have regard to the paramountcy principle.
	Of course, the statement by Lord Justice Wall is very welcome, but those who have made representations to me have said that although some judges may have this point at the forefront of their minds, others do not. That is perhaps not something that we can settle today, beyond my telling the Minister that I welcome her recognition of this issue and that the courts, in appropriate circumstances, should be encouraged to look at it as an option in the menu. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
	[Amendment No. 25A not moved.]

Lord Northbourne: moved Amendment No. 26:
	After Clause 6, insert the following new clause—
	"FUNDING OF COURTS AND CAFCASS: SECRETARY OF STATE'S DUTY
	In order to enable the courts and CAFCASS to fulfil their responsibilities under Part 1 of this Act and, in particular, to reach informed judgments on—
	(a) the circumstances of the child, and
	(b) the order most likely to be in the child's best interests,
	the Secretary of State shall provide the courts and CAFCASS with adequate funding and other resources."

Lord Northbourne: My Lords, the Government's case for arguing that we do not need to amend this Bill rests on Clause 1 of the Children Act 1989 relating to the paramountcy of the welfare of the child. If the courts require that the child's welfare should be the court's paramount consideration, should not the Government also be required to be concerned to ensure that the child's welfare is their paramount consideration? Such inquiries as I have been able to make have convinced me that at present that is not the case.
	The report Domestic Violence, Safety and Family Proceedings quotes criticisms of CAFCASS which clearly relate to inadequately trained staff and pressure of work on staff. CAFCASS is, I believe, struggling manfully to build a team of able, well-qualified officers and to reform the way that it works. To do this job properly over time will involve more resources, not just a few million pounds found from some other budget, but a reliable and consistent funding stream adequate to do the job and to do it to a standard that will, where necessary, ensure the paramount importance of the welfare of each child, not forgetting that there are, alas, an ever increasing number of such children.
	At least five Members of the House—the noble Baronesses, Lady Pitkeathley, Lady Howarth, Lady Morris and Lady Walmsley, and the noble Earl, Lord Listowel—referred in this debate to the problems of funding and staffing of CAFCASS in developing its new role. Children have only one chance to grow up. We should not short-change this chance by prejudicing the ability of CAFCASS to fund its activities. In addition, the evidence seems also to indicate that the courts are underfunded and understaffed, causing substantial delays—one of the most serious problems to the effective functioning of the present system. To resolve this problem will need more specialist judicial capacity and a management organisation and ethos that recognises the importance of early intervention and avoidance of delay in proceedings. That, too, will cost money. It will also need a committed and prioritised source of dedicated Treasury funding.
	This is a probing amendment to give the Government an opportunity to tell the House what their funding plans are. It will also give noble Lords more expert than I a chance to tell the House whether and to what extent CAFCASS and the family courts are adequately funded or underfunded today. If the Government argue that this is a money matter which should be reserved to another place, I will explain that I do not intend to place a money issue in the Bill. However, this House has the right to be satisfied that the resources will be available for the additional loads that this Bill will place on the courts and CAFCASS. I beg to move.

Baroness Walmsley: My Lords, I added my name to this amendment not because I do not accept that it may be on the edge of the competency of this House in relation to financial matters, but in order to give general support to the spirit of the amendment that the Government should put their money where their intentions are. I welcomed the statement made by the Minister earlier this evening in relation to Amendment No. 22, when he made it quite clear that the Government will ensure that the resources are available to do the risk assessments that we have now included in the Bill. It is a great shame that we are now in a situation whereby, on average, there is about 16 weeks' waiting time up to the first appointment in most areas. I heard from a district judge only a few days ago that in some areas it is 20 weeks. That is four or five months out of a child's life before even the first appointment for the report to be written, which really is an unacceptable delay.
	I also had great difficulty believing my ears when I heard the Minister suggest in Committee that CAFCASS does not require any further resources to be available to implement the various measures in the Bill because of savings that will be made in other areas of its work. I would be very surprised if the workload in any of its areas of responsibility were reduced, or if the need were reduced, in order to take account of the various measures that we are putting in place in this Bill.
	In addition, the voice of the child is missing from the Bill. I am aware from talking to practitioners that it takes quite a long time to listen to children; you usually have to do it in the home, take time over it and be extremely sensitive about it. It is something that takes practitioners quite a long time. If we are to do more of that, as we all agree we should, there will be an even greater workload on the CAFCASS officials.
	Therefore it is in agreeing with the spirit of the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Northbourne, rather than making any particular manifesto commitments from these Benches, that I support him. I hope that the Minister will be able to extend the undertaking that he gave us in relation to Amendment No. 27 and reassure us that the resources will be available for pay, for the amount of hours needed to do the job well and for training and recruiting the very best social workers to CAFCASS.

Baroness Pitkeathley: My Lords, I ask the leave of the House in speaking to this amendment, as I clearly have a vested interest in it. I thank the noble Lord for moving it—and your Lordships will not be surprised to know that I do not oppose it. I very much welcome the fact that it mentions both the courts and CAFCASS, because it is important for proper resources to be made available for all contact activities in the court, whether they are mediation services, contact centres, parenting education or other input such as perpetrator programmes and so on.
	I am too experienced a campaigner and chair of non-departmental bodies to ask for unlimited or even adequate funds, or even for very limited funds, without making a proper case. I am only too ready to admit the faults and shortcomings of CAFCASS in its early years. But I emphasise now that the CAFCASS board is committed to reforming and improving CAFCASS, and we do not want that aim to be jeopardised by a lack of small amounts, in the scheme of things, of extra money.
	We have not hesitated, even with major budget difficulties, to drive through a range of practice and productivity improvements that have included a drastic reduction in national office staffing levels, devolving more budgets to frontline services, controlling public law backlogs, despite increasing demand of up to 20 per cent in some regions. But that has been at the cost of being able to give the pay rises that our hard-worked staff deserved and at the cost, too, of seriously putting a brake on much-needed training programmes and upgrading of vital IT systems. So we are already at the limit and could not possibly deliver on the extra responsibilities placed on us without extra resources, unless the expectations of other organisations in the system change as we have always maintained that they must for us to deliver within existing resources. Our staff are ready and willing to change their private law practice—for example, on early intervention models instead of long reports; but we can do that only if the culture surrounding some courts changes. If resources are released in that way, we can redirect them. That requires a major culture change, however, and a change in the trend of cases to become ever more complex. That is a worry to us.
	We also face great competition for our workforce. As we heard today, local authorities are increasing their rates of pay, and we cannot compete with those. We are attempting to strengthen our infrastructure, which has always been needed, but it is a constant struggle, and the demands that we make of our staff endanger morale.
	The proposals in the Bill offer huge opportunities for a new way of working with children and families, but we cannot do that justice without proper resources. Moreover, I remind your Lordships that investment in families at a time of such great difficulties saves vast amounts of money later on, by lessening the impact of family breakdown on the children's ability to achieve in later life. We must always bear that in mind whenever there is any discussion of resources.

Baroness Morris of Bolton: My Lords, my honourable friend Tim Lawton put down a Written Question in another place on Friday 14 October—I am very impressed that it was answered by Monday 17 October—asking the Secretary of State for Education and Skills what funding had been given to CAFCASS in each of the past five years and how much was planned for 2005–06 and 2006–07. Although this rose considerably from 2001–02, from £80.8 million to £107 million in 2004–05, in 2005–06 it is £101 million because £6 million was transferred to Wales. It looks as if it is frozen for 2006–07 at £101 million. At a time when CAFCASS is going to be required to do more, it seems that its budget is frozen. Will the Minister comment on that?

Baroness Howarth of Breckland: My Lords, I do not want to repeat what the noble Baroness, Lady Pitkeathley, has said. I also have to ask for the leave of the House as deputy chair—I clearly have a vested interest.
	I begin by thanking the Government for the money that they have already put into the system. When the noble Baroness and I were invited to see whether CAFCASS was viable, which it certainly is—I think that is what we were really asked to do, rather than get it going—we had to see whether the budget met the needs, because no one actually knew. Now we know that it is not really adequate to meet the baseline service. Most of the services that you are involved in will put somewhere near 3 per cent of their budget into training, although it depends how you add that up. At the moment, we have hardly any training budget. We train by our staff putting in, and by conferences that other people are putting in, and by helping each other to improve the service.
	We need to improve all that. To do that, as the noble Baroness, Lady Pitkeathley, said, we have halved the staff at headquarters, significantly reduced the senior staff and devolved our services. That is a modernisation programme in a year that many organisations would give their eye teeth to have achieved. It is a substantial achievement.
	We do not need the megabucks that we have already been given to make the difference. We need enough to make the service work, to have decent training and to have basic IT for our case-recording service, which will save time and money if we can only get it up. I know there are particular funds for IT. If only we could get some of that money. We need enough to ensure that, as has been said several times here, we can pay a decent staff a decent wage to do a decent job.
	Every day matters. Every day, we have to ensure that children are not waiting to have their reports; that they are not waiting to be seen or to be heard. That is our commitment, but we need help and support in order to achieve it, as well as for the surrounding services and CAFCASS to be involved in the development of contact centres and the kind of work that it is doing extraneous to the day-to-day work in court. We have been helped considerably by the Government. We are grateful for that. To complete the job we need that help to continue.

The Earl of Listowel: My Lords, perhaps I can quote from the report that we have been discussing. Under "Overall assessment" the report says:
	"a system to improve the standard of practice overall has not been implemented and accountability for service delivery is deficient throughout CAFCASS. There is a disconcerting culture of rush and hurry in CAFCASS but practitioners do not make best use of the time available . . . The nature of domestic abuse is not sufficiently understood by most CAFCASS practitioners; the routine approaches used by CAFCASS do not assess risk and some are dangerous. There is a worrying lack of attention to safety planning throughout CAFCASS".
	The problem is not just one of funding. There is much work to do. I know that my noble friend and the noble Baroness, Lady Pitkeathley, are working extremely hard to take the system forward. I understand that the toolkit that they have introduced on assessments for domestic violence is a welcome innovation and meets some of the concerns in the report. However, we need to give the organisation all the support that we can—financially and in other ways.
	I refer to the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley, about representation of the voice of the child in such proceedings. A concern was raised in the recent Joint Chief Inspectors' report, Safeguarding Children, involving children in court proceedings. That has to be done in an extremely sensitive manner, as was pointed out in the longitudinal report with which the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, provided me. Younger children can find themselves being caught between a rock and a hard place, if they feel that they are put in the position of having to choose between one parent and the other, but older children want to be part of the process and want to give their views on it. Professional work needs to be carried out. I thank my noble friend for tabling the amendment.

Lord Adonis: My Lords, I pay tribute to my noble friend Lady Pitkeathley, to the noble Baroness, Lady Howarth, and to their senior management team at CAFCASS for the remarkable work that they have done in the past year in turning round the organisation. The figures given by my noble friend on the efficiencies that have been procured and the redeployment of resources to the front line speak for themselves in the effect that they are making on the organisation. We greatly appreciate the work that they have been doing. We recognise the pressure under which their staff work, and we are committed to seeing that they are properly resourced.
	All the way through the passage of the Bill, concerns have been expressed that the resourcing should be adequate to the tasks that Parliament wants to impose on various departments and agencies concerned with taking forward the agenda. I shall repeat what I have said at every stage of the debates: we are mindful of those new responsibilities, and we regard it as a duty on us to see that the resourcing is adequate. However, I cannot enter into spending commitments for future years because I am simply not in a position to do so, although I can say to the noble Baroness, Lady Morris, that funding decisions for CAFCASS for next year, 2006–07, have not yet been made. My department is monitoring the current financial position of CAFCASS, and there are ongoing discussions about budget pressures with the chair, the chief executive and my department. I thought that she was very fair-minded in her comments, and she pointed out, in a remarkable display of efficiency by the DfES, that she received a written reply through her honourable friend in three days—that must be almost without precedent in the history of the DfES.
	The figures for investment in CAFCASS over the past four years have risen significantly, as the noble Baroness said. They rose from £80.8 million in 2001 to £95 million in 2003–04 up to £107 million in 2004–05, which included £12 million extra to improve training and to remove the backlog of cases. We have sustained that funding for this year, which needs to be seen against the backdrop of the significant increase in funding over the previous three years.
	I know that my noble friend will immediately say that further resources are needed, so I shall not push the point too far, but I believe that our good faith has been demonstrated, as it has in the funding of mediation services, to which my noble friend Lady Ashton referred, where again there was a significant increase in funding. On the funding for supervised contact centres, which is a cause dear to the heart of the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, we have had significant increases—£3.5 million for contact centres next year, rising to £4.5 million in 2007–08. However, I appreciate the additional pressures and burdens that will be imposed on the various services and the increased demands that there will be in future years. All I can say, as I say on every occasion that we debate the matter, is that we are mindful of the pressures when we allocate funding in future years. We would not be before the House today proposing this legislation if we did not regard it as important that those additional services were provided. I hope that we can meet the concerns that have been expressed in the House to the satisfaction of noble Lords when we announce funding settlements for future years.

Lord Northbourne: My Lords, I am extremely grateful to all noble Lords who have taken part in the debate and to the Minister for that helpful and broadly encouraging reply. I know that the process of government is different from business, but would any managing director come before his board and say, "Gentlemen, we are proposing all these wonderful changes, but we do not know how we are going to pay for them"? That is not for real. I wish that the Government had a system—I do not suppose that governments ever have had or ever will have such a system—whereby they could approach the Treasury before coming forward with ideas of this kind, so that when they come to Parliament they know that they will be able to implement them. At the moment, whatever we pass or do not pass today or at Third Reading, we will not know whether it will be possible to implement it because we do not know whether the right honourable gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer will cough up the funds when the time comes. It is a highly unsatisfactory situation. However, we are doing our best.
	I am most grateful to the Ministers, the noble Baroness, Lady Ashton of Upholland, and the noble Lord, Lord Adonis. I know that they are deeply committed to this objective. I wish them good luck in their negotiations with the Treasury. We should support them in every way that we can. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Baroness Thornton: moved Amendment No. 27:
	After Clause 6, insert the following new clause—
	"RISK ASSESSMENTS
	After section 16 of the Children Act 1989 (c. 41) insert—
	"16A RISK ASSESSMENTS
	(1) This section applies to the following functions of officers of the Service or Welsh family proceedings officers—
	(a) any function in connection with family proceedings in which the court has power to make an order under this Part with respect to a child or in which a question with respect to such an order arises;
	(b) any function in connection with an order made by the court in such proceedings.
	(2) If, in carrying out any function to which this section applies, an officer of the Service or a Welsh family proceedings officer is given cause to suspect that the child concerned is at risk of harm, he must—
	(a) make a risk assessment in relation to the child, and
	(b) provide the risk assessment to the court.
	(3) A risk assessment, in relation to a child who is at risk of suffering harm of a particular sort, is an assessment of the risk of that harm being suffered by the child.""
	On Question, amendment agreed to.

Baroness Morris of Bolton: moved Amendment No. 28:
	After Clause 7, insert the following new clause—
	"REMOVAL OF CHILD FROM JURISDICTION
	The Secretary of State shall lay before Parliament proposals to strengthen the efficacy of the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction agreed at the Hague on 25th October 1980."

Baroness Morris of Bolton: My Lords, as your Lordships know, the Hague Convention is a multilateral treaty that seeks to protect children from the harmful effects of abduction and retention across international boundaries by providing a procedure to bring about their prompt return. I have retabled the amendment to discuss in more detail some of the responses that the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, provided in Grand Committee and in his letter of 24 October, for which I thank him.
	In Committee, I raised concerns that had been expressed about the effective implementation of our duties under the Hague Convention and the use of the International Child Abduction and Contact Unit (ICACU)—concerns about whether we really are addressing the scale of the problem. The noble Lord, Lord Adonis, argued in Grand Committee that the convention,
	"is generally recognised as working well and we play a full part in it".—[Official Report, 17/10/05; col. GC 165.]
	I would suggest that only with the true statistics will we be able to clarify if that is indeed the case. I understand the need to protect vulnerable children who may be involved in cases, but surely there must be a way to publish the figures separately from case details. As it stands, we have no idea exactly how many children are abducted by a parent every year.
	Have the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, or the noble Baroness, Lady Ashton, seen a copy of PACT's report Every Five Minutes—indeed, they have, it is available—which is a review of the available data on missing children in the UK? It highlights the fact that every five minutes a child is reported missing in the UK. Alongside the human and social cost, missing children must be one of the urgent social issues of our time. Will the Minister's department respond to the report and, if so, when will that response be published?
	The noble Lord, Lord Adonis, said in Grand Committee that the International Child Abduction and Contact Unit in the office of the Official Solicitor, as well as processing applications for return and contact, provides information to parents. I wonder whether the Minister can clarify that information. Does it include legal advice, or just a list of practitioners to whom parents can go for advice? What happens if parents cannot afford legal practitioners?
	In Committee, the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, discussed the Child Abduction Co-ordination Group. Will the Minister explain the most recent suggestions on new ways to prevent abduction and say whether the Government will be implementing them?
	We were glad to hear that the convention was kept under review by the Hague Permanent Bureau through a series of regular special commissions. As the Minister highlighted, the second commission in 2002 concluded that improved contact arrangements could reduce the risk of abduction. Indeed, in the current Hague Project on Preventive Measures, the background document states:
	"Orders or agreements may be sought during, for example, divorce or custody hearings, which prohibit the unilateral removal of a child from a jurisdiction. Such pre-emptive prohibitions at a stage when the parents have possibly never even contemplated abduction may alert them to the potential illegality of any removal. Thus abductions may be averted as a parent is made aware of the need to contact the other parent in order to discuss potential removals".
	I wonder whether the Government have responded to the Hague questionnaire on preventive issues. Did they respond last year to the one on enforcement?
	As a solicitor has highlighted to us, the arrangements for contact in the family law system often make parents unreasonable, thus contributing to the possibility that one will resort to abducting their child. That is why we strongly propose the inclusion of co-parenting and reasonable contact, both of which proposals have been defeated. We need to focus on prevention rather than cure, although we recognise what the Government are trying to do with contact activities and enforcement.
	Abduction is the most dramatic strand of parent alienation, which has critical effects on the child's welfare and mental well-being. I do not know whether this is the right amendment. I do not know whether there is a right amendment to be made to the Bill. We just felt that the matter was of sufficient importance to debate. I beg to move.

Baroness Barker: My Lords, I offer our support to the noble Baroness, Lady Morris. I do so principally because I watched a couple of television programmes on the subject that were some of the most harrowing that I have ever seen. I understand that, although PACT may not be the Government's favourite organisation at this moment, it is important that people who may wind up in this situation are alerted as early as possible to that possibility.
	In Grand Committee, I asked whether the Minister could supply information about which countries and which jurisdictions were the main ones to which children had been abducted and not returned. I am pleased to say that the Minster supplied it. I am interested, as I have been throughout the Bill's passage, in the extent to which practitioners and parents can be given information and resources to enable them to deal with the situation that emerges. As well as monitoring aspects of the convention, which the Government must do, do they provide resources, particularly to the voluntary organisations that are in touch with parents, to allow them to pass on information and experience to each other? I know a number of women—it is usually women in this situation—who, although they have not succeeded in getting their children back, have had limited contact with them in the country to which they have been abducted. That is not wonderful, but it is something, and it is better than nothing. If the experiences of individuals who have battled their way through different legal systems could be made available to people who one day find themselves in a horrifying situation that they never envisaged when they started out on life, that would be of enormous benefit. Just as we have been arguing on the domestic scene, on the international scene it is also about trying to enable good practice to be handed on between parents.

Baroness Ashton of Upholland: My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness for raising this incredibly important issue. I am the Minister responsible for the Hague Convention, so I am delighted to be able to discuss it.
	I have got the PACT report. I have no views about PACT as an organisation; it seems to be doing an extremely good job. I have already committed my officials to talking to PACT, because a lot of the issues that have been raised by both noble Baronesses should be dealt with by good conversations about what happens. We fund an organisation called Reunite, which offers help and support 24 hours a day, seven days a week to parents who may find themselves in this situation. I take on board the comments of the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, about what more we could do to give parents greater support by knowing about other situations that have been relevant in particular countries.
	We keep a lot more statistics than we publish, and the reason why we do not publish them is that we have grave concerns about identifying the children involved. So we know a lot more; I know about all the individual cases that come to my attention. We are keen to ensure that this is kept under review. I do a lot of work with my counterparts in Europe where we may have a particular issue with an individual country where you can see from the statistics that perhaps more needs to be done. We have bilaterals going on between officials and between me and my fellow Ministers to raise issues and try to deal with them speedily as possible. Noble Lords know that my department acts as a "central authority" to process applications and to provide information to parents. I cannot get an answer in time on the specific question about legal advice, so I shall write to the noble Baroness.

Baroness Barker: My Lords, for clarification, will the noble Baroness say whether, when she talks about dealing with her opposite numbers in Europe where there is a particular problem with a country, she means countries in the European Union or countries outside the European Union with which all member states have problems?

Baroness Ashton of Upholland: My Lords, I mean countries in the European Union and countries involved with the Hague Convention. We are also keen to ensure that as many countries as possible participate in, join and sign the Hague Convention. I cannot talk about specific things that I am doing at present, but we are keen to ensure that we use our efforts, particularly during the EU presidency, to persuade more countries to be involved in it, for obvious reasons. That is something that I feel strongly about and something that we have done a lot of work on to ensure that it happens well.
	I appreciate that the situation is by no means perfect. We are trying to support the voluntary sector, and we are trying to support parents as far as we can. I take on board the comments that have been made. Officials will meet with PACT to discuss what else can be done. I have more statistics, but I cannot and will not release them for the obvious reasons that I have given. I am keen to ensure that we play our full part in the convention and that we support families who are dealing with impossible and harrowing circumstances, as the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, said. I do not think that it is the right place make the amendment, but I am delighted to have had the chance to talk about some of the work that I am doing. On that basis, I hope that the noble Baroness will feel able to withdraw her amendment.

Baroness Morris of Bolton: My Lords, I thank the Minister for her sensitive reply. I am glad that her officials will contact PACT. I like the idea expressed by the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, of government funding for voluntary organisations working in the distressing field of abduction, and I hope that the Government will consider that. I also look forward to receiving the letter from the Minister. In Grand Committee, I said that the words "you will never see your child again" must strike fear in the heart of every parent, and we hope that everything is done to help parents in that most distressing situation. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
	[Amendment No. 29 not moved.]

Baroness Walmsley: moved Amendment No. 30:
	After Clause 7, insert the following new clause—
	"GUIDANCE
	(1) The Secretary of State must issue guidance to the court.
	(2) The guidance must outline the circumstances under which the court should exercise its powers under section 37 of the Children Act 1989 (c. 41) (powers of court in certain family proceedings) in order to achieve the best interests of the child.
	(3) Before publishing guidance under subsection (1), the Secretary of State shall consult and seek approval from—
	(a) experts in the development and safety of children;
	(b) the family courts of England and Wales;
	(c) any other person who appears to him to have an interest or expertise in the issue.
	(4) The Secretary of State may not issue the first edition of this guidance unless a draft has been laid before, and approved by resolution of, each House of Parliament.
	(5) The Secretary of State may, from time to time, revise the guidance, subject to the provisions of subsection (3)."

Baroness Walmsley: My Lords, this is the other leg of my child safety priority agenda this evening and I hope that it will find favour with the House.
	There are two important contexts in which harm typically needs to be addressed in private law cases. The first is the clear evidence that children being exposed to ongoing conflict between parents causes them emotional harm. That point has already been alluded to. It can arise as a result of the contested proceedings themselves and is recognised in Section 31 of the Children Act 2002, as amended. The second is where allegations of harm are made by one party against the other, which obviously need to be investigated as a matter of urgency to ascertain the risk to the child, either from the allegation of harm being substantiated, or emotional harm being caused by a false allegation of harm being made by one warring parent against another, possibly to boost their case in respect of another issue.
	It is imperative that harm is explored precipitately once evidence of it emerges in whichever of these contexts and that where there is prima facie evidence of harm the court uses its powers to direct the local authority to investigate under Section 37 of the Children Act 1989. Thereafter the public law provisions of that Act would be invoked to ensure the child's safety and protection unless inquiries by the local authority under Section 37 reveal absolutely no evidence of harm.
	It is very important that the private law provisions of the Children Act focus on private law issues and do not attempt to be a second-tier system for protecting children, which would replicate or worse still dilute the existing protection system and inevitably confuse practitioners, leaving children at greater risk of harm. The best way to avoid this would be to issue guidance to courts on when and how the Section 37 powers should be exercised, which is why I have tabled this amendment. Section 37 is the vehicle that gets private law cases into public law so that they can then be dealt with.
	I have set down a process to devise the way in which guidance for the courts on the consistent exercise of Section 37 powers should be done in cases where there have been allegations of harm or in particularly high conflict cases. My intention is to bring more consistency and rigour into the whole process. I have reason to believe that such guidance would be welcomed by the courts.
	I draw the attention of the House to the wording of my amendment. Subsection (2) refers to the guidance being used,
	"in order to achieve the best interests of the child".
	Subsection (3)(a) provides that the Secretary of State shall, before publishing the guidance, consult and seek approval from,
	"experts in the development and safety of children".
	It is of course important to consult child development experts but in this particular case people who know about the issues relating to the safety of children should also be consulted when devising such guidance.
	My amendment also provides that the draft of the guidance should be laid before and approved by resolution of each House of Parliament. That would make it quite a strong vehicle for bringing consistency and rigour into the system. Standing alongside the successful amendment tabled by the noble Baronesses, Lady Gould of Potternewton and Lady Thornton, an amendment such as this would certainly help to satisfy all of us that the issues about potential harm to children are being addressed seriously. I beg to move.

The Earl of Listowel: My Lords, this is an interesting amendment. In the chief inspector's foreword to the HMICA report, he states:
	"We also need to recognise how emotionally wearing it is for the wide range of professionals who have to deal with domestic violence on a near daily basis. As this inspection shows, there is a risk that individuals within agencies sometimes find it easier to down-play or even ignore the presenting signs of domestic violence".
	My assessment from the report is that there may be a serious concern about what is going on in a family, but the CAFCASS officers do not know what to do with it, so they shove it under the carpet, metaphorically speaking, or turn away from it. That is partly because they are worn down by the difficult cases with which they are faced, and partly because they do not know where to take such concerns. What I welcome about the amendment is that it says, "If you have serious concerns about the family, we will improve the connection with the professional interventions in public law to make sure that they are dealt with". I look forward to the Minister's response, and thank the noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley, for tabling the amendment.

Baroness Thornton: My Lords, I also think that the amendment is interesting, because the debates on the subject in this House over the past few years have centred around how we make sure that children involved in private law proceedings are granted at least the same protection as those involved in public law proceedings. That is a legitimate question to ask the Government, and one to which we should have an answer. The amendment may not be the way to do it, but the Government should address it.

Baroness Howarth of Breckland: My Lords, at this late hour, I almost did not get up to speak. I simply want to say that it is an absolutely legitimate concern to ensure that we look at the cases on their needs, rather than on which way they come through the system. Although I am not sure that the amendment is the vehicle by which we achieve that, because guidance in the area is always difficult to get exactly right, CAFCASS is looking at the matter in practice. You will see that in everyday matters. We are attending to it. The situation cannot be allowed to continue in which you spend six times as much time on a public law case as on a private law case, when the circumstances of those cases are difficult to distinguish. The service—and, I am sure, the Government—are determined to put that right. I am not sure that guidance will help us, but it is worth being prodded to get the practice right.

Lord Adonis: My Lords, we are grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley, for raising the issue. We have demonstrated, both in the amendments that I have moved this evening and in those that we have accepted from my noble friends, that we take the safety of children and all legislative and other means for ensuring that they are protected very seriously. That applies to the concerns raised by the noble Baroness too. I am not entirely closed-minded about the issues that she raises. As we have shown, we are prepared to consider all issues relating to child safety again and again where we think that changes would lead to a better regime for the protection of children.
	I invite the noble Baroness perhaps to tell me in more detail her concerns after the debate. She made a rather enigmatic remark about the courts not being unwelcoming—I think that was her phrase; it was something of that kind—to such guidance, or her having reason to believe that they might welcome it. I would very much welcome any information that she could give me on that, as our advice is that the courts are content with the status quo and have not exhibited any concerns about the absence of guidance for using their powers. Their powers as set out under Section 37 of the 1989 Act are very robust in the instructions that they can give to local authorities for the investigation of cases where there could be a public law dimension, and in which care orders or other interventions may be required.
	Our current position—subject to further discussion, which I am prepared to undertake—is that we do not see a case for the further guidance because it would meet no need. Therefore, it would not lead to an improved regime. Indeed, we are somewhat concerned that issuing guidance by the Secretary of State, as the amendment suggests, could even have the effect of limiting the discretion of the judiciary, despite all the eminent people that the noble Baroness suggests we should consult. We would then have to lay down the specific cases, or give indications of what those cases would be, where they should act, which could only have the effect of circumscribing the discretion of the courts, unless the guidance was so general that it did not serve to amplify in any way on Section 37 of the 1989 Act.
	We see this in the context of the amendments we have passed today. These amendments strengthen investigating procedures in respect of children who may be at risk. Amendment No. 27 moved by my noble friend Lady Gould sets out the statutory approach that we have now agreed to risk assessment. CAFCASS has made it clear that if its risk assessments alert it to concerns for children, it will take the opportunity to refer them directly to the local authority to make the necessary investigations under Section 37 of the 1989 Act.
	Taking all this together, we are not at the moment persuaded that there is a case for further change, but we are mindful of the need to do everything we reasonably can to meet concerns about child safety. If the noble Baroness wishes to amplify on her earlier remarks to me, I would be happy to look at the matter further.

Baroness Walmsley: My Lords, I thank the Minister for his response and other noble Lords for their support for the idea of this amendment. I am sure that it would not be beyond the capability of the Government and their lawyers to draft guidance which, while setting down the range of circumstances under which these powers should be used, could at the same time make it clear that the discretion of the court was not fettered or limited to those situations. One would not want to fetter the court. Perhaps a practice note to go with such guidance might be helpful. My enigmatic remark related to conversations I have had in confidence with members of the judiciary, so I cannot go any further than that.
	I am particularly taken by the comments of the noble Baroness, Lady Howarth of Breckland, about the amount of time spent on children in public law and private law. I am looking for rigour and consistency and I do not argue for one moment that the Section 37 powers are not robust. What we want is for them to be used and used consistently. It is like the risk assessment issue—some people did it but others did not. In some circumstances where they did not, there may have been a problem. This is why the noble Baroness wanted to introduce her successful amendment. My approach is the same. In some cases these powers are used perfectly appropriately; in others, one has the feeling that there are situations where there should be intervention and there is none. That is why I think guidance might be helpful.
	It is not the answer to everything—guidance is only guidance. But it can have considerable power when it relates to issues like this, where a child could be killed if the courts did not use the powers appropriately. The pressure on them to comply with the guidance would be considerable. I am sure all the expert practitioners in the country would want to contribute to the consultations that take place before the publication of these guidelines. I am sure the Government would not be short of experts to advise them on such guidance.
	I have listened to what the Minister said. Perhaps we can have a conversation about this issue before the next stage of the Bill. I tabled the amendment in the spirit of the constructive development of the safety issues of the Bill. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
	Clause 12 [Power to charge]:

Earl Howe: moved Amendment No. 31:
	Leave out Clause 12.

Earl Howe: My Lords, I make no apology for returning to an issue that we debated briefly in Grand Committee; namely, the provisions in Clause 12. It was clear from our earlier debates that there is an issue of principle here about which we and the Government are in fundamental disagreement. The Government propose to levy charges for the work done by departmental officials in connection with intercountry adoptions. They justify that by saying that this work is a personal service and that the money could be better spent elsewhere. I am the first to agree that no public expenditure is trivial. But we are looking here at saving a sum of money which in the departmental context is small but which to individual adopters could well be substantial. That situation, frankly, does not commend itself to me.
	More importantly, however, I take issue with the argument that this is a personal service. It is surely no such thing. It is in essence nothing more nor less than child protection work. Where else in this country do public authorities charge for child protection? In the case of intercountry adoptions we have entered into international obligations to ensure that those children who are adopted from abroad are not exploited or otherwise improperly treated. So I ask the question that I posed in Grand Committee. Since when has it been thought right to transfer the cost of meeting those obligations from the public purse to private citizens?
	I should be very grateful if the Minister was able to answer those points, because bodies such as BAAF which concern themselves with intercountry as well as domestic adoptions regard Clause 12 as a clear and unwelcome signal from government that intercountry adoption, for all the fine words heard during the passage of the 1999 Act, is seen as a low status activity in comparison with domestic adoption. I have to say that that is the only logical conclusion that can be drawn from this clause. I beg to move.

Baroness Barker: My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Earl, Lord Howe, for returning to this subject, not least because it enables me again to ask the Minister a question that I asked in Grand Committee and I believe has not yet been answered. The service is provided not only to individuals seeking to adopt but is a service that is provided to others including local authorities. Can the Minister explain whether the department, in its costings and reaching its figure of £240,000, has separated out the service to individuals from the service that will be more widely used?

Lord Adonis: My Lords, I am well aware that I am arguing the least popular cause of all this evening and that my comments will not make many converts, but I hope that I can at least explain the Government's thinking behind the inevitably unpopular decision to charge for a service that has previously not been charged for.
	In the first case, there is a simple issue of priorities. We believe that it is better to put the resources into the front line where there is higher priority than to subsidise individuals whom we believe are well able to pay the fees we are discussing, while accepting that we will waive those fees on a means-tested basis for those who are not able to pay.
	Our second argument relates to some of the international comparisons which we have looked at since then. I think it was suggested in an earlier debate that we were highly unusual in adopting this course. In fact it transpires that other countries do charge at similar rates for their administrative casework services. I am informed that every state in Australia, for example, charges administrative fees at varying rates and for different functions. New South Wales charges 2,270 Australian dollars, about £950, for a central administrative and casework service similar to the one that we are proposing, which is part of government fees totalling 9,700 dollars, or £4,100, on top of fees from other sources. Switzerland, Norway and Israel all have fees which include costs for adoption assessments and for administrative work akin to our casework process. Israel caps total fees at 20,000 US dollars, which is about £11,300.
	So I do not think that we are way out of line on international practice in what we are seeking to do.
	The Hague Convention allows reasonable fees to be charged for that work, which is precisely what we propose in this case. As we have said, in the context of approximate total cost to inter-country adoption, which ranged between £10,000 and £12,000, we do not think that it is unreasonable to make a fee of that kind so that resources can be directed to higher priority services.
	On the point raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, we see advice to social workers on domestic and international issues as fundamentally different from the support service that is provided directly to individuals. It is reasonable to split out those costs in the way that we propose.
	In Grand Committee, I made a point which I repeated today. We are very mindful of the need to see that the service reaches a higher standard before people are expected to pay for it. In Grand Committee, I indicated that we would expect applications for which we are in receipt of full and complete documentation to be processed within 12 to 14 weeks, which is significantly less than some of the periods that have been experienced recently, as we modernise the service and seek to bring administrative functions together in one place. We would be charging for a service that would be improving. I recognise that charging for any service which has previously been free will be regarded by some people as unreasonable. But in the context of priorities, international best practice and overall charges which inter-country adopters face, and the waiver that we will give for those on lower incomes, we believe that this is a reasonable step to take.

Earl Howe: My Lords, it would be disingenuous of me if I said that I was disappointed by that reply because I was not seriously hoping that the Minister would suddenly eat his words at this stage. However, I am very happy to thank him for throwing further light on the matter. I still maintain that it is an unfortunate signal to send to those who, with the best motives at heart, want to give a good and loving home to a deprived child from overseas and who will find themselves saddled with additional costs for all the trouble and expense that they already have to incur in setting about that task.
	Nevertheless, I have noted what the Minister has said. I hope that the exemptions about which he spoke will cut in at a reasonable point and that it will be readily apparent to those who are going through the process that those exemptions are potentially available. It is important that it is brought to their notice that if they are of limited means there could be a case for them to apply for dispensation on those grounds. It remains for me only to beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
	Clause 13 [Other amendments relating to adoptions from abroad]:

Baroness Barker: moved Amendment No. 32:
	Page 16, line 40, at end insert—
	"( ) In section 85 of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 (c. 38) (restriction on taking children out) in sub-section (2) after "paragraph (a)" insert—
	"(aa) the High Court has given leave for the child to leave the United Kingdom to be placed with the prospective adopters pending the issue of an application under section 84"."

Baroness Barker: My Lords, I find myself in the unenviable position, late at night when people are tired, of having to go through something quite technical at some length. I crave the indulgence of the House to do so. We discussed this matter in a very short period at the end of a day in Grand Committee. I am afraid that we did not do the subject anything like the justice that it should have had. It was a highly unsatisfactory discussion and outcome. So I have to return to the subject at some length.
	The issue concerns the adoption of children from this country in countries abroad. Frequently, they will be adoptions by relatives of the children. The Government's response in Committee was that this would be a deregulation too far. The noble Lord, Lord Adonis, accepted that the proposal in this amendment might appear burdensome to some individuals. Our case is that for many individuals it will not be burdensome, it will be impossible. A measure that is designed to protect children may have the effect that they cannot be placed with the most suitable adopters, who are often people with whom they have a relationship. Noble Lords will understand that this amendment seeks to give the courts the power to waive the period of 10 weeks' residence in this country with the people who are going to adopt the child.
	The Minister said that the period for the child to have lived with the adopter was being reduced from six months to 10 weeks. He described that as
	"a significant move in the direction that the noble Baroness wishes".—[Official Report, 17/10/05; col. GC 178.]
	That is misleading. Under the existing provisions of Section 55 of the Adoption Act 1976, the court cannot make an order unless the child has had his or her home with the prospective adopters for six months prior to the order. Under the 2002 Act, the 10-week period must have elapsed before the application can be commenced. Even if the court and all the parties act with the greatest possible speed, it is most unlikely that an order could be made in less than, say, three weeks after the issue of the application. In practice, it could be much longer. The move in the right direction may not be very significant.
	There are other changes that have an effect in this matter. Prior to June 2003, the restriction on taking a child out of this country for adoption did not apply if the child was to be adopted by a parent, guardian or relative, which was defined as including aunts, uncles and grandparents, but not great aunts or great uncles. Since that date, the amendment to the 1976 Act introduced by the Adoption and Children Act 2002 has removed the exemption in relation to adoption by relatives. The 2002 Act does allow for regulations to be made that would make exceptions for relatives, but none has been made.
	In addition, the 2002 Act has made a significant amendment to the Children Act 1989, which restricts the ability of a local authority that has a child in its care to obtain leave of the High Court to place the child outside England and Wales if the placement is to be for the purpose of adoption. That amendment will come into force with the rest of the 2002 Adoption Act on 30 December this year. It is somewhat illogical that the power exists for the court—any court, it could be a magistrate's court or a family proceedings court—to make an order permitting a local authority to place a child in its care outside the jurisdiction under paragraph 19 of Schedule 2 to the Children Act 1989, including overruling a parent's objection to such a course if the court is satisfied that the parent is unreasonable in refusing to consent, as long as, from 30 December when the Adoption and Children Act comes into force, the placement is not for the purpose of adoption.
	There are no specific requirements about the report that must be supplied to the court or about the nature of the supervision that it is proposed will be exercised once the child leaves the jurisdiction, although, in practice, the court will wish to be satisfied that the arrangements are going to be made. The court in such Children Act proceedings is required, as it will be in the proceedings under the Adoption and Children Act 2002, to regard the child's welfare as its paramount consideration. However, the court may, in those cases where a placement for adoption is proposed and it is impossible for the prospective adopters to comply with the residence requirements of Section 84 of the Adoption and Children Act, find itself unable to make the order that would, in its view, be the best one to promote the child's welfare.
	In Committee, the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, said that it was necessary to have regard for the fact that once a child was outside the United Kingdom, he or she would no longer have the protection of the authorities in this country. The same applies to children placed, with the leave of the court, outside the jurisdiction under the Children Act 1989.
	The noble Lord suggested that should the adoption not proceed as planned, we in the UK would not know whether it had occurred. That is a possibility. But the reason for suggesting in the amendment that this power should be exercisable only by the High Court underlines the importance of careful scrutiny that would be required before an order were made. In practice, in placements for the purpose of adoption, it is likely that careful assessments and inquiries would have been undertaken before an application was even made to the court and that there would be an even greater likelihood that it might be the case, say, if the child were placed with foster carers under the Children Act provisions, that the overseas authorities concerned would notify the UK authorities if for some reason the adoption did not proceed.
	The trial period required before an adoption order can be made has been put in place to enable the court, with the benefit of reports presented to it by the adoption agency, to satisfy itself that the child has settled in well with the new family. It presents a problem where the family does not live in the same country as the child. The solution we have adopted in England and Wales is that adopters who live in another country must be in this country for a trial period. That is a major drawback, particularly for relatives who live abroad and who may have jobs abroad. They may not have jobs at all but simply live abroad, but they are the only relatives of those children.
	The point of this amendment is to enable families living abroad who are going to adopt children to do so, when it has been determined that they are the best people. As the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, outlined the matter, adopters will have to move back to this country for a period, which may jeopardise their livelihoods and would not be in the best interests of children.
	I have taken a lot of time on the amendment, for which I apologise. I realise that these provisions apply to a very small number of children, but I do not think that I shall have an opportunity in the near future to raise their case again. All we ask is for the High Court to have the flexibility, in particular cases where it is satisfied that it is in the best interests of a child to be adopted abroad, to enable that to be done in a way which does not mean those prospective adoptive parents cannot meet our criteria. What matters is the welfare of the child when living with those adoptive parents. I cannot see why insisting that they be assessed for an extended period in this country will necessarily help the court to determine what happens. I beg to move.

Earl Howe: My Lords, I very much share the concerns expressed so well by the noble Baroness. In what may appear to be the rather arid terminology we are using in these amendments, it always helps to give a graphic example—I hope this is a graphic example. I have been advised of one case where a local authority wished to place a child with her aunt who lived in Spain, who was the child's only relative in the whole of Europe. The aunt and her husband already had three young children. The husband was employed in Spain and the two older children were at school there. So, in order to achieve an adoption placement with the aunt it would have been necessary for the aunt, her husband, and, in practice, the other children, to come and live in this country until an application could be made after the child had had her home with the family for 10 weeks. One has to ask where that home would have been—in some temporary lodging or other, very probably. How would that have been funded? Maybe by the local authority, but we do not know. Would the husband have lost his job? Probably, and the family would have been put in the position of being unable to support either this child or the other children.
	In another case, pending at the moment, a local authority wanted to place a small child with prospective adopters who have already adopted her two brothers. Since the earlier adoption orders were made, the family has moved permanently to the Republic of Ireland. To enable the placement to proceed, the family has contemplated the possibility of arranging for the parents to come to live in temporary accommodation in England for several months, leaving the older children with a relative in Ireland so that they can continue their schooling. Not only would that impose considerable hardship on those older children, but it would mean that there would be no opportunity to test how well the older children adjusted to the presence of the younger ones, or how well the parents would be able to look after the child when they had the older children to care for as well.
	The amendment proposed would introduce an element of flexibility to enable the court, where proper safeguards were in place, to make an order that would best meet the needs of the child concerned. The drawback of the Government's proposals, apart from the disruption to the lives of the prospective adopters, even assuming that they were able to comply, is that the observations of the agency on the development of the child's relationship with the prospective adopters are bound to take place in artificial surroundings. I suggest to the Minister that this is a matter to which the Government may agree to give some further thought.

Lord Adonis: My Lords, the principle on which we are acting in this matter is the same as that on which we have acted in every other matter that we have discussed in relation to the Bill, which is that the interests of the child should be paramount. Although the number of children about whom we are talking in this area is tiny—in the dozens per year—they nevertheless demand our full consideration, and I do not think that the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, need apologise in any way for taking up the time of the House in setting out her case.
	I could simply repeat the argument that I made in Grand Committee, that is, the Government's inclination in response to this amendment. However, since the noble Baroness has set out an extremely detailed case that considers a number of cases arising from the Acts of 1976 and 2002, and issues relating specifically to relatives of those people who have been adopted, the most constructive reply that I can make is that I will study with care what she has said in that regard. Without prejudice at all to that consideration, because I do not want to give a misleading impression from the Dispatch Box, I will consider what she has said and discuss it with my honourable friend Maria Eagle, who has policy responsibility for it. It may be that the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, Maria Eagle and I can meet to discuss the matter to see whether we can address some of the concerns that the noble Baroness has raised. I say that without prejudice, because our concern in this matter is to ensure that the interests of the child are protected.
	It is a requirement of the 2002 Act that before applications can be made for orders under Section 84, the prospective adopters and the children must have shared their home for 10 weeks. That is an absolute requirement under the Act and one that seems to us eminently reasonable in relation to issues concerning child protection. We should need to be convinced that any change, even in respect of relatives, gave us absolutely robust protection in cases where children had been taken out of the jurisdiction and concerns were then raised at a later stage.
	With the important rider that I cannot give any undertaking that we will change our policy, I will look at this matter further, I will draw it to the attention of my honourable friend and I will consider whether we can meet some of the noble Baroness's concerns.

Baroness Barker: My Lords, I thank the Minister for his reply. I also thank the noble Earl, Lord Howe, for humanising a very technical matter.
	I thank the Minister, but he will understand that on this side of the House, we have absolutely no intention of setting up loopholes and enabling people to find their way around child protection. We are simply endeavouring to find a way around the problem when it has been broadly determined that the best interests of a child are served by being with a particular person and that person is not resident in this country. It applies to only a small number of children, although I suspect that the number of children who come into this category may increase as people become more mobile and cross borders to live in different places. I welcome the Minister's suggestion that we may meet his counterpart in another place to take this matter forward. With that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Earl Howe: moved Amendment No. 33:
	Before Clause 14, insert the following new clause—
	"REGISTRATION OF PRIVATE FOSTER PARENTS
	For section 69 of the Children Act 1989 (power to prohibit private fostering) substitute—
	"69 REGISTRATION OF PRIVATE FOSTER PARENTS
	(1) Every local authority shall keep a register of persons who act as private foster parents within their area.
	(2) A local authority shall not register any person as a private foster parent unless it is satisfied that he is fit to act as a private foster parent.
	(3) The Secretary of State shall by regulations make provisions as to the considerations to which a local authority is to have regard in reaching a decision as to whether to register a person as a private foster parent.
	(4) A local authority shall cancel the registration of any person under subsection (1) if—
	(a) it appears to them that the circumstances of the case are such that they would be justified in refusing to register that person as a private foster parent;
	(b) the care provided by that person for any privately fostered child is, in the opinion of the authority, inadequate having regard to the needs of that child; or
	(c) the premises in which any privately fostered child is or would be accommodated are not suitable for that purpose.
	(5) No person shall act as a private foster parent unless he is registered under subsection (1).
	(6) A person who contravenes subsection (5) shall be guilty of an offence.
	(7) A person guilty of an offence under subsection (6) shall be liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months, or to a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale, or to both.
	(8) A person aggrieved by the refusal of a local authority to register him as a private foster parent may appeal to the court in accordance with paragraph 8 of Schedule 8 to this Act.""

Earl Howe: My Lords, Amendment No. 33 returns briefly to an issue which we have debated a number of times over the past three or four years, most recently during the passage of the Children Act 2004. The issue is private fostering.
	This Bill quite properly tightens up the current legal provisions relating to inter-country adoptions, and it does so with the purpose of protecting vulnerable children from exploitation. But there is another group of children whom one could argue were equally vulnerable to children adopted from abroad; namely, children who are the subject of private fostering arrangements. It seems to us that anyone who wanted to get round the procedures associated with inter-country adoption could opt instead for private fostering, where the regulations are, to put it mildly, a great deal looser. That is the justification for our having tabled this amendment.
	The numbers of children who are privately fostered are probably considerable. The best estimates are that about 10,000 children in England and Wales are fostered privately and some studies mention as many as 15,000. Between 80 and 90 per cent of them come from West Africa. At the moment, private foster carers are required only to notify local authorities of the arrangements that they have made: in other words it is up to private fosterers to own up. That is not the kind of process which is likely to expose to the daylight those foster parents who may pose a danger to children. When serious problems occur it is often too late. There is a tighter alternative to notification, which is to make all private fosterers subject to registration. That is the alternative which we have consistently proposed to the Government on a number of occasions and which they have, with equal consistency, rejected at least in practice although there is provision in the Children Act to go ahead if the Government believe that that is right.
	We all acknowledge that a registration scheme would be more bureaucratic than simple notification, but it would also have a number of advantages. One of them would be that local authorities would be able to bring a private fostering arrangement to an end if they thought that it was undesirable. They cannot do that at the moment, or at least not without a great deal of difficulty. Another advantage would be to ensure that private fosterers were approved in advance as being suitable. People often object that this is none of anybody's business if the arrangement is purely private. But with the tragedy of Victoria Climbié still fresh in our minds, my own view is that many of these arrangements should be vetted in advance; and at the very least the child's individual needs should be assessed and provided for. Notifying yourself as a foster carer is not at all the same thing as being approved, but in the minds of birth parents overseas, it can look like the same thing, and that can lead to a false sense of security.
	I should be grateful if the Minister could take this opportunity to say how the Government's thinking has developed since we debated the issue last year. What have been the results of the enhanced notification system thus far? What criteria are they using to decide whether the current system is or is not satisfactory? The last time that the Government collected figures in this area was 1991, so the up-to-date statistics will be quite revealing—perhaps in a way that may not be fully anticipated. I beg to move.

Baroness Barker: My Lords, I do not know whether the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, is aware of this but I believe that he is the third Minister who has been at the crease since the noble Earl, Lord Howe, and I raised this subject. The noble Earl and I take it in turn to go into battle on this issue, and today he has been the equivalent of Freddie Flintoff and I shall be the spinner.
	Has the Minister had an opportunity to read the recent report on the work done by BAAF, in consultation with the Voice newspaper? That paper for the first time did a large survey among its readership about private fostering—and a very revealing document it is too. It has long been known, since the publication of the report People Like Us, that there are different communities within this country in which private fostering is more prevalent and more the usual custom, partly because of the traditions in the parents' country of origin. They are very honourable traditions in which extended families, friends and relatives look after children.
	On the last occasion that we discussed this subject, the noble Baroness, Lady Ashton, was keen to impress on us that some local authorities had pilot schemes in which the local authority had employed officers to work with particular communities and potential private fosterers. Could the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, tell the House what has happened in those pilot areas and what the results of those schemes have been? That was the Government's principal reason for resisting the reasonable and persuasive case set out by the noble Earl, Lord Howe, to move towards a more rigorous system of registration.
	Finally, we are talking not only about the case of Victoria Climbié—there are many other cases of children in such situations, such as Toni-Ann Byfield and others—when the understanding of parents who live abroad of the systems of childcare at work in this country has been perhaps in part a contributory factor in those children being put into situations of great danger—situations which we would not allow to happen if they were any other child. On these Benches, it is our contention that until such time as private fostering is registered, we run the risk of leaving these extremely vulnerable children—perhaps some of the most vulnerable—in danger. So I am very pleased to support the noble Earl, Lord Howe, again on this matter.

The Earl of Listowel: My Lords, I thank the noble Earl, Lord Howe, and the noble Baroness, Lady Morris of Bolton, for tabling these amendments. Could the Minister say how successful the Government have been in their proposals that a social worker should visit privately fostered families to check on them every six weeks for the first year? Is he aware that in the consultation by the Children's Rights Director, Dr Roger Morgan, based at the Commission for Social Care Inspection, children said that social services should definitely check to make sure that privately fostered children are safe, and that one of the best ways in which to do that was to have a social worker to visit? The majority of children said that they should visit once every month rather than every six weeks. Perhaps the Minister could write to me to let me know how successful and consistent these visits are, as far as he can find out. When will he report on the adequacy of current arrangements? This is in line with the questions the noble Earl, Lord Howe, asked.
	I look forward to the Minister's response, but I suppose he will also recognise the relevance of concerns about social worker recruitment, particularly the fact that there is currently a 20 per cent vacancy rate in London. Our concerns about monitoring these placements must be reinforced, given the concerns about the workforce availability to keep an eye on these children in these vulnerable situations.

Lord Adonis: My Lords, I am new to these debates, which seem to take place regularly in your Lordships' House. I am not sure whether they always take place during Test matches, because I have read the last debates, and the noble Baroness's remarks in introducing amendments similar to the one moved by the noble Earl this evening always seem to begin with cricketing metaphors. Indeed, she started almost word for word in the same way last year as she did this year. At least I am not in the position of having to repeat myself.

Baroness Barker: Yes, my Lords, but since the last time we have won the Ashes.

Lord Adonis: My Lords, I will not follow that up by saying that this will be a second triumph in that line.
	Our concern on this amendment is straightforward. The House debated this at some length last time. A significant change was made in the notification scheme that was enacted by the Children Act. The new regime set out in the Children Act has only just come into force. It did so on 1 July this year, as did the regulations to implement it.
	The sunset clause, as I believe it is called, which my noble friend Lady Ashton talked about at great length in the last debate, expires in 2008, so the requirement to undertake the assessment the noble Earl referred to is something we take seriously. We will do so during the lifetime of this clause. Since the arrangements have only just come into effect, however, it would be too soon at the moment to seek to replace one set of arrangements, to which local authorities are now working and seeking to upgrade their services to meet, with another. However, the Bill does give the Government the power, if they believe it necessary on their evaluation of the progress of the new notification system, to bring in an enhanced system if they believe this would be in the public interest.
	I shall deal with the two specific points that have been raised. I am told that the first statistics from the new monitoring arrangements will be available at the end of this month. I will see that they are made available to all noble Lords who are participating in this debate so they can add some factual basis to our discussions. With regard to the pilots, I am told by my officials that they are not pilots as such, but:
	"proactive schemes for engaging with private fosterers",
	which is somewhat different, because we want to see all local authorities move rapidly to a greatly enhanced service in respect of notification. I cannot give details of how those schemes are working at the moment, but I will write to noble Lords to give them that information when we have gathered it.
	The case I make is therefore similar to the case that was made last year, but with the added force that we have legislated for a new arrangement that has just taken effect. We do not believe that to replace the one with the other at this stage would be a well-founded move. The new notification scheme offers a robust framework of safeguards. In particular, the new regulations that came into effect on 1 July require local authorities to satisfy themselves of the suitability of a proposed arrangement before it commences, where advance notice has been given to them. Previously there was no requirement for the local authority to take action prior to the commencement of an arrangement. Local authorities can now exercise their powers to impose conditions upon, or prohibit, a proposed arrangement before it begins. There are corresponding new obligations on local authorities to promote awareness within their areas of the need to notify them of private fostering arrangements. Local authorities are required to monitor closely the operation of notification schemes in their respective areas, and they are now under a duty to appoint an officer for this purpose.
	Our objective is to encourage parents and private foster carers to come forward so that local authorities can fulfil their Children Act duty to satisfy themselves that the welfare of privately-fostered children is satisfactorily safeguarded and promoted. We believe the new arrangements set out in the Children Act, and in the regulations that have just come into force, will ensure that we have the additional powers as set out under the Act. We have a requirement to assess progress against criteria that we will develop, and we have a sunset clause that means this must all take place within the next three years. On that basis, we do not believe the time has come to change the law just a year after it was last changed. I know there are still strongly held views on this matter, but I hope that the amendment can be withdrawn at this stage.

Earl Howe: My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for that reply and to the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, and the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, for their supportive comments. We shall await the publication of the statistics with considerable interest and watch the progress of the enhanced notification scheme with equal interest. While I take the Minister's point that the amendment is perhaps not entirely appropriate for this Bill, I hope that he will take on board the numerical point that I made: that the sheer number of children in private fostering arrangements whom we believe we are considering—of course, no one knows the precise number—dwarfs the number of inter-country adoptions. On that level, at least, the potential problems thrown up by private fostering are greatly magnified in comparison. In view of the time, it falls to me, with thanks to the Minister, to beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
	In the Title:

Baroness Thornton: moved Amendment No. 34:
	Line 2, after "orders;" insert "to make provision about risk assessments;"
	On Question, amendment agreed to.
	House adjourned at twelve minutes past ten o'clock.
	Monday, 14 November 2005.